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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nothing exposes the gaping disconnect between the theory of war and the practice of war as 
much as the killing of civilians.  Historically, ‘just war’ and other cultural traditions have 
proscribed the targeting of noncombatants, and in the post-1945 era these normative 
considerations have become increasingly embedded in international legal regimes and 
national military doctrines. Targeting civilians is also conventionally seen as strategically 
counterproductive, as it may strengthen an opponent’s resistance whilst not sufficiently 
detracting from its military capabilities. In theory, then, civilian deaths in warfare should 
remain minimal. 
 
In practice, civilians are routinely killed in large numbers.  It is estimated that in the past three 
centuries the proportion of civilian deaths in warfare has averaged from 50 to 64 percent; in 
the twentieth century alone this totalled 50 million civilian deaths.1 Civilians suffer even more 
disproportionately in civil wars, where a staggering 69 percent of deaths are noncombatants.2  
In short, normative values and strategic theory provide rather flimsy protection for civilians 
caught in the terrible reality of modern war. 
 
The prevalence of civilian victimisation in contemporary warfare is often attributed to an 
increase in frequency of these particularly brutal intrastate wars, in which non-state forces 
that lie outside the boundaries of international law and state-based norms utilise strategies of 
civilian victimisation rather than direct military engagement.3  Explanations such as these may 
be generally insightful, but for the most part they fail to account for why non-state forces 
engage in behaviour that is not only strategically risky but in opposition to nearly universal 
norms. 
 
This dissertation grapples directly with this question, whilst also examining the strategic effects 
of this particular aspect of non-state-actor behaviour. In contrast to the common 
characterisation of civilian victimisation as irrational and purposeless violence, this dissertation 
focuses on the instrumentality of targeting civilians in warfare – in other words, the deliberate 
                                                                 
1
 Estimates from Eckhardt (1989), 89-98. 
2
 Ibid. The oft-quoted claim that 90 per cent of civil war deaths are non-combatants has been largely debunked; see 
Center on International Cooperation (2011), 28. 
3
 This argument is well summarised and critiqued in Newman (2004). On the association of barbarism with civil war, 
see Kalyvas (2006), 52-55. 
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use of violence against civilians as a means of achieving political and strategic objectives.  It 
argues that non-state forces face an array of normative, strategic and criminal incentives to 
engage in either civilian victimisation or restraint, and may vacillate between them within a 
given conflict.  Their choice of targeting has definitive strategic consequences, most 
immediately within the dynamics of the conflict itself but also within the long-term strategic 
landscape of a post-conflict state.   
 
This dissertation applies an analytical framework known as the strategic approach to civilian 
victimisation and its consequences, by examining the links between an actor’s incentives, its 
strategic choices, and the outcomes it experiences. In doing so, it departs from other models 
of conflict analysis in two ways. First, it adopts a timeframe that extends well beyond the 
cessation of hostilities: the outcomes under examination include not only the short-term 
results of war-fighting but the long-term consequences for security and stability of the state. 
Second, it argues that the common distinction between ‘political’ and ‘criminal’ non-state 
forces is analytically suspect and serves to obscure the totality of civilian victimisation in a 
given conflict. Political and criminal violence usually operate synergistically in conflict scenarios 
and there are distinct advantages to considering the multiple aims and levels of behaviour of a 
particular armed group.  
 
These theoretical arguments and assumptions are brought to life via an in-depth examination 
of the Tajik civil war and the victimisation of civilians by the Popular Front of Tajikistan. Using 
the strategic approach, this dissertation seeks to answer one central research question: how 
and why did the Popular Front of Tajikistan engage in civilian victimisation, and what were the 
strategic effects in the near and long term? By providing an analytically rigorous answer to this 
question, this dissertation enhances our understanding and analysis of the Tajik civil war and 
suggests possible new avenues of research into the perplexing dynamics of modern civilian 
victimisation. 
 
This dissertation therefore contributes to strategic studies generally (and the literature on 
intrastate conflict dynamics specifically) by providing a case study of a little-examined conflict 
actor and suggesting a framework for evaluating the drivers and effects of civilian victimisation 
in the short and long term. By engaging with literature and evidence from across the fields of 
strategic studies, the political economy of conflict, and constructivist analysis, it offers a new 
way of investigating the vexing question of why war-fighting forces target civilians and the full 
range of strategic effects that may be expected. The case study also contributes to the field 
empirically by providing a significantly expanded strategic history of the Tajik civil war. Finally, 
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by demonstrating how a set of criminal warlords became the most powerful political and 
strategic actors in the nation – largely due to a strategy of civilian victimisation – this 
dissertation challenges several important assumptions regarding the utility of targeting 
civilians and the capabilities and motivations of criminal actors.  
 
In this introductory chapter, I present the Tajik case study’s rationale and scope of inquiry, 
followed by an in-depth explanation of the dissertation’s research methodology and structure. 
I conclude with a review of the relevant literature across several fields of study. 
 
 
1.1  Case Study Summary and Rationale: The Tajik Civil War and the Popular  
        Front of Tajikistan 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s provoked widespread speculation 
that a host of conflicts would erupt within its fragile and unstable successor states.  In Central 
Asia this alarm proved to be unwarranted, except in one instance: Tajikistan, which endured a 
brutal and devastating civil war from 1992 to 1997.  The conflict was well summarised by 
Barnett Rubin thusly: 
 
The attempt by political forces excluded from the communist system of power to 
democratise this weak state soon degenerated into an inchoate, brutal civil war. 
As institutions broke down, an insecure population increasingly fell back on 
whatever resources it could find for collective action and self-defence, namely 
armed struggle based on ethnic and clan affiliations and aid from whatever 
external sources were willing to give it. The resulting disorder resembled 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia or Liberia, and the human disaster it produced 




Overshadowed by more proximate and seemingly more relevant conflicts in the Balkans and 
West Africa, the Tajik war drew little extra-regional attention despite claiming 50,000 to 
100,000 lives, displacing hundreds of thousands of people, and sparking serious cross-border 
crises with neighbouring Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.  Yet it warrants serious examination to 
this day, for two reasons. First, although the war was formally resolved in 1997 following an 
exhaustive peace process, the devastating political, economic and humanitarian consequences 
of the conflict linger.  Tajikistan remains one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the 
                                                                 
4
 Rubin (1993), 71. 
 13 
world, straddling an immense narco-trafficking route out of Afghanistan that inhibits the 
foundations of good governance and economic development. The Tajik population endures 
severe unemployment and economic deprivation, political repression, and ongoing social 
tensions that were unaddressed within the political reconciliation process.  Thus, a more 
comprehensive analysis of the events and impact of the civil war contributes to the continuing 
efforts to stabilise and reconstruct a geostrategically important state. 
 
Second, there is a growing awareness that contemporary counterinsurgency campaigns and 
interventions would benefit from conflict analysis that goes beyond the classic insurgencies of 
the Cold War and decolonisation eras and looks for insights from the complex intrastate 
conflicts of the 1990s.5 The Tajik war possessed a number of characteristics that make it 
relevant to today’s ongoing conflicts, including:   
 
• Irregular, intrastate warfare to which external and neighbouring states 
contributed arms, sanctuaries and other resources 
• The presence of multiple actors and factions, requiring non-dyadic 
strategies 
• War-fighting dominated by militias and non-state actors, including powerful 
criminal groups 
• Overlapping regional, ethnic and religious aims and institutions 
• The use of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and civilian victimisation as military strategies 
• Post-conflict strategies of militia and warlord incorporation, leading to 
negative security and governance outcomes 
 
The outbreak of civil war so soon after independence created a relatively unusual conflict 
dynamic in which the regime did not possess a state armed force to confront its challengers 
and thus had to rely upon non-state militias.6 Thus, the Tajik civil war offers an array of non-
state armed forces which could be examined within the remit of this dissertation, as atrocities 
were committed by all parties to the conflict. The rationale for focusing on the pro-
government Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT) is largely a methodological one: there is 
marginally more data available on PFT activities and its leadership, many of whom assumed 
prominent roles in the post-war political sphere. 
 
                                                                 
5
 On the utility of examining intrastate wars of the 1990s for counterinsurgency strategy today, see Metz (2007).  
6
 Kalyvas refers to civil wars with no state armed force as ‘symmetric non-conventional wars’. Another notable 
example is the Liberian civil war (1987-2003). Kalyvas (2005), 92. 
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The PFT was founded and led primarily by Sangak Safarov, a notorious crime boss in the 
southern region of Kulyab who had spent more than twenty years in prison for crimes ranging 
from extortion to murder. Yet within months of the outbreak of war in 1992, he became one of 
the most powerful men in Tajikistan, with the political leverage to engineer a Kulyabi takeover 
of the government, negotiate with Russian and Uzbek officials, and dictate strategies for 
dealing with opposition forces and refugees. 
 
How did this common thug become a kingmaker and nationally feared warlord? I argue that 
his rapid acquisition of power and influence stemmed in large part from his ruthless campaigns 
against civilians in Dushanbe and southern Tajikistan. To be sure, it was not the sole 
determinant – after all, all parties to the conflict targeted civilians, and the outcome of the war 
also hinged on the superior weaponry and military capabilities that the PFT acquired in the 
autumn of 1992. But the ultimate success of the PFT’s strategic choices could not have 
occurred had the strategic decision to target civilians not been taken. In other words, civilian 
victimisation was a necessary (if not sufficient) factor in the PFT victory. Whilst it is often 
theorised that targeting civilians is counterproductive in war (as discussed in Section 1.4) this 
was clearly not the case for the PFT. Thus, this case study contributes to a growing 
understanding of the diversity of outcomes for the perpetrators of civilian victimisation. 
 
The PFT was formally disbanded a year into the conflict (March 1993) but many of its field 
commanders and members continued to operate as conflict actors over the following four 
years. Thus, whilst the case study focuses on the PFT as a unitary actor only for the first year of 
the war, it continues to trace the activities and impact of PFT members throughout the course 
of the conflict. 
 
 
1.2  Definitions and Scope of Inquiry 
In examining civilian victimisation by the PFT during the Tajik civil war, this dissertation 
engages with a number of conceptual elements that lack consistent and enduring definitions. 
The decision to utilise particular interpretations or definitions has been informed by current 
scholarly consensus, trends in contemporary analytical thinking, and a cross-disciplinary 
approach to the question at hand. 
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First, the type of actor that this dissertation focuses upon – the non-state actor – is subject to 
varying definitions depending on analytical context and field of study. Within security studies, 
and within a context of intrastate conflict, non-state actors generally refer to armed groups, 
distinct from the state, which engage in violence for the purpose of political, religious or other 
objectives.7 It is not uncommon to find reference in the literature to armed non-state actors or 
violent non-state actors, but the sole context of intrastate war addressed in this dissertation 
obviates the need for such distinctions here (generally, non-violent non-state actors in 
intrastate wars are referred to as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or civil society 
actors). The defining attributes of non-state actors are not fixed; today, for example, the 
traditional notion that non-state actors automatically possess less legitimacy and authority 
than states is challenged by new ways of looking at sub-state governance.8 For the purposes of 
this dissertation, the key definitional features of a non-state actor are: 1) its acquisition of a 
unit-level identity distinct from state actors; 2) its collective use of violence; and 3) its 
formulation of some kind of conflict-related objective, however broad and loosely defined at 
the individual level. 
 
In a context of civil war and contested legitimacy – especially a civil war such as Tajikistan’s, 
which did not feature a state armed force in its decisive stages – it is especially important to 
consider carefully the application of the term ‘non-state actor’. Often, the label is more or less 
reflexively applied to any armed group other than the professional state armed forces – but in 
conditions of state breakdown and near anarchy, does the state/non-state dichotomy still hold 
true? If an armed group acquires governance functions in a defined territory, is it still a 
thoroughly non-state actor? What ambiguity is attached to the term when armed groups 
receive considerable support from state actors, domestically or externally? 
 
In the case of Tajikistan, however, I argue that the state did not disintegrate to such an extent 
or for such a length of time that the state/non-state dichotomy cannot be applied to the PFT. 
The central government in Dushanbe, while weak, volatile and contested, maintained a 
minimal continuity of existence even during the height of the conflict, after which it gradually 
succeeded in reimposing its authority on most of the country. The PFT did receive considerable 
support from domestic and external state actors (as is common for non-state conflict actors) 
but operated autonomously within Tajikistan and for its own purposes, thus further earning 
the ‘non-state’ label. 
                                                                 
7
 See, for example, Bartolomei, et al. (2004); Bellal, et al. (2011), 48. Whilst in-depth explorations of the concept of 
‘non-state actor’ are common in the broader field of international relations (where it has a more complicated 
history), security scholars tend to focus on defining specific non-state species (e.g., terrorists, insurgents) rather 
than the category as a whole. 
8
 Menkhaus (2010); Heuser (2012). 
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Second, definitions of civilian victimisation (also referred to as civilian targeting) tend to be 
state-based. One of the most commonly used definitions, for example, is ‘a government-
sanctioned military strategy that intentionally targets and kills noncombatants or involves 
operations that will predictably kill large numbers of noncombatants’.9 Removing the 
‘government-sanctioned’ modifier, however, leaves a definition of civilian victimisation that 
remains useful for the purposes of this dissertation. 
 
The second element of this definition – ‘operations that will predictably kill’ – is critical for the 
approach taken here. Non-state armed forces typically do not operate under coherent military 
doctrines or in conformance with international humanitarian law. Their war-fighting tends to 
rely on indirect military strategies and the fomenting of instability and unrest, all of which 
predictably victimise civilians even if this is not the sole or primary purpose of the group’s acts. 
Thus, I concur with the approach taken by Alexander Downes and Benjamin Valentino (two 
leading scholars of victimisation) in utilising a fairly broad definition of civilian victimisation 
that includes not only massacres, ethnic cleansing, mass displacement and sieges, but any use 
of indiscriminate force or coercion that might predictably lead to civilian suffering (for 
example, seizing the assets of a collective farm, which would predictably leave its residents 
with no food or livelihoods).10 The subset of victimisation limited to direct violence against 
civilians – including ‘rape, mutilations, torture and killing’ – may be more specifically 
categorised as atrocities.11 While this direct violence tends to be more visible and receive more 
attention, I argue that an in-depth analysis of the functions and outcomes of victimisation 
requires a broader consideration of the full scope of civilian suffering (as explicated in Chapter 
4). 
 
The concept of civilian victimisation is also complicated by the fact that ‘civilian’ is a normative 
construct subject to varying interpretations across time and culture (norms being defined here 
as ‘collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity’).12 This 
dissertation uses the ‘negative definition’ of civilian offered in Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions: ‘the civilian population is made up of persons who are not members of 
the armed forces’.13  Article 50 explains the use of a negative definition as both necessary 
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 Downes (2008), 14. 
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International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977: Article 50, Paragraph 1. Accessed 10 October 2007 at: 
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given the widely varying interpretations of ‘civilian’, and the best possibility for precision given 
the consensus opinion on what constitutes a member of an armed force.  
 
This definitional problem is further complicated in intrastate warfare, however, due to the 
blurring of the combatant/noncombatant distinction under conditions of irregular warfare (as 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Non-state armed groups usually pursue the strategic 
advantage of embedding themselves within the legally protected civilian population. By 
making distinction difficult for the state actor, non-state armed groups protect themselves 
from the direct use of force while also luring the state into the strategically risky strategy of 
indiscriminate warfare.14 In addition, civilian involvement in non-state violence – whether 
voluntary or coerced – includes a wide range of activities, from supplying food, sanctuary and 
intelligence to participating in violent actions on an occasional basis.15 The temporary and/or 
limited nature of these activities lends further ambiguity to the usual process of distinction. 
However, in the case of the Tajik civil war, these definitional issues are not a substantial 
problem for the purposes of postwar analysis. The widespread use of pre-existing solidarity 
groups (including well-known security forces and mafia gangs) and the fact that only 
combatants were likely to be armed – there was an extremely low rate of gun ownership in 
Tajikistan prior to the war, and the small arms that were rapidly disbursed at the beginning of 
the conflict ended up with organised militias on both sides16 – served as additional proxy 
variables for distinction during armed conflict, and thus ameliorated some of the ambiguity 
concerns usually present in civil wars. In short, the concept of ‘civilian victimisation’ can be 
confidently deployed in analysis of the Tajik war, albeit with careful consideration of its 
normative aspects. 
 
Third, the specific war considered within this dissertation’s case study – the Tajik civil war – is 
here presumed to stretch from the outbreak of sustained military activities in June 1992 to the 
formal acceptance of the peace accords in June 1997.  One key element of ambiguity within 
the conflict is the fact that no one can say with any certainty how many fatalities it produced. 
Estimates range from 25,000 (which the scholar Muriel Atkin calls ‘implausibly low’) to 
100,000, with most accounts presenting a range of 50,000 to 60,000.17 Estimates of internally 
displaced persons and refugees range from 500,000 to 1,000,000.18 Variance in these 
estimates is the inevitable result of a brutal conflict in which atrocities were not recorded or 
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 Walzer (1977), 176-87; Kalyvas (2006). 
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reported, victims were quickly buried (in line with local traditions) or simply disappeared, there 
were no post-war mechanisms to account for the dead, and refugees were not systematically 
counted or tracked.19 I have reflected the general consensus in the literature in settling upon 
50,000 dead as the most probable estimate for war-time fatalities. 
 
Examining the Tajik war also requires grappling with the difficulties of consistently 
transliterating place and proper names. Historically, names were transliterated from Tajik into 
Russian, and then into English, although more recently scholars and journalists have made a 
practice of transliterating directly from Tajik to English.20 In addition, place names were 
frequently changed throughout the Soviet sphere, and again with the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. As a result of these two factors, a single city in Tajikistan might be represented in the 
literature by a dozen different forms. I have followed the example of scholars, such as Shirin 
Akiner, who favour the cause of clarity over rigid consistency and use the most common or 
familiar variations of Tajik place and proper names.21 In addition, to minimise confusion 
between quoted material from the historical record and the textual analysis of the case study, 
in many cases the spellings in use during the civil war period are employed rather than 
contemporary variations (most notably, today’s ‘Kulob’ and ‘Qurghonteppa’ are rendered in 
their 1992 spellings: ‘Kulyab’ and ‘Kurgan-Tyube’).22  
 
Fourth, in discussing the PFT and other non-state forces, the dissertation refers to criminal 
actors – yet ‘criminal’ is a normative term whose use should be carefully considered rather 
than automatically applied (especially given the tendency of state actors to criminalise non-
state rivals in order to delegitimise them23). Ideas of what constitutes criminality vary not only 
across cultures and societies but across historical and political epochs; the robust literature on 
‘state formation as organised crime’ attests to the highly normative and evolving character of 
criminality (as well as the concepts of legitimacy and governance).24 Notions of criminality in 
warfare are further fraught with definitional problems, as acts that would be considered 
criminal in peacetime undergo a form of ‘norm-stretching’ during war that renders them more 
acceptable as ‘coping mechanisms’ necessary for survival.25 For example, many civilians must 
rely on smuggling, theft and the black market to survive during prolonged sieges or occupation 
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– yet few would consider them criminals for doing so. Thus, I have relied less upon legal 
definitions of crime than upon political economy and constructivist approaches, which more 
accurately capture the environment of a society where law and order has broken down or 
been corrupted.  
 
Nevertheless, adopting a more flexible approach toward the concept of crime does not 
necessarily negate one’s ability to judge whether a particular group can be termed criminal. In 
the case of the PFT, for example, many of its leaders and members were criminals (in the most 
legal sense of the word) before the outbreak of war, having served prison sentences; and their 
behaviour during the war included acts that violated not only pre-war laws but traditional 
social norms, such as theft and extortion.26 It should be noted that the norm-stretching that 
occurs during most conflicts does not erase the notion of crime, but rather generates more 
forgiving interpretations when it is engaged in for the purposes of survival (at the individual or 
collective level) rather than profit. It is true that in states with extremely long conflict periods, 
such as Afghanistan, where a deep and complex war economy has been established, the 
distinction between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ becomes significantly problematic.27 But the period of 
state breakdown in Tajikistan was relatively short and non-pervasive; laws did not disappear 
entirely, but were unenforced in certain areas for a set period of time (especially in its later 
stages, the dominant paradigm for the Tajik war was not anarchy but impunity).  In short, a 
reluctance to define a group solely by its criminal characteristics (and thus neglect its political 
and strategic character) does not necessitate the denial of its criminal activities and 
membership, despite the potential normative hazards. 
 
Finally, in extrapolating insights about modern warfare from the case of the PFT, the 
dissertation uses the term intrastate war, defined here as sustained military conflict between 
two or more forces within the boundaries of a sovereign state.28 I further use the high-fatality-
threshold definition of war as sustained military conflict – namely, at least 1,000 annual 
deaths.29 This is intended to help emphasise that any conclusions within this dissertation 
regarding non-state armed forces are intended to apply only to non-state actors operating in 
conditions of intrastate war, and not sub-war conditions of political violence. For example, the 
broader insights and framework developed in this dissertation will not generally apply to 
actors who engage solely in terrorist activities – as, by definition, such actions are aimed 
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primarily at civilian targets.30 This is not to say that war-fighting forces do not make use of 
terrorism, but they also engage in armed combat and thus confront a range of targets with a 
higher degree of military utility than the often symbolic targets chosen by terrorist groups.31 In 
other words, the ‘target landscape’ for war-fighting forces is not quite the same as that for 
terrorist groups, and thus an attempt to trace targeting choices and their consequences is 
better served by considering these types of forces separately (although it can be expected that 
insights relevant to one type may prove adaptable to the other to some degree). 
 
 
1.3  Research Approach and Methodology 
This dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of civilian victimisation by non-
state armed forces via an in-depth examination of the Tajik civil war. Interrogating such a 
complex and under-explored case requires a theoretical framework capable of organising and 
accommodating a large array of actors and outcomes, whilst adhering to broader assumptions 
of instrumentality and multivariate drivers. Thus, I have utilised the strategic approach to 
construct a comprehensive case study of the civil war and an explanatory model for civilian 
victimisation by one of its prominent non-state participants. As this dissertation aims to be 
explanatory, not just descriptive, and as the actual motivations of the PFT are opaque and their 
strategic effects so complex, the strategic approach helps immeasurably in providing likely 
drivers and organising the effects. It also helps organise the conclusions from this case study 
into a form that could potentially be applied to other conflicts, for maximum translatability. In 
short, this combination of case study and explanatory model is, I believe, the most effective 
way of contributing significant information and insights in the service of the overall research 
aim. 
 
1.3.1  Key Elements and Assumptions of the Strategic Approach  
This dissertation utilises the strategic approach to analyse the drivers of civilian victimisation 
by a non-state armed force, and then trace this strategic choice to its short and long-term 
consequences. As conceptualised by scholars such as M.L.R. Smith and Peter Neumann, the 
strategic approach encompasses several key principles that render it useful for this 
dissertation’s objectives: 
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• Its primary unit of analysis is the behaviour of conflict actors, and it lacks theoretical 
impediments to the analysis of non-state actors.  
• It does not depend on a single or narrow definition of strategy, but broadly focuses 
on an actor’s efforts to correlate means and ends.32  
• It presumes the collective use of force to be instrumental, in that it is purposefully 
employed to attain political objectives. 
• It assumes conflict actors are rational, in that they engage in some form of cost-
benefit calculation and choose what they believe to be the optimal means of 
achieving their aims.  
• It encourages concomitant yet separate analysis of an actor and its environment, 
thus enabling a broader and potentially multivariate explication of strategic choices. 
 
In short, the strategic approach offers a framework that is flexible enough to accommodate 
non-state actors and non-conventional conflict, whilst maintaining the key principles of 
strategic theory and thus anchoring analysis within a long-developed intellectual tradition. As 
Smith explains: 
 
The essence of the strategic approach is simply to trace the line of thinking 
of a particular political entity in order to comprehend how it proposes to 
achieve its objectives; and also to look at the ideological assumptions and 
values that underlie that entity’s thinking and how this informs the way it 
formulates its strategy. Like most analytical frameworks, strategic theory 
offers a way of reducing an amorphous mass to manageable proportions 





One of the greatest advantages of the strategic approach is that it enables analysis of an 
actor’s normative and cultural influences whilst acknowledging the important mediating role 
of the strategic environment.34 This is critical because existing approaches to the question of 
civilian victimisation tend to privilege either normative or strategic influences upon an actor’s 
targeting decisions – even though an examination of the empirical evidence across a number 
of cases suggests that conflict actors themselves are not bound by such strictures, and that it is 
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the interplay of multiple variables that affects their behaviour toward civilians. By 
disaggregating actors from their environment, and considering each in turn, the strategic 
approach highlights the effects of an actor’s values and ‘preference structure’ on its strategic 
choices and on eventual outcomes.35 Yet unlike some strictly culturalist models, the strategic 
approach does not neglect the role of the strategic environment in determining the actions 
and information available to an actor. Thus, this dissertation situates itself within a small but 
emerging field of analyses that draw upon both ideational and rationalist approaches within 
strategic studies.36  
 
However, I have expanded the typical application of the strategic approach in two ways. First, I 
have expanded the usual timeframe under consideration, examining not just the short-term 
outcomes of targeting decisions but long-term strategic effects after the conclusion of a 
conflict. Second, I have added ‘criminal’ incentives and effects to the normative and strategic 
factors usually considered. In this way, this dissertation serves to test the boundaries of the 
strategic approach and demonstrate its potential usefulness for a broader range of research 
questions.  
 
In sum, the strategic approach offers a flexible means of considering multiple drivers of an 
actor’s behaviour within the context of a specific strategic environment. It can thus cope with 
the strictures of a case study in which the principal actor under consideration was a non-state 
criminal militia that confronted a range of other non-state armed groups before being 
absorbed by a newly independent regime and participating in counterinsurgent operations. 
 
 
1.3.2  Applying the Strategic Approach to Civilian Victimisation by the PFT  
I argue that applying the strategic approach to civilian victimisation by a non-state armed 
force, with the aim of understanding short and long-term outcomes, requires five 
consequential steps: 
 
1. Evaluating the strategic environment and the strategic discourse during the conflict 
2. Providing a scope and typology of the behaviour under analysis 
3. Analysing strategic choices and decision-making by the conflict actor(s) 
4. Evaluating near-term strategic effects and outcomes 
5. Proposing long-term strategic effects and outcomes 
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I have followed this five-step approach in my analysis of civilian victimisation by the PFT, and it 
forms the basis for the structure of this dissertation. 
 
The first step is to consider the strategic environment and the strategic discourse that shaped 
the conflict and the targeting decisions of its participants. I have done this by providing a 
thorough analysis of the structural and historical drivers that shaped the strategic environment 
(Chapter 2), followed by an in-depth strategic history of the Tajik civil war and the role of the 
PFT within it (Chapter 3). These two chapters, in essence, form the empirical case study upon 
which the subsequent analysis is based. Because civilian victimisation was a consistent feature 
of the civil war, and cannot be neatly separated from its key events and actors, it is necessary 
to present the broader context of the conflict in order to understand the evolving dynamics 
and incentives that affected targeting decisions as well as the strategic outcomes that the PFT 
experienced. The lack of existing strategic histories of the war and case studies of the PFT also 
necessitated the construction of these chapters, as discussed in Section 1.4. 
 
The second step aims to answer the first element of the central research question (how did the 
PFT target civilians?) by corralling the countless individual instances of victimisation into 
manageable and meaningful categories of analysis. Chapter 4 thus commences the 
interrogation of the case study by providing a typology of victimisation in Tajikistan and 
situating the PFT within it. It is a key step not only for narrowing the scope of behaviour that 
the strategic approach is being applied to, but for facilitating the subsequent analysis of the 
relationship between specific types of victimisation and particular conflict dynamics.  
 
The third step addresses the next part of the overall research question: why did the PFT target 
civilians? Given the lack of existing theory for non-state targeting of civilians, I examine the 
Tajik case study and its typology of victimisation through the prism of an original model that 
considers three sets of targeting incentives: normative, strategic and criminal. This incentives 
model conceptualises civilian victimisation not as a singular phenomenon but as the result of a 
choice between two competing options – civilian victimisation (the deliberate targeting of 
noncombatants) vs. restraint (targeting of a predominantly military nature). In warfare, there 
exist ample incentives not to target civilians, and thus any explanation for civilian victimisation 
should account for why these incentives are overridden. Thus, I argue that the variables that 




Table 1.1   Incentives for Civilian Victimisation by Non-State Actors 
 
 

































Normative incentives include the societal and legal norms that aim to induce restraint, as well 
as the processes of demonisation and ideological influences that override these strong taboos 
and lead to victimisation. Strategic incentives refer to the rationalist consideration of the 
advantages and disadvantages of civilian victimisation for the purpose of achieving military and 
political aims. Criminal incentives, also highly rationalist, include the aspects of decision-
making that take account of the criminal imperatives for profit and market protection. All of 
these incentives, taken together, will have varying levels of influence upon targeting decisions, 
either directly or by overriding each other. Chapter 5 considers each of these six groups of 
incentives, evaluating the strength and weakness of each and the manner in which they 
interacted and were manifested in targeting decisions and strategic behaviour during the Tajik 
civil war. 
 
The fourth step is to determine the effect of strategic choices on strategic outcomes in the 
conflict (i.e.: what were the strategic effects in the near term?). Based on a thorough review of 
the literature, I argue that there are five aspects of intrastate war in which the effects of 
civilian victimisation are particularly manifest: military strategies and operations; the 
escalation and resolution of conflict; the dispersion of violence; territory and resource 
acquisition; and legitimacy. Chapter 6 examines the relationship between civilian victimisation 
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and conflict dynamics in the Tajik war in depth, before evaluating the role that victimisation 
played in the PFT’s overall strategic outcomes. 
 
Typical applications of the strategic approach might stop here. However, this dissertation 
includes a fifth step, which is to continue this line of analysis by considering post-conflict 
developments that derive from a non-state actor’s targeting decisions during warfare. It thus 
addresses the final element of the research question: what were the strategic effects in the 
long term? Perhaps because it is now taken for granted that intrastate wars will experience 
high civilian casualty levels, the specific links between civilian victimisation and long-term 
consequences are not often explicitly traced; the roots of a particular security problem may be 
attributed to ‘the war’ generally rather than civilian casualties specifically. Yet it is possible to 
discern direct and indirect linkages between civilian victimisation in warfare and ongoing or 
emerging phenomena within the postwar strategic environment. The purpose here is not to 
demonstrate a linear causality – to say that civilian victimisation directly and inexorably leads 
to a specific long-term phenomenon – but rather to illustrate the way in which civilian 
victimisation facilitates and contributes to long-lasting security problems.  Chapter 7 thus 
considers the array of security threats facing postwar Tajikistan and evaluates the degree to 
which they can be traced to civilian victimisation during the civil war.  
 
The completion of these five steps should thus serve to answer the research question: how 
and why did the PFT target civilians, and what were the short and long-term strategic effects? 
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by evaluating these five steps and presenting key 
findings, whilst also considering whether the approach taken in this dissertation could be 
generalised in order to further theoretical analysis of civilian victimisation by non-state armed 
forces in intrastate war.  
 
 
1.3.3  Research Design 
The research design for this dissertation was formulated following sustained inquiry into the 
challenges of researching the Tajik civil war. It was quickly established that a quantitative 
approach would not be feasible. Data on civilian casualties, always problematic in civil wars, is 
practically non-existent in the case of Tajikistan. Even the most utilised and authoritative 
conflict datasets – such as the PRIO and Uppsala datasets – contain only sparse references to 
the Tajik conflict. (For example, the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset, which reportedly 
includes civilian deaths by government and rebel forces in intrastate wars from 1989 to 2010, 
has but a single listing for Tajikistan: 34 civilians killed by government forces in 1992, a year in 
 26 
which it is estimated that actually tens of thousands of people were killed.37) Accumulating 
such data, for even a small area, is extremely difficult due to a noted reticence among Tajiks to 
discuss the war – a silent testimony to both the emotional trauma of the war and the need to 
continue living amongst its worst perpetrators.38 
 
However, a qualitative approach faced issues of its own. As will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next section, there is a serious lack of secondary and scholarly literature on the Tajik civil 
war. The literature that does exist tends to focus on the more documented aspects of the war, 
namely the diplomatic efforts to end it and the complex machinations of regional states drawn 
into the conflict. Information on the actual military conduct of the war and the strategic 
behaviour of its participants is extremely thin – a few pages here, a paragraph there. Taken 
together, however, it formed a skeleton of the conflict’s trends and events.  
 
This was then fleshed out by a comprehensive review of contemporary media reportage of the 
conflict, using Tajik, Russian, European and American sources (including newspapers, wire 
services, news magazines, and TV and radio transcripts). Fortunately, with the Tajik war 
occurring at the end of the Cold War period, I was able to take advantage of the then still-
copious translations of Russian and Tajik news sources into English (particularly by the BBC’s 
‘Summary of World Broadcasts’ service). This constituted the bulk of the primary source 
research for this dissertation, as I reviewed an estimated 5,000 articles and wire reports. 
Because of the inherent flaws in the source material – given the difficulties of accurate 
reporting in the midst of a conflict, coupled with the lingering authoritarian attitudes toward 
the press in post-Soviet Tajikistan – all of the reportage was carefully evaluated, using a 
consistent ‘triangulation of data’ approach. Most often, this involved comparisons of reportage 
across Tajik, Russian and Western news sources, or between print and broadcast media; I also 
attempted to reconcile news accounts with official reports and scholarly works. Much of the 
reportage could not be faithfully utilised: for example, I quite often had to disregard Tajik 
opposition radio reports, as their accounts were not matched by any other sources. Generally, 
however, this process yielded a vastly improved amount of data and information on the use of 
violence by non-state forces during the conflict. For the first time, it became possible to trace 
the movements of particular actors and the impact upon civilians throughout the war.  
 
This close media analysis allowed a more granular analysis of conflict dynamics, and thus 
enabled more nuanced and in-depth interpretations of key events and arenas of victimisation. 
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For example, whilst virtually all secondary sources note the outbreak of armed clashes in 
Dushanbe during the first week of May 1992, few narrow the first occurrence to the evening of 
May 5, and only one notes its immediate catalysing incident. In most accounts, the first shots 
seem to happen rather spontaneously and perhaps inevitably – yet the media accounts reveal 
that a roadblock confrontation outside the capital was actually the immediate catalyst for the 
first armed clashes in Dushanbe, after weeks in which tens of thousands of people refrained 
from violence during mass demonstrations.39 As another example, this review of the media 
reportage reveals a far more serious crisis at the Tajik-Afghan border during the 1993-1997 
phase of the war than the secondary literature usually conveys. Armed incursions by hundreds 
of Tajik militants, and Russian artillery and helicopter assaults on Afghan bases and towns, 
actually made the Tajik-Afghan border one of the more dangerous and destabilising zones in 
the former Soviet space (particularly after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban). Finally, the 
considerable human costs of continued conflict in eastern Tajikistan during this period, 
including hundreds of deaths and tens of thousands of newly displaced people, are similarly 
neglected by studies that reference merely sporadic and low-grade combat in the area. Thus, 
the use of media resources to expand the strategic history of the civil war represents an 
empirical contribution to the field, in presenting and summarising the key developments and 
behaviour of conflict actors during this time period to a degree not typically undertaken. 
 
This dissertation also benefited from twenty-nine semi-structured interviews conducted during 
a research trip to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.40 Fieldwork in Tajikistan presents many challenges. 
As noted, the civil war is a strongly taboo subject of conversation socially, and an ethically 
problematic topic to broach with people given the extreme trauma that most Tajiks living in 
the war-affected regions experienced. The perpetrators of civilian victimisation that I focus on 
in this dissertation – the PFT – became the most powerful political and criminal figures in the 
postwar era, and I could not expect people to openly discuss their past crimes. The 
government still monitors the press and foreign visitors; before going to Tajikistan, I was 
warned by a number of people with experience working in the country to be extremely 
discreet in my discussions, and not to keep any incriminating notes on my person. Whilst in the 
end I did not suffer undue harassment (except for the occasional surprise police visit), such 
warnings give an indication of some of the challenges of conducting research in an 
authoritarian and highly criminalised state.  
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Due to these strictures, most of my interviews were conducted ‘off the record’, to minimise 
potential problems for both the interviewees and myself. The twenty-nine interviewees 
represented a range of institutions: local NGOs (4); international NGOs (6); UN agencies (8); 
local universities (6); EU agencies (3); and local media (2). (Some of the organisations 
represented include the OSCE; the UN Office on Drugs and Crime; the EU Border Management 
Programme; the Social Research Center of the American University of Central Asia; and 
International Crisis Group.) Seventeen of the interviewees were Tajik or Kyrgyz; twelve were 
foreign employees of international organisations or NGOs (most with long experience in 
Central Asia). The primary purpose of these interviews was to discuss Tajikistan’s postwar 
security challenges, in order to enhance the analysis undertaken as part of the fifth step of my 
research approach (i.e., the long-term strategic effects of civilian victimisation during the Tajik 
civil war). Overall, the interviews were extremely helpful in providing a front-line view of the 
efforts to combat narco-trafficking, militancy, corruption and poverty, as well as practitioner 
interpretations of the root causes of such challenges (which I have cited within the relevant 
chapters). In particular, speaking to practitioners in the field revealed the depth of Tajik 
corruption and its adverse effects on the population, and were a direct inspiration for my 
investigation of the political economy literature (which yielded the substantial portion of this 
dissertation dedicated to criminality as a form of civilian victimisation). In addition, my travels 
gave me a better appreciation of the spatial aspects of the civil war itself, as a drive from 
Dushanbe to and across the Afghan border emphasised the short distances involved and the 
alternately accessible and difficult terrain to be navigated. In short, my research trip proved a 
useful supplement to my scholarly research, providing me with a helpful filter of experience 
through which to assemble and evaluate documentary evidence. 
 
I have also drawn upon field research conducted by other scholars (notably, Gunda Wiegmann, 
Idil Kilavuz, John Heathershaw and Sophie Roche) who were able to reside in Tajikistan for far 
longer than I could have hoped. In particular, the interviews with rural Tajik residents 
conducted by Kilavuz and Wiegmann and excerpted in their dissertations were a useful source 
of firsthand accounts for my study of civilian victimisation and the long-term effects on specific 
regional constituencies.41 Finally, I also utilised reports from front-line aid agencies and NGOs 
(particularly the operational updates published by the Red Cross in Tajikistan and the observer 
reports produced by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki) in order to construct the strategic history 
of the conflict and the typology of victimisation within it. 
 
                                                                 
41
 Kilavuz (2007); Wiegmann (2009). 
 29 
Another key aspect of the research design was the decision to conduct a micro-case study of 
the PFT. This is an increasingly popular and prevalent research method in the social sciences, 
as it allows a more granular analysis of complex phenomenon.42 In this case, I felt that the 
question of why non-state forces engage in civilian victimisation would be better served by 
examining the behaviour of one specific non-state force rather than all the non-state 
participants in the conflict (which were many). In essence, I have sacrificed breadth for depth. 
A comparative study of all the non-state participants would be ideal, but would require far 
more time and space than allowed by this research project. 
 
In sum, the research design utilised here was crafted in response to the significant challenges 
posed by conducting research on a little-known war, in an inhospitable environment, with a 
focus on events that were traumatic at both the personal and societal level.  
 
 
1.4  Literature Review 
In this dissertation, I primarily (although not exclusively) draw upon three broad categories of 
literature: 1) civilian victimisation; 2) the political economy of conflict; 3) qualitative studies of 
the Tajik civil war. Each of these categories suffers from serious limitations, yet taken together 
they have enabled the construction of the Tajik case study and the analytical framework I have 
applied to it. This wide-ranging use of scholarly literature has been necessitated by the dearth 
of attention to the Tajik conflict and the lack of theorisation with respect to non-state-actor 
civilian victimisation. In the end, much of the literature on intrastate war and civilian 
victimisation could be only indirectly utilised, as it tends to focus on state actors and the 
causes (rather than conduct) of civil wars.  
 
 
1.4.1  Civilian Victimisation by Non-State Actors 
It is not difficult to find descriptive accounts of civilian victimisation. Journalists, NGOs and 
humanitarian actors tend to focus on atrocities as dramatic and empathy-inspiring events that 
can encapsulate the broader experience of a conflict and prod external aid and intervention. 
Within the academic literature, however, civilian victimisation is not a major locus of attention. 
According to Valentino,  
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…scholarly writing on war and rebellion has generally neglected violence 
against civilians or simply assumed that this kind of violence is irrational, 
driven by sadism or the frenzy of battle. Scholars of war have devoted a 
great deal of effort to understanding the causes of conflict, but little 





Stathis Kalyvas also notes that civil war violence against civilians ‘is a phenomenon that has 
long remained off research limits because of its conceptual complexity and empirical 
opacity’.44 Nevertheless, in the past two decades a growing body of literature has emerged 
that specifically addresses civilian victimisation.45  The reasons for this are not definitive, but 
may be traced to such high-profile atrocities as those in Bosnia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 
during the 1990s, and ongoing intrastate wars with high civilian casualty levels in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Sudan.  Investigations into the changing character of warfare also draw 
attention to the role of civilian victimisation, as high civilian casualty levels in intrastate wars 
offer a purported element of distinction from the presumably more restrained nature of 
modern inter-state war, whilst the current focus on counterinsurgency in US and UK military 
circles naturally leads to enhanced consideration of the role of the civilian population. 
 
These works offer a wealth of insights to draw upon but several limitations must be overcome. 
First, the field is still limited and predominantly state-centric.46 Historically, state forces have 
been more likely to target civilians on a mass scale, for several reasons related to their greater 
capacity and capabilities relative to non-state forces, as well as their greater difficulties with 
regard to distinction (given militant concealment within the population).47 This greater 
incidence of civilian targeting by states helps account for the relative lack of literature on 
civilian targeting by non-state forces. Whilst state-centric theories of civilian victimisation are 
useful, they must be adapted significantly in order to have relevance to non-state forces, given 
that they face significantly different constraints, costs and opportunities relative to state 
actors. Second, the causes of civilian victimisation are usually attributed to either normative or 
strategic factors – for example, either ideology or asymmetric weakness – whilst a 
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fundamental assumption underlying this dissertation is that both arenas must be considered in 
theorising target selection processes.   
 
Perhaps because of the puzzle that civilian victimisation poses for rationalist analysis, the 
literature on its causes tends to bypass its instrumental nature – i.e., the extent to which it is 
engaged in deliberately and for some strategic purpose – and to choose from amongst a range 
of other causal factors that can be categorised into four groupings: psycho-emotional; 
culturalist; organisational; and structural.48 
 
By far the oldest approach to civilian victimisation in warfare is to look to the psychological and 
emotional thought processes of individual human beings involved in combat.49  Psycho-
emotional explanations include the elaborations throughout history of why people ‘love war in 
strange and troubling ways’50 – in other words, the ways in which it fulfils some sort of visceral, 
emotional need – as well as more modern analyses of the cognitive processes of different 
kinds of combatants, from national army recruits to suicide bombers.51  Christopher 
Browning’s Ordinary Men, for example, offers an explanatory description of the atrocities 
committed by a reserve police battalion in Poland during the Second World War that 
emphasises the role of group conformity, peer pressure, racism and an inflated sense of 
superiority.52   
 
Whilst focused on individual motivations, psycho-emotional explanations may offer useful 
insights regarding civilian victimisation at the small-group level.  For example, the suggestion 
that those individuals most prone to violence are those who suffer from unsatisfied egotism 
may help explain the attractiveness of ‘vanguard forces’ in militant ideological movements and 
their consequent justifications for civilian victimisation.53 However, psycho-emotional 
explanations on their own are not sufficient to account for civilian victimisation because they 
neglect its instrumental and unit-level characteristics.54  In other words, the focus on individual 
motivations for violence and transgressive behaviour yields a study of its expressive qualities – 
it supposes violence as an end in itself, or at best a means to some symbolic or emotional goal, 
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but not a mechanism for the achievement of political aims.55  It is probably true that at the 
level of the individual perpetrator, civilian victimisation is expressive violence.  However, as an 
act of collective and deliberate violence it is instrumental, in the sense that it contributes in 
some way to the purposes of the group.56 In short, psycho-emotional approaches yield 
theories of motivation but not strategy. 
 
In addition, psycho-emotional explanations are less likely than other approaches to assume the 
rationality of actors; indeed, they are prone to asserting that civilian victimisation represents 
the apogee of human senselessness and evil.57  However, assenting to this idea of perpetrators 
as irrational places the phenomenon of civilian victimisation outside the scope of social science 
or any other effort to theorise and thus hopefully attenuate its occurrence.  As Isabelle 
Duyvesteyn writes, ‘When irrationality is accepted as an explanation for the behaviour of 
actors, the researcher accepts that their actions cannot really be understood’.58 
 
A turning point in the study of deliberate civilian victimisation in war came with Omer Bartov’s 
The Eastern Front, 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (1985), which 
addressed the impact of ideological imperatives on the behaviour of combatants toward 
civilians.  Bartov discussed the importance of conditions at the front and the composition of 
the officer corps but emphasised the correlation between extreme barbarism and the 
presence of ‘some version of an Untermenschen ideology or, for that matter, religious 
fanaticism’.59   
 
Culturalist explanations for civilian victimisation focus on a broad range of influences upon 
armed forces that engage in transgressive behaviour, including social, religious and ideological 
variables that facilitate a decision to attack civilians.60  The advantage of such explanations is 
that they address both individual and unit-level violence.  However, they risk prioritising 
cultural factors to such an extent that they appear deterministic, as if the strategic context and 
political aims of a group bear little relevance for its targeting decisions; in essence, they can 
obscure the instrumental and functionalist qualities of victimisation.61 This was arguably the 
case with those works that laid the blame for post-Cold War ethnic conflict, such as occurred in 
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the Balkans, on immutable and primeval ethnic hatreds.62  This approach has been challenged 
by studies showing that inter-ethnic hostility and violence tend to occur more often as a result 
of political violence and not as a causal factor.63  More recent works on such concepts as ‘tribal 
warfare’ risk the same over-prioritisation of cultural variables to the detriment of strategic and 
political factors.64  
 
A similar sense of determinism can creep into organisational explanations for civilian 
victimisation. A notable example of this subset of the literature is Jeremy Weinstein’s Inside 
Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, one of the few scholarly works to directly theorise 
non-state-actor civilian victimisation. Weinstein argues that insurgent targeting choices are a 
function of the initial economic and social resources available to them, as these shape the 
membership and organisation of the group in ways that affect the likelihood of violence 
against civilians (for example, rebel groups with good access to economic inputs can offer 
selective rewards to recruits, thus attracting more opportunistic members who are less likely 
to show restraint toward civilians).65 Whilst logical in its sub-arguments, the emphatic path-
dependency embedded within this model and its explicit rejection of strategic discourse as a 
driver of targeting choices render it problematic as a generalisable model, especially for cases 
with significant in-conflict variation in behaviour. Its focus on the insurgency variant of civil war 
and reliance upon Cold War-era conflicts also limit its applicability for conflicts such as the 
Tajik civil war, which featured multiple non-state forces (instead of a state-insurgent dyad) and 
identity-based targeting during the most intense phase of the conflict. More useful for cases 
such as Tajikistan are the organisational arguments advanced by Abdulkader Sinno, who 
explicitly shuns ‘strategic determinism’ in his focus on the effects of organisational structure.66 
 
Structural explanations prioritise the intrastate nature of modern warfare as the key variable 
in its propensity for civilian victimisation.  They emphasise the lack of legal constraints; the 
strength of modern sovereignty norms, rendering external intervention problematic; the 
prevalence of paramilitary and thuggish forces not under the moderating influences of civil 
control; and the near inevitability of conflict occurring amongst civilian-populated areas as 
forces fight for territorial and political control.67  For example, Daniel Byman and Kenneth 
Pollack note: 
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Internecine conflicts are frequently the most vicious conflicts of all, with 
many accepted constraints on behavior in warfare falling by the wayside. In 
part, this is derived from the fact that in many civil wars, there are no 
organized armies standing between a civilian population and an attacking 
army; both armies are generally drawn from, and therefore intermingled 
with, the civilians, which is why levels of civilian deaths and other atrocities 




Structural explanations are a key variable in accounting for civilian victimisation in intrastate 
war, but they tend to focus on those factors that facilitate rather than determine civilian 
victimisation.  They may explain why it is easier for forces to attack civilians, but they cannot 
account for why forces would do so even when it is strategically counterproductive. 
 
What is mostly lacking in the literature on civilian victimisation by non-state armed forces are 
theorisations based on strategic explanations.69  It is often described as 1) counterproductive 
for non-state forces; 2) more avoidable because non-state forces have fewer problems with 
identifying enemy targets; and 3) utilised less frequently by non-state forces than states70 – 
but the fact that non-state civilian victimisation nevertheless exists is inadequately theorised.  
 
Fortunately, scholars in recent years have focused increasingly on strategic rationales for 
civilian victimisation. Alexander Downes has made great analytical strides in addressing the 
strategic logic in civilian victimisation, although thus far he has only focused on civilian 
victimisation by state actors.71 Hugo Slim’s comprehensive review of civilian victimisation (by 
both state and non-state actors) includes strategic as well as ideological factors in its typology 
of drivers.72 Claire Metelits’ study of three key insurgent groups (the SPLA, the FARC and the 
PKK) rests upon a theory of civilian victimisation driven by ‘active rivalry’ with state or non-
state competitors.73 The March 2012 special issue of Civil Wars directly addresses the question 
of why atrocities occur in civil wars; Beatrice Heuser and Kieran Mitton, in particular, discuss 
                                                                 
68
 Byman and Pollack (2007), 8. Like many authors, Byman and Pollack cite the disproportionate number of civilian 
deaths in civil war as a matter of convention and do not cite empirical sources. 
69
 The literature on suicide operations includes strategic explanations (notably Robert Pape’s Dying to Win) but thus 
far has focused more heavily on their use in terrorist campaigns, not intrastate warfare.   
70
 These points are well summarized in Walzer (1977), 180; Heuser (2012). See also Kalyvas (2006), 73, 89-91, 144. 
71
 Downes (2008, 2007, 2006). 
72
 Slim (2007), 121. 
73
 Metelits (2010). 
 35 
the potential for strategic logic in atrocities (as well as the explanatory limits of such 
frameworks).74 
 
Most notably, Stathis Kalyvas’ landmark work, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, sets forth an 
influential rationalist theory of civilian victimisation linked to territorial control by state or non-
state actors, although to some extent it also prioritises civilian victimisation by the state in its 
analysis (for example, in a chapter setting forth a ‘logic of indiscriminate violence’, Kalyvas 
briefly notes that insurgents are capable of indiscriminate violence but devotes the entirety of 
his analysis to violence by the state actor).75 His earlier work on the Algerian civil war, 
however, focuses on civilian victimisation by the non-state Islamist rebels in Algeria’s conflict 
of the 1990s: 
 
The central thesis is that massacres can be understood as part of a rational 
strategy aiming to punish and deter civilian defection under specific 
constraints. Massacres are likely to be committed by insurgents in the 
context of a particular strategic conjuncture characterised by (a) 
fragmented and unstable rule over the civilian population, (b) mass civilian 




A number of elements from Kalyvas’ work inform the arguments presented in this dissertation: 
that civilians will comply with the most credible coercive threats; that levels of violence can be 
linked to levels of control and contestation in a given territory; that escalation is a significant 
variable affecting civilian victimisation; and that civilian victimisation cannot be reduced to 
irrational or purposeless barbarity. However, I depart from the Kalyvas approach in attempting 
to incorporate normative factors and criminal incentives into explanations of civilian 
victimisation. Kalyvas is dismissive of the role of ideology in driving massacres, believing that 
the consistent ideology of the Islamists coupled with their varying levels of victimisation 
indicate that the latter is not driven by the former. However, I argue that ideational factors 
play an important role in affecting strategic considerations of the utility of civilian victimisation 
as well as ‘stretching’ norms, which may account for variation over time. I also argue that 
models focused solely on political competition and coercive violence in civil war, such as 
Kalyvas’, do not fully capture the dynamics of civilian victimisation, as both eliminationist and 
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criminal actors account for a substantial portion of violence against civilians.77 Finally, the 
Kalyvas approach is difficult to graft onto the Tajik conflict, as it was not a binary conflict 
between a state and an insurgent actor, but rather a multilateral smorgasbord involving many 
non-state domestic actors with intervention from foreign states. 
 
In sum, what has emerged to date are a range of partial explanations for non-state-actor 
civilian victimisation in intrastate warfare.  The use of the strategic approach – which 
incorporates both actor-level and environmental characteristics and allows the consideration 
of both strategic and normative drivers – enables analysis that includes the best features of 
these existing theories whilst transcending their explanatory limitations. 
 
Finally, with respect to literature on the short and long-term effects of civilian victimisation, 
the impact of targeting choices on the dynamics of conflict receives greater attention within 
the literature on insurgency and intrastate war. Here as well the focus tends to be on civilian 
targeting by state forces, but non-state forces receive more attention within this arena than 
they do in the causation literature. Overall, this set of literature advances the argument that 
attacks on civilians by non-state forces violate the principles of guerrilla warfare (in particular, 
Maoist insurgent principles): using violence and coercion against civilians rather than non-
violent means of gaining popular support risks being strategically counterproductive, in that it 
jeopardises a non-state actor’s key potential resource (popular support).78 The classic case 
study for this argument is the Algerian Islamists and their disastrous campaign during the 
1990s civil war, when the brutal slaughter of thousands of civilians eliminated popular support 
for what had previously been a strong anti-government opposition.79 Other exemplars include 
the Bosnian mujahidin, Chechen guerrillas and Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq. 
 
What is less likely to be noted are the short and medium-term successes that may result from 
civilian victimisation. In West Africa, for example, Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh ‘were able 
to invade Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively with little more than a hundred men and bring 
both countries to their knees within a year by dramatically killing, cutting people’s arms off 
and abducting their children’.80 Atrocities committed by Al Qaeda in Iraq may have backfired in 
the long run, but in the short term they succeeded in sparking sectarian warfare between 
Sunni and Shi’a communities (a key strategic aim). In short, it is important to consider that 
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non-state forces may engage in civilian victimisation because sometimes, it does ‘work’ – even 
if only narrowly and in the short term.81  
 
Less often considered are the long-term strategic effects of civilian victimisation, as most 
studies of civilian victimisation consider either its short-term strategic effects on the conflict or 
the long-term humanitarian impact on the country. This dissertation’s examination of the long-




1.4.2 Criminal Actors and the Political Economy of Conflict 
Considering the Tajik civil war in depth highlights the fact that its later stages were increasingly 
‘not about policy but rather access to resources’.82 The war coincided with a massive 
expansion in regional narco-trafficking and the Tajik war economy provided considerable 
opportunities for corrupt and criminal actors. These activities were responsible for a 
substantial amount of civilian victimisation during and after the war, whilst also significantly 
affecting conflict resolution processes. Thus, this aspect of the conflict necessitates some 
utilisation of the literature on the political economy of conflict. 
 
The distinction between political/ideological actors and criminal actors possesses an enduring 
attraction for scholars. Whilst ‘political’ armed groups are commonly seen as security threats 
to states that require a military response, ‘criminal’ groups are typically not thought to 
challenge the state and can be handled by domestic law enforcement.83 The two categories of 
actors are also thought to have distinct aims and structures. However, whilst these two 
spheres of action can sometimes be meaningfully separated, more often within a conflict they 
tend to overlap and act synergistically.84 Analysts have struggled to conceptualise the tensions 
and relationships between political and criminal actors over the last two decades, and 
consensus in this area is still emerging.85  
 
In the 1990s, this dichotomy was a key element within the ‘greed or grievance’ debate. The 
debate was sparked by the surge of interest in the economics of intrastate war, as it became 
clear in the post-Cold War era that such conflicts were able to become self-financing despite 
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the drawdown in superpower proxy funding, thanks to new illicit sources of support.86 Most 
notably, Paul Collier and others within the World Bank utilised quantitative models to advance 
their argument that civil wars could be more accurately attributed to motivations based on 
greed than on political or ideological grievances.87 This elevation of greed as an explanatory 
variable – one which emphasised criminal aims and organisation – was not persuasive to many 
other political economists and development specialists with years of experience in the field. 
They found the quantitative formulae upon which it rested problematic and saw much more 
evidence of ‘grievance’ than such models allowed for.88 For example, David Keen, a prominent 
critic of the Collier approach, demonstrated that Sierra Leonean rebels – one of the exemplars 
for ‘greed’ theorists – had additional political and social grievances which helped fuel their 
aims and behaviour.89 Critics also emphasised the interdependence of economic and political 
power within conflict states that makes separating motivations difficult.90 In addition, more 
nuanced studies emerged that considered the characteristics of the economic assets at stake 
and their varying impacts on conflict onset and duration; these suggested that the presence of 
lootable resources such as narcotics tended to lengthen but not cause conflicts.91 Within a 
decade of the debate’s emergence, the question of greed or grievance had been largely ‘laid to 
rest’, with general agreement within the field that both factors were critical to understanding 
armed conflict.92 This dissertation thus draws more heavily upon more recent efforts to 
grapple with the complexities of war economies, such as Jonathan Goodhand’s useful typology 
of combat, shadow and coping economies within conflict environments.93 
 
Following the 9/11 attacks, there was an expanded interest in the ‘crime-terror nexus’.94 This 
body of work facilitated typologies and approaches that could cope with the challenges posed 
by such actors as the FARC and the PKK, which were heavily involved in the drugs trade whilst 
also fighting long-running insurgencies.95 One of the most influential conceptualisations, by 
Tamara Makarenko, was based in the Central Asian context: 
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[T]he term ‘crime-terror nexus’ refers to a security continuum with 
traditional organised crime on one end of the spectrum and terrorism at the 
other. In the middle of the spectrum is a ‘gray area’ – where organised 




This body of work has contributed substantially to an improved conceptualisation of hybrid 
groups but has several drawbacks: 1) such works often prioritise the ‘logistical nexus’ between 
criminal and terrorist groups and neglect the ‘gray area’ and the symbiotic infrastructure of 
crime and terrorism that can emerge within conflict zones; 2) the field has been dominated by 
studies of ‘narco-terrorism’, obscuring the many other forms of hybrid criminal-terrorist 
activity as well as the ‘state-crime nexus’; and 3) sweeping conclusions tend to be made on the 
basis of very little observable data.97 There is considerable consensus in the literature, for 
example, that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was heavily, perhaps even primarily, 
involved in narco-trafficking prior to its near-elimination in 2001 – yet there is virtually no data 
to support this view.98  
 
Nevertheless, the apparent hybrid nature of many armed groups today suggests the need for a 
more holistic approach. This is further encouraged by Keen’s challenging of the ‘breakdown’ 
paradigm within civil war analysis. The ‘messy’ and ill-defined conflicts that emerged after the 
Cold War were seen by many as representative of a complete breakdown of order, rather than 
a transformation into an alternative order. However, by approaching the political and 
economic relationships in a society systemically, and considering the cost-benefit motivations 
of actors in such a wartime system, a less dichotomous and more nuanced view of conflict 
emerges: 
 
Rather than listing the causes of war or famine and rather than portraying 
war as fundamentally irrational or as an aberration or interruption, it would 
be more helpful to investigate how violence is generated by particular 
patterns of development, by particular political economies which violence in 
turn modifies (but does not destroy). Indeed, part of the problem in much 
existing analysis is that conflict is regarded as, simply, a breakdown in a 
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particular system, rather than as the emergence of another, alternative 




This approach to the context of civil war facilitates a more holistic view of non-state armed 
groups; it allows us to think of them as conflict actors, broadly speaking, without needing to 
pigeonhole them as either political or criminal actors.100 This approach to non-state armed 
groups appears more useful in engaging with real-world case studies than frameworks which 
ghetto-ise criminal groups to the detriment of better understanding of conflict dynamics.  
 
In engaging with the political economy of conflict literature, two opposing pitfalls loom large. 
First, some scholars may be tempted to over-emphasise the criminal aspects of war – even to 
the extent of considering war little more than a criminal endeavour. This is particularly likely in 
conflicts where criminality is overt and highly visible whilst conventional military activity is 
limited. Mueller, for example, reduces the Bosnian conflict to ‘the actions of apolitical bands of 
opportunistic loot-seekers’.101 At the other extreme, however, many scholars simply ignore 
even obvious manifestations of criminality in the modern international system. There exists 
 
…a more general tendency for international relations scholars to shy away from 
scrutinizing the ‘covert world’ and the illicit dimensions of the global economy. 
Smugglers, arms traffickers, and criminals-turned-combatants are typically not 
treated as central players – strikingly apparent by the virtual absence of these 




This dissertation aims to navigate between these extreme stances by considering the 
economic and criminal aspects of the war in depth, whilst not reducing the entire Tajik conflict 
to the pursuit of illicit wealth. 
 
 
1.4.3 The Tajik Civil War  
The Tajik civil war remains largely under-examined by scholars: a literature review in 2011 
noted that ‘few detailed studies of the war have emerged and book-length analyses of the 
events of the war are only available in Russian’.103 Heathershaw further noted, ‘There is no 
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single authoritative account of the civil war; there are no open academic or political debates 
over the whys and wherefores. Most of the military battles, human costs and social and 
political implications are partially known or overlooked’.104 
 
There are several possible reasons for this gap in the literature. First, the field of Central Asian 
experts who might contribute such analysis was relatively small during its occurrence and 
remains limited today, relevant to other regional specialisations. Second, the geographical 
remoteness of the country and its varieties of political repression and censorship inhibited 
reportage of the conflict as well as subsequent academic fieldwork, leaving few primary 
sources to plunder (in 1994, the Committee to Protect Journalists named Tajikistan ‘the most 
dangerous country in the world for journalists’).105 As Shirin Akiner noted in 2001, ‘There is as 
yet no authoritative account of the Tajik civil war. This is largely because there are almost no 
first-hand reports of the conflict’.106 Analysis of the war, as in this dissertation, requires a 
painstaking piecing together of data from a large number of partially salient sources. 
 
Third, the Tajik war in a certain sense lacks a clear representative narrative that makes it 
relevant to a broader scholarly and public audience.  The Balkan wars served as an effective 
crucible for post-Cold War anxieties about ‘neo-tribalism’ and the future role of Western 
security organisations, and offered a useful paradigm for illustrating the crux of the 
primordialist interpretation of ethnic conflict.107  Wars in West and Central Africa, portrayed as 
Hobbesian conflicts with sickening levels of brutality, were invoked to illustrate ‘new wars’ and 
fundamental shifts in the character of warfare, as well as the rising challenges to the very 
concept of the nation-state.108 In contrast, the Tajik war did not feature a dominant ethnic 
component (most of the violence was Tajik-Tajik) and its remoteness served to mask in-depth 
reporting or analysis of the high level of atrocities that did occur.  It did emblemise conflict in 
the former Soviet republics, but suffered from the attention given to conflicts in the Caucasus 
that better conveyed ethnic rivalries and Russian intervention in its new ‘near abroad’ (the 
outbreak of conflict in Dushanbe in May 1992 coincided with a coup in Azerbaijan, Armenian 
military victories in Nagorno-Karabakh, armed clashes in Georgia, and separatist entrenchment 
in Trans-Dniestr, Moldova).109  
 
                                                                 
104
 Heathershaw (2011), 1. 
105
 US Department of State (1995); Burkhalter testimony (1994); BBC/Ostankino, 11/9/92; BBC/Mayak, 7/5/93; 
Washington Post, 24/10/94; AP, 27/10/94; AFP, 1/5/96. 
106
 Akiner (2001), 37.  
107
 Yanacopulos and Hanlon (2006), 97; Semelin (2005), 12. 
108
 See Kaldor (1999); van Creveld (1991). 
109
 These events were often packaged and framed as of a piece, despite significantly divergent local dynamics. 
Washington Post, 11/5/92; Toronto Star, 17/5/92; New York Times, 24/5/92. 
 42 
Nevertheless, there does exist a body of literature concerned specifically with the Tajik war, 
primarily located within the field of Central Asian studies.  This literature benefits from a 
substantial degree of consensus as to the causes and character of the war, although some 
debate exists with regard to specific aspects of its participants. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of conflict, a host of explanations for the war 
emerged.110 Of these, the binary configurations of ‘communists vs. Islamo-democrats’ or 
‘hardliners vs. reformers’ were amongst the most popular. Whilst not wholly incorrect, they do 
not adequately capture the oppositional dynamics that occurred during the war, which went 
beyond broad political loyalties. 
 
Analysts today largely agree that the Tajik war was fuelled by competition amongst regional 
elites for power and resources in the context of an evaporating Soviet political apparatus and 
devastating economic collapse.111 Specifically, elites from the Leninabad region, who had 
dominated the communist regime for decades, fell into confrontation with elites from other 
areas of the republic that had been historically marginalised. Strong regional identities and 
network structures allowed these competing elites to mobilise armed supporters at the local 
level and disperse communal violence beyond the capital. Kilavuz refers to this process as 
‘network activation’, a useful conceptualisation given the strong, regionally based patronage 
networks that were engaged.112 (Abdullaev, in another helpful interpretation, presents it as the 
‘ruralisation’ of the conflict.113) 
 
It is important to emphasise, however, that regional differences did not lead to conflict in and 
of themselves; rather, they shaped the terms of competition and the mobilisation of violent 
actors.114 There was little overt enmity amongst people of different regional origin before the 
war. However, the desperate scarcities caused by Soviet disintegration created a climate of 
competition that facilitated conflict between rival regional networks.115 Demographic factors – 
in particular, the Tajik ‘youth bulge’ – also affected competition and the mobilisation of 
violence but remain relatively unexamined in the literature.116 
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Within this broad consensus – from which this dissertation does not depart – scholars do 
prioritise certain variables. For example, Rubin gives weight to the ‘breakdown of social 
control’ and ‘generalised insecurity into which the collapse of Soviet institutions threw so 
much of the population’.117 Both Akiner and Kilavuz stress the factors beyond regionalism that 
helped construct the critical elite networks – such as education, career and personal 
relationships – as well as the fact that at the beginning of the conflict there were significant 
factional splits within each region.118 Lynch focuses on Tajikistan’s weak national identity and 
the struggle to define the newly independent state within the broader factional competition 
for power.119 In keeping with the interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation, and noting that it 
is concerned primarily with the conduct of the war and not its causes, I do not argue for the 
prioritisation of any one explanation over another. Instead, Chapter 2 examines the full range 
of suggested conflict drivers and causal variables in order to holistically examine the factors 
that shaped and organised the conduct of the war.  
 
Given the prominent role of regional and other sub-state identities, one might expect the 
literature to dabble in debates over identity conflict theory. Instead, virtually all the notable 
scholars of Tajikistan reject primordialist theories of identity conflict and promote explanations 
that fall into the instrumentalist or situational approaches, arguing that identities were 
manipulated by elites and/or that conditions of insecurity drove people to identify more 
strongly with available solidarity networks.120 
 
However, one main point of dispute within the literature concerns the nature of the Islamic 
Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP), a key actor in the conflict. First, there is some debate on 
whether Tajik Islamists were genuine in their desire for a more Islamicised society and state, or 
whether political Islam served as an effective rallying cry, identity-building mechanism, and 
vehicle for political and cultural opposition to an officially atheist regime.121 Tadjbakhsh, for 
example, stated at the time of the conflict that ‘political Islam is an artificial, reactionary 
symbol that unifies all those dissatisfied with 70 years of Communist rule’.122 Others believed 
that the IRP played up its Islamist credentials whilst in exile in northern Afghanistan in order to 
attract funding and arms from sponsors in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia.123 
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However, given the difficulty in assessing the validity of stated political preferences on the part 
of individuals, this is a generally irresolvable debate. Naumkin, for one, concludes that ‘Islam 
was used instrumentally for political mobilisation and as a genuine system of values and 
concepts around which some groups of the population rallied’.124 
 
Second, whilst there appears to be considerable consensus that the IRP was and remains a 
moderate Islamist actor with limited aims, this analysis may be skewed by hindsight in view of 
the IRP’s participation in the postwar government and substantial scaling down of its Islamist 
rhetoric.125  Scholars writing in the mid-1990s, before the formal conclusion of the war, 
appeared less certain; and some – perhaps not coincidentally, comprising mostly Russian 
scholars – identified the IRP as radical fundamentalists aiming to set Central Asia aflame and 
threatening the soft underbelly of the Russian state.126  
 
This divergence in the literature may be partly due to different interpretations of the spectrum 
of Islamic activism. Matveeva and Kuzmin, for example, refer to IRP members as ‘Wahhabis’ 
whilst Rubin (amongst others) states that Wahhabism, as such, did not have a presence in 
Tajikistan.127 The erroneous attribution of Wahhabism to Islamist actors in the former Soviet 
sphere is commonplace. 
 
It would hardly be any exaggeration to say that virtually all articles devoted 
to regional wars in the Muslim regions of the former USSR mention the so-
called Wahhabis… But, in reality, equating the terms ‘fundamentalist’ and 
‘Wahhabi’ is fundamentally wrong (the first concept is considerably 
broader). As Bushkov and Mikulskiy, authors of the [Russian-language] book 
‘History of the Civil War in Tajikistan’, observe, the basis of the directive 
stratum of the Tajik opposition is composed of natives of the distinguished 
Central Asian Ishan class – leaders of the Sufi fraternal orders. From the 
Wahhabis’ viewpoint, devotion to Sufism contravenes the canons of Islam; 




Essentially, regimes in Russia and the former Soviet republics used the term ‘Wahhabi’ to refer 
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to non-establishment Islamic figures who might undermine or threaten the status quo.129 It 
was not applied on the basis of a reasoned analysis of the religious beliefs of such Islamic 
leaders, but rather generated by political fears and reflexive discriminatory approaches (or, as 
Akiner says, it was ‘intended to convey disdain rather than to give an accurate description of 
their beliefs’.130) Thus, characterisations of the Tajik Islamist opposition that invoke the 
‘Wahhabi’ label must be treated with a fair bit of scepticism. 
 
Nevertheless, one factor contributing to consensus within the literature on the Tajik civil war 
may be its overall focus on the political aspects of the conflict, and in particular on the 
diplomatic efforts surrounding peace negotiations from 1994 to 1997.  Indeed, the peace 
process is perhaps the most well-covered aspect of the Tajik civil war: the heavy international 
involvement in negotiations produced a wealth of reports on diplomatic efforts and well-
documented meetings, thereby facilitating research and analysis. (Given this already extant 
and excellent pool of research, this dissertation only briefly covers the peace process in 
Chapter 3.) 
 
With few exceptions, the literature does not delve deeply into the military and strategic 
dimensions of the conflict, beyond brief summaries of the intense war-fighting of 1992 and 
particularly violent attacks within the insurgency that followed. This is, in fact, one of the more 
striking aspects of the Tajik civil war literature – the near-uniformity with which most scholars 
follow a pattern of detailing the events of 1992, mentioning the beginnings of guerrilla warfare 
in 1993, noting the deaths of 25 Russian border guards in July of that year, and then shifting to 
the diplomatic arena and the launch of peace talks in 1994. All acknowledge that the conflict 
continued from 1993 to 1997, but military developments during these years are generally 
summed up very briefly, obscuring the significant variations in violence that occurred both 
geographically and over time. For example, the fact that the conflict fell into a relative lull in 
1995 before a significant escalation in violence in 1996 is usually glossed over, as are the 
relative oscillations in war-fighting activity at the Tajik-Afghan border and in the mountain 
valleys of eastern Tajikistan.  This curious conformity in the scope of analysis likely contributes 
to the general sense of consensus regarding the war, as more thorough analysis of these 
aspects might reveal more significant analytical divergence. It also necessitates the use of 
additional, contemporary media sources for analysis of the military aspects of the war, as 
discussed in Section 1.3. 
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Finally, with respect to the subject of this dissertation’s case study, there is an extremely 
limited amount of information on the PFT within the scholarly literature on Tajikistan, and 
virtually no primary sources attributable to the group itself. There are no full-length scholarly 
publications devoted solely to the PFT; at most, the group tends to receive a few paragraphs 
within treatments of the civil war in full. Put together, they provide a basic account of the 
group’s activities, but in order to fully analyse the PFT and its wartime behaviour this case 
study has relied more heavily upon contemporary media accounts and government and NGO 
reports. All of these sources have been carefully examined for purposes of credibility, and 
discrepancies noted. The resulting case study thus represents a major contribution to the 
literature on the Tajik civil war. 
 
In short, this dissertation has been undertaken with a full appreciation of the serious lacunae 
in the scholarship related to both civilian victimisation and the Tajik civil war, but with 
confidence that the utilisation of a wide range of primary and secondary sources and the 
construction of new analytical frameworks serve to compensate for these evidentiary 
difficulties.  
 
Having presented the aims and methods of this dissertation, I now turn to the first step in the 
strategic approach: an appraisal of the strategic environment within which the PFT and other 
conflict actors operated during the Tajik civil war. 
 47 
CHAPTER 2 
UNDERSTANDING PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE IN THE TAJIK CIVIL WAR:  




The Tajik civil war does not fit neatly into the familiar tropes of internecine conflict. It was 
neither a grand ideological confrontation nor an impassioned struggle for secession. It was not 
a superpower proxy war or a genocidal ethnic slaughter. Most intriguingly, it was not a binary 
conflict between a central state military and a rebellious non-state group: the Tajik regime did 
not have time to assemble a coherent armed force in the brief period between independence 
and open warfare, and thus the civil war featured a ragged cast of pro-regime militias, 
opposition guerrilla forces, foreign jihadis, Russian and Uzbek army units, Central Asian 
peacekeepers, and UN monitors and negotiators. In this sense, the Tajik civil war was more 
akin to wars of the decolonisation era – logically enough, given the parallels between the 
breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of European colonialism.131 
 
The aim of this dissertation is not simply to record the events of the Tajik civil war, but to 
understand its complex patterns of violence and the incentives for conflict actors to participate 
in transgressive and possibly counterproductive activities. The strategic approach requires 
analysis not just of an actor’s behaviour but of its environment and the intangible influences 
that shape strategic decision-making. Thus, as a first step, this chapter elaborates seven 
structural and historical factors that organised and shaped the violence perpetrated by the 
Popular Front of Tajikistan and other non-state armed forces during the civil war. These factors 
helped construct the strategic environment within which the war occurred, and were a 
primary determinant in how the PFT interpreted and responded to the ongoing strategic 
discourse throughout the conflict. They are: physical terrain and infrastructure; the Soviet 
structural and societal legacy; Tajik social structures; Tajik regionalism; Islam and Islamism; the 
military, political and economic transformations of the 1980s; and the emergence of the 
Kulyabi mafia.  
 
 
2.1  Physical Terrain and Infrastructure 
Tajikistan’s unusual topography – more than 90 per cent of the land is mountainous, and only 
7 per cent is arable – has facilitated the development of distinct regions, often physically 
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separate from each other, with varying levels and types of socioeconomic development and 
historically a ‘low level of contact’ between them. 132 Akiner notes that ‘28 [mountain] ranges 
slice the country into a patchwork of isolated (or at best semi-isolated) areas of habitation’, 
whilst Olimova discusses the prominence of regional ‘gorge identities’ over other types of 
identity – including national identity – for most Tajiks.133  
 
In addition, Tajik frontiers are not coterminous with the Central Asian population of Tajiks: at 
the time of independence in 1991, 62 percent of Tajikistan’s population of 5.1 million people 
were classified as Tajik while 23 percent were Uzbek (concentrated in areas contiguous to the 
Republic of Uzbekistan); millions of Tajiks lived across the borders in Uzbekistan and northern 
Afghanistan.134 This dispersion of the primary national affiliation impeded efforts to create a 
singular national identity post-1991 and contributed to the cross-border migration of conflict 
during the civil war. 
. 
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The topography of the Tajik republic had a significant impact on patterns of violence during the 
civil war. Terrain-delineated solidarity groupings shaped the terms of political conflict and 
enabled the mobilisation of local militias, which made up the bulk of combatants during the 
war. The mostly mountainous terrain had the effect of funnelling the conflict into key valleys 
(Vakhsh, Hissar and Karategin) and flatlands (Kurgan-Tyube). It prevented conflict from 
spreading into other areas, notably Leninabad (which was easily sealed off behind the 
Zarafshan mountain range). The mountains also helped conceal opposition bases in eastern 
Tajikistan as well as the supply routes between these bases and northern Afghanistan. Finally, 
the small amount of arable land has led to high population density in parts of the republic, 
making it possible to inflict significant human and physical damage even within a relatively 
small area. 
 
The physical terrain facilitated strategies of civilian victimisation in several instances. The 
opposition was able to impose a ‘blockade’ on the Kulyab region in part because it was already 
largely cut off from its allies by mountain ranges with few good roads.136 The Amu Darya river 
on the southern border (known historically as the Oxus, and locally as the Pyanj) inhibited the 
flight of civilians from ethnic cleansing operations carried out by the PFT. In the east, tens of 
thousands of civilians suffered from malnutrition, disease and cold for long periods due to the 
sheer inaccessibility of the Pamir region to outside aid. Finally, the lengthy border with 
Afghanistan led to Tajikistan becoming a key transit state for the narcotics trade, which as 
described in Chapter 4 had a range of deleterious effects on the Tajik population. 
 
All actors in the civil war faced serious disadvantages due to the relatively limited scale of 
transport and communications infrastructure in the Tajik republic (a function of the difficult 
terrain). Most notably, few roads connected the warring regions and the capital, which limited 
the movement of armed forces and allowed actors to impose blockades with a minimum 
application of resources.137 The roads that did exist were often blocked by snow from October 
to March, leading to a seasonal pattern of fighting during the guerrilla warfare phase of the 
conflict. Communication between cities and villages was easily shut off as well, impeding 
coordination between actors and encouraging the proliferation of rumours. Many of the 
rumours featured tales of atrocities, which contributed to demonisation of the enemy and 
attacks upon civilians. 
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The combination of the mountainous terrain and limited infrastructure combined to make the 
conflict a heavily localised one. Nourzhanov notes that in the Vakhsh raion, 94 per cent of the 
militants killed were near their place of birth or residence.138 It can be argued that this sort of 
localisation facilitated strategies of civilian victimisation for two reasons: 1) a focus on local 
targets, in heavily rural Tajikistan, would inevitably mean civilian targets, as few military and 
government targets existed; 2) local actors would face fewer problems with distinction, and 
could easily identify civilians associated with the enemy. 
 
 
2.2  The Structural and Societal Impact of Sovietisation 
Lying astride the path of mass nomadic invasions (the Huns, Turks and Mongols), competing 
imperial incursions (the Persians, Arabs and Russians) and valuable trading routes between 
Europe and China, the territory comprising modern-day Tajikistan has been subjected to many 
forms of dynastic rule. Some elements of continuity remain, including Persian culture and 
language, bequeathed by some of its earliest rulers and centralised in the great civilisational 
cities of Bukhara and Samarkand; and Islam, which arrived in the region alongside seventh-
century Arab invaders. The inhabitants of the region commingled culturally and linguistically 
beneath the political machinations of these various dynasties; as Roy notes, ‘The idea of 
associating a territory with an ethnic group defined by language was alien to the political ideas 
of the Muslims of Central Asia’. 139  
 
Russian tsarist expansion between 1868 and 1876 – part of the ‘Great Game’ waged between 
Russia and Great Britain in Central Asia – gradually enveloped the three Uzbek-ruled emirates 
of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva. This area was a prime battleground during the Russian civil war 
of 1918-20 but eventually Bolshevik forces triumphed (although local basmachi militias 
convened a guerrilla war against them throughout the 1920s). The Soviet Tajik republic – 
commonly thought to be ‘the most artificial Soviet construct in Central Asia’ – was pieced 
together from the former territories of the Kokand and Bukharan Emirates.140 Soviet 
demarcation of borders in Central Asia (known as the ‘national delimitation’) aimed to forestall 
the emergence of potentially powerful pan-Turkic movements by creating a patchwork of 
Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz territories in the Ferghana Valley and surrounding area. This left 
Tajikistan awkwardly shaped and deprived of the major centres of Tajik civilisation and 
learning (in particular, Bukhara and Samarkand, which were located in the new republic of 
                                                                 
138
 Nourzhanov (2005), 128. 
139
 Roy (2007), 3. See also: Rubin (1993), 75; Atkin (1997b), 280; Bennigsen (1985), 92; Heathershaw (2011), 21; 
Rubin (1998), 135-39.  
140
 Akiner (2001), 2. 
 51 
Uzbekistan).141 This loss left most of the Tajik intelligentsia outside of the territory of their new 
‘homeland’, inhibiting the development of a ‘Tajik identity’.142  
 
The Soviet impact upon Tajikistan was immense. All of the trappings of the modern nation-
state – government structures, political parties, administrative processes, rigid borders, a 
nation-based identity – originated in the Soviet era. Moscow also held to an unrelenting course 
in which Tajikistan provided raw materials – in particular, cotton and aluminium – to be 
processed elsewhere in the Soviet Union, keeping the overall state of development and 
industrialisation within the country to low levels and ensuring environmental degradation in 
the long run. These economic policies would have significant repercussions later in the 
century, as they led to internal migrations that would fuel future grievances.  
 
The negative political and economic effects of Sovietisation were accompanied by significant 
social improvements as well. Soviet modernisation greatly improved access to education, 
health care, transport and new economic markets. In the countryside, residents benefited 
from rural electrification and communications projects. The positive side of these changes was 
a more literate, healthy, mobile and economically engaged Tajik citizenry.143 The downside – in 
addition to ongoing political repression and forced migration – was the creation of a society 
kept in a state of ‘extreme dependency’ by the comprehensive provision of the accoutrements 
of modern existence by the Soviet system.144 In addition, comparative inequalities fostered 
resentment in the regions that did not always receive such modernising largesse (such as the 
Karategin Valley).145 These grievances would help mobilise opposition movements and militias 
in the post-independence era. 
 
The Soviet era also saw the solidification of strong regional identities, which would later 
contribute to the outbreak of war. The imposition of collectivisation reinforced local, clan-like 
allegiances, as traditional affiliations revolving around a village or extended family were 
subsumed within the new communist entity of the ‘kolkhoz’, or collective farm.146 As Naumkin 
writes, ‘[O]n the one hand the kolkhoz, ‘as a new tribe’, was an attempt at modernization of 
traditional social networks and structures, replacing them with new, territory-based ones; but 
on the other it fostered their preservation and social perpetuation, rather than their 
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destruction’.147 Each kolkhoz, to a large extent, was a ‘self-contained social unit’, and it was not 
uncommon for neighbouring kolkhozes to have minimal contact with each other.148 In the 
context of forced internal migration during the Soviet era – during which entire kolkhozes 
were relocated to different regions – this ‘froze’ local identities in a way that facilitated 
communal clashes during the civil war. 
 
In sum, Sovietisation structured the Tajik republic in ways that would facilitate the outbreak of 
war and the organisation of violence along regional lines, and its administrative treatment of 
certain regional ‘clans’ would create the conditions for grievance and demonisation that 
fuelled civilian victimisation during the war. 
 
 
2.3  Tajik Social Structures   
Tajikistan remained a largely rural society; only 32 per cent of the population lived in urban 
areas in 1990.149 Those Tajiks allowed by the Soviet authorities to migrate to the cities typically 
brought rural social structures with them. Thus, the social organisation of the countryside – in 
both its traditional and Soviet forms – had an outsize impact on collective and individual 
affiliations and relationships throughout the entire republic. Further, the organisation of Tajik 
society – particularly rural society – had key implications for the response of communities to 
the breakdown of the state and the mobilisation of rural populations for war.  
 
The most important basis of Tajik affiliation has traditionally been the avlod, or extended 
family: a ‘kinship/patronymic group’ of hierarchically organised blood relatives, headed 
(usually) by a male leader and linked to a particular locale.150 Avlods were a key element of the 
regional patronage networks that formed the foundation of Tajik political, economic and social 
life during the Soviet era. When the civil war began, the rapid mobilisation of rural populations 
was accomplished largely via avlod social structures: 
 
The Tajik scholars Saodat and Muzaffar Olimovy consider the avlod 
structure to be one of the main drivers of mobilisation for fighting during 
the conflict. According to their interviews with former war participants, 
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many fought because they were prompted by the avlod leaders and had 




As emphasised by Akiner, however, it would be a mistake to characterise the conflict as a 
battle between avlods; they were a ‘conduit for mobilizing group action’.152  
 
Gaps and gashtaks represent another key social affiliation in Tajik life. They are social networks 
for male Tajiks, based on professional, educational or other connections. During the Soviet era 
these traditional solidarity groups also helped patronage systems function and were a key 
mechanism for transmitting information through society.153 And, like the avlod structure, they 
facilitated mobilisation during the war – in particular, the mobilisation of criminal elements.  
 
These solidarity networks based on family and profession operate within the collective social 
institution known as the mahalla, or neighbourhood; a typical village, or kishlak, might have 
one or several, whilst in urban areas a mahalla might encompass but a single street.154 
Mahallas aim to be largely self-regulating, with a leader who settles disputes and organises 
help for those in need. Whilst they serve as effective forms of local governance, mahallas also 
reinforce a tendency toward localism in social affiliations, and fail to ‘provide sufficient 
incentives for common national or interregional collaboration’.155 Rural residents who moved 
to cities tended to settle along mahalla and village patterns brought along from the 
countryside. These also facilitated mobilisation when conflict broke out.156  
 
In sum, the types of traditional social structures still existing in Tajikistan at the time of 
independence played a key role in shaping participation in civil war violence, as group loyalties 
were the primary mechanism for mobilising and organising the use of violence during the war. 
 
 
2.4  Tajik Regions and Regionalism 
Tajik regional divisions, whilst heavily influenced by physical terrain, are more than simply 
geographical affiliations. Over time, the accretion of divergent political, socioeconomic and 
religious trends lent characteristics to each region that superseded those of mere territory. In 
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addition, regionalism became a decisive organising principle during the war not solely because 
of individual affinity for particular normative identities, but because of the development of 
powerful, regionally and locally based patronage networks immersed in the administrative 
infrastructure that accompanied Soviet collectivisation policies. Tajiks, like other Central 
Asians,  
 
predominantly identified himself/herself with a place, kolkhoz, sovkhoz or 
any other work group rather than his/her national features. Each of these 
units had their own leaders who controlled the distribution of subsidies 





Kolkhoz directors – who in pre-Soviet times would have been ‘rural notables’ – formed the 
linchpins of patronage networks, by distributing resources to those under their authority 
whilst also building and maintaining relationships with their party and government 
superiors.158 They played a key role at the outbreak of war, as they were able to quickly 
mobilise kolkhoz residents on behalf of a particular elite faction. 
 
These types of patronage networks were common throughout the Soviet Union (despite being 
officially condemned as ‘nepotism’ or ‘clientalism’) and to a large extent enabled the 
Communist system to function, particularly in the less developed republics.159 The 
phenomenon was particularly pronounced in Central Asia, however, as administrative 
patronage was reinforced by familial ties (i.e., avlod structures) as well. Over time, these 
networks would develop into something that could be referred to as a ‘clan’ – not in the usual 
sense of an extended family grouping, linked to a singular primordial ancestor, but as a way of 
connoting a hybrid network of professional and familial ties, centred on a particular 
geographical area.160 For example, the so-called ‘Leninabadi clan’ included avlods as well as 
people unrelated to each other, who all derived their status and income from the same 
structures of governance and wealth in Leninabad.  
 
Regional identities were also sharpened by the region-based competition for resources 
throughout the Soviet era. Benefits and resources were centrally distributed from Moscow and 
Dushanbe, and deprived communities had little autonomy to generate their own revenues. 
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They could not know the parlous state of the Tajik (and USSR) economy overall, and instead 
presumed that resources were being unfairly distributed to other regions at their expense.161 
This sort of competition and sense of injustice remained a mostly latent social grievance in the 
late Soviet period, but it was activated to great effect during the post-independence turmoil. 
 
For most of the civil war period (1992-1997), Tajikistan was divided into three regions and one 
autonomous region:  
 
• Dushanbe and its subordinate districts, including Gharm and Hissar  
• Leninabad, the northern region known since 2000 as Sughd  
• Khatlon, the southern region created in 1993 from the merger of Kurgan-
Tyube and Kulyab 
• Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), comprising the eastern half 
of the country.162  
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It is perhaps more accurate to say that the war was driven not by regions but by regional elites. 
There was little overt hostility or violence amongst the ordinary inhabitants of different 
regions in the years leading up to the war. This is not to suggest that inter-communal tensions 
never existed – communities had clashed over land and water resources in previous decades in 
Kurgan-Tyube and the Ferghana Valley – but there is a broad consensus that such ‘micro-
conflicts’, even when between different ethnic or regional communities (such as Gharmis and 
Uzbeks), did not represent entrenched or ‘primordial’ communal hatreds.164 Rather, they were 
a fairly typical result of competition for resources in the context of impoverishment. Whilst 
these previous conflicts were to some extent resurrected in the context of civil war violence, 
they were not the direct cause of the war itself.165 
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During the civil war, conflict was driven by competition for power and resources amongst 
regional elites, who were able to mobilise militias and spark an escalating war of atrocities 
within the broader population. As Kilavuz notes, 
 
The conflict started in Dushanbe as a struggle among elites at the republic 
level, and then spread to other regions through the activity of militias. This 
was a top-down mobilization. The activation of networks by the elites and 
their decision to work with illegal groups for the support of their cause were 
especially important for the beginning of the civil war, and its spread to 
other regions of the country. 
 
He thus rejects the notion that the civil war occurred due to local conflicts becoming somehow 
intensified (an alternative explanation for civil war outbreak in the theoretical literature).166 
 
However, as the war went on, and large-scale civilian victimisation occurred, communal 
violence reinforced regional affiliations to a much greater degree. Revenge and Tajik ‘blood 
feud’ norms spurred demonisation and hatred of opposing regions, and dissenting members 
within each region fled or were driven out, leaving more homogenised districts behind. The 
ethnic cleansing operations in Dushanbe in 1993 – in which civilians were singled out solely 
according to regional origin – demonstrate that regionalism indeed became an important 
shaper of violence in the later stages of the conflict.167  
 
Given the central importance of regionalism to the causes and conduct of the war, the salient 
characteristics of each region are here briefly described. 
 
Dushanbe 
Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, was little more than a weekly bazaar town until it became 
the capital of the new Soviet Tajik Republic in 1929. Its population grew sharply in the Soviet 
era (to roughly 600,000 in 1989). The Dushanbe region includes a number of subordinate 
districts to the east and west of the city.  Gharm (a mountainous region northeast of Dushanbe 
in the Karategin/Rasht Valley) and Hissar (an industrial region west of Dushanbe, on the Uzbek 
border) played a significant role in the civil war.  Gharmis made up a large portion of both the 
pre-war intelligentsia and the Islamist opposition forces, and the region was a primary location 
for guerrilla fighters during the second phase of the war. Gharmi opposition to the regime was 
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largely a result of the growing economic (but not political) power of Gharmi elites, their 
resentment of Leninabadi political dominance, and their frustration with a lack of social 
mobility.168 Conversely, Hissar – like most other Uzbek areas – largely supported the pro-
government forces during the first year of the war; some of the most powerful PFT factions 
and commanders hailed from Hissar.169 Following the Kulyabi takeover of the regime in 1993, 




The Leninabad (now Sughd) region, encompassing the northern spur of the country, is 
surrounded by Uzbek and Kyrgyz territory and separated from the rest of Tajikistan by the 
Zarafshan mountains, which until recently were impassable by road in the winter. Historically 
the region was part of the Kokand Emirate, whilst most of the rest of the republic was carved 
out of territory from the Emirate of Bukhara. The Kokand Emirate had been directly 
incorporated into tsarist Russia in the 19th century and thus was exposed to industrialisation 
and modern education much earlier than other areas. As a result of these historical and 
geographical circumstances, Leninabad has had a large Uzbek population (roughly one-third of 
the region’s population), closer ties to Uzbekistan, and an important role as the industrial 
centre of Tajikistan.170 By the end of the Soviet era, Leninabad accounted for about 65 per cent 
of Tajikistan’s GDP.171 
 
Significantly, Leninabad was also the first region to be taken by the Bolsheviks, and the only 
region where they could recruit sufficiently educated and modernised personnel to run the 
republic. It remained the power base for the Tajik Communist Party throughout the Soviet era, 
supplying the ranks of Party members as well as all First Secretaries after 1946. Northern elites 
formed solid political and personal networks aimed at consolidating their hold on power, 
excluding other regions from advancing in the political and economic spheres: for example, 
through 1992, three-quarters of ‘key positions’ in government were held by Leninabadis.172 
This dominance should not obscure, however, the participation of elites from other regions in 
key government posts or the fact that from the 1980s the Leninabadis lost full control of the 
security sector to the Pamiris. They also never firmly controlled political structures in the rural 
areas of other provinces.173 
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Nevertheless, the region’s grip on power in Tajikistan stoked resentment among other regions 
and proved a major factor in the outbreak of civil war after independence.  The lack of 
significant interaction between inhabitants of Leninabad and the other regions meant there 
was little basis for resentment and hostility, aside from the inescapable fact that the 
northerners controlled both the political apparatus and the flow of resources into the country. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that status quo was determined to be ripe for change by 
previously marginalised groups. 
 
Khatlon   
Southern Tajikistan is largely agricultural and the most populous region of the country. In 
1993, the two southern regions of Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab were merged to form the 
administrative region of Khatlon. However, the two areas retain distinct identities and, as civil 
war adversaries, throughout most of this dissertation will be referred to as separate entities.174  
 
Kurgan-Tyube was the site of most of the armed clashes during the first year of the civil war 
(along with Dushanbe) and as Human Rights Watch noted at the time, its ‘complex 
demographic structure is key to understanding the pattern and targets of violence that 
characterised the civil war’.175 Historically, Kurgan-Tyube was largely an arid desert, sparsely 
peopled by Lakay Uzbeks and nomads who spoke Tajik but considered themselves ‘Arabs by 
descent’.176 Beginning in the late 1920s, however, the imposition of massive irrigation projects 
and cotton farming operations by the Soviets transformed the region into a more settled, 
agricultural area. This also required an expanded labour force, and over the next few decades, 
hundreds of thousands of people were transferred from mountainous regions like Gharm and 
the Pamirs, as well as parts of Kulyab.177 Entire villages were relocated whole and generally 
resettled within a single kolkhoz, or as distinct ‘brigades’ or kishlaks within a larger kolkhoz, 
thus retaining longstanding social and geographical identities.178 
 
This internal migration of highlanders to the lowlands introduced more volatile demographics 
to Kurgan-Tyube, as the self-contained kolkhoz system allowed the newcomers – who 
continued to be collectively referred to as ‘Gharmis’ and ‘Kulyabis’ – to remain in many cases 
non-integrated and culturally distinct whilst at the same time competing for resources in their 
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new homeland. 179 This set the stage for future communitarian conflict. As Roy notes, ‘The end 
result of sedentarisation and forced population transfers was often to create competition 
between groups which had not hitherto been in competition. The systematic territorialisation 
implemented by the Soviets also had the consequence of creating antagonisms between 
ethnic groups where they had not existed before’.180 
 
Throughout most of the Soviet era, the inhabitants of Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab had little 
power or wealth. Starting in the 1970s, however, the elites of Leninabad initiated a 
cooperative relationship with the Kulyabis that endured until the civil war. The reasons for the 
emergence of this cooperation are several, including the rise of a more educated elite in 
Kulyab and economic ties resulting from cotton production; northern elites may also have 
initiated the alliance with Kulyab in order to hold off demands from frustrated Gharmi elites.181 
Leninabad remained the dominant party, acting as a patron to the less powerful Kulyabis. 
Today, however, the Kulyabi elite are the most powerful faction in the country, due in large 
part to the fact that their armed militias were the first and strongest defenders of the regime 
as civil war broke out.  
 
Gorno-Badakhshan 
Gorno-Badakhshan is the largest region of Tajikistan, covering 40 per cent of its territory and 
most of its eastern half, but it contains only 3 percent of the population due to its most 
distinguishing physical characteristic: the Pamir Mountains, often referred to as ‘the roof of 
the world’, from which the Himalaya, Karakoram, Tien Shan and Hindu Kush mountain ranges 
unfurl.  
 
The residents of Gorno-Badakhshan are known as Pamiris, an ethnic group characterised by its 
use of an eastern, rather than western, Persian dialect that cannot be understood elsewhere in 
the country, as well as the adherence of many to Isma’ilism (a sect of Shi’a Islam) instead of 
the Sunni Islam dominant in the rest of Tajikistan. Pamiri adherence to Isma’ilism has led to 
their traditional preference for a secular (as opposed to shari’a) state; Pamiris would 
potentially face great hardship under a strict Islamic state, given widespread notions of 
Isma’ilism as heretical (by both Sunnis and Twelver Shi’a).182 These distinctive linguistic and 
religious characteristics, unfortunately, made it easier for PFT militias to identify and victimise 
Pamiris in Dushanbe during the civil war.  
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During the 1980s, the Pamiris became heavily represented among the security services within 
the Tajik republic, for two reasons: 1) Soviet Premier Andropov’s anti-corruption crusade in the 
Central Asian republics led him to set the previously marginalised Pamiris into watchdog 
positions over the Leninabadi and Kulyabi elites at the Ministry of Interior (MVD); 2) following 
Afghan Isma’ili support for the communist government in Kabul, the Soviets believed the 
Pamiris were more trustworthy in the security apparatus than the Tajiks and Uzbeks, who 
might side with their ethno-religious cousins amongst the Afghan mujahidin.183 This 
regionalisation of a key security sector would have important consequences during the 
outbreak of civil war, as Pamiris largely supported the opposition and thus the regime could 
not depend on MVD police forces to uphold its authority as armed clashes broke out.  
 
In sum, the distinct development of each region’s socioeconomic conditions and populations, 
and the structural mechanisms within which they related to each other, was a critical driver of 
the outbreak of conflict and perhaps the most important determinant of how violence was 
organised and targeted. 
 
 
2.5  Islam and Islamism in Tajikistan 
Another key organising principle during the civil war was Islam -- or, more specifically, the 
dispute as to the degree of influence Islam should have in the political and social lives of 
Tajikistan’s citizens. Nevertheless, neither Islam nor Islamism should be seen as a ‘cause’ of the 
civil war. Rather, political Islam – ‘a modern political ideology that calls for Islam to be linked in 
some way to the state’ – helped define and shape the opposition movement, whilst also giving 
the staunchly secular PFT a substantial vector for demonisation rhetoric and behaviour.184 
 
Tajik Muslims – outside of the Pamirs – are overwhelmingly Sunni and followers of the Hanafi 
madhhab (school of law), known for its use of rationalist and subjective judgment in 
interpreting Islamic principles and laws and considered more liberal than, for example, the 
Hanbali school popular in Saudi Arabia.185 The Hanafi emphasis on consensus-building 
‘facilitated the Islamization of pre-Islamic norms and traditions’ and was key for the spread of 
Sufism, a mystical and highly spiritual form of Islam that from the eleventh century was the 
primary vehicle for the Islamisation of Central Asia beyond urban centres.186 Sufism is 
                                                                 
183
 Rubin (1993), 75; Roy (2007), 106, 128. 
184
 Collins (2007), 67; Interviews (AUCA), Bishkek, 2008. 
185
 Olimova (1999), 1; Lewis (2008), 185. 
186
 Naumkin (2005), 7. 
 62 
controversial in other parts of the Islamic world – particularly in Arab regions, where Sufis are 
often considered heretics. In Central and South Asia, however, Sufism thoroughly permeates 
both the practice of Islam and the structure of rural society.187 The prevalence of Sufi Islamic 
beliefs and practices helps account for Tajik resistance to certain fundamentalist or Wahhabist 
strains of Islam, according to which Sufis are apostates and legitimate targets of violence. 
 
Soviet attitudes toward Islam in Central Asia vacillated between harsh repression and 
accommodation. In the 1930s, the darkest years of Stalinism, the Soviets destroyed mosques 
and executed Islamic scholars; in the 1940s, when Stalin needed Muslim support in the Second 
World War, the campaign of enforced atheism was relaxed. In 1943 Stalin created four 
‘spiritual directorates’ to govern the affairs of Soviet Muslims; each Soviet republic also had its 
own Qazi, a sort of head Islamic judge and theologian. After the war, these official religious 
institutions were used to channel Soviet Islam into acceptable paths; they restricted the 
practice of Islam to minor levels whilst also advertising official tolerance of Islam for Cold War 
propaganda purposes.188  
 
This form of ‘official Islam’ was not popular in Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics. 
Instead, a more traditional or ‘parallel’ Islam endured and covertly sustained popular religious 
practices throughout the Soviet era.189 The pivotal figures in this process were the Sufi 
shaykhs, who were extremely respected within Tajik society due to their longstanding and 
hereditary roles as custodians of traditional shrines, educators, spiritual guides and advocates 
for the unfortunate. Despite the risks of imprisonment or exile, many shaykhs continued to 
lead religious activities in secret and thus helped maintain the practice of a more authentic and 
traditional form of Islam than that allowed by official Islam. Many Tajiks maintained a sort of 
dual identity: publicly communist, privately religious. This unspoken bargain worked for the 
most part, but it was not sustainable. The loosening authority of the Soviet regime in the 1980s 
allowed a burgeoning of religious expression in Tajikistan, as discussed in the following section. 
 
In short, an examination of Islam and Islamism in Tajikistan yields several significant insights 
into the normative stance and affiliation of conflict actors. It helps explain the rhetoric and 
political ideology of the major combatant forces; the resistance of most Tajiks to more radical 
ideologies; and the mechanisms by which Islamic beliefs and practices survived the brutal 
Soviet era and were thus able to exert such substantial influence upon conflict actors. These 
normative influences would play a key role in shaping civilian victimisation, as they facilitated 
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processes of demonisation and self-defence legitimisation that helped actors transcend 
societal taboos against violence toward civilians. 
 
 
2.6  Tajikistan in the Turbulent 1980s: Military, Political and Economic  
        Developments 
During the last fifteen years of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, a number of pivotal events 
and trends occurred that would contribute to the outbreak of civil war and the manner in 
which it was conducted. Among these were: the Soviet war in Afghanistan; political and 
economic instability; and the flowering of Islamic cultural, religious and political organisations. 
 
The Tajik republic was an important staging ground for Soviet operations in Afghanistan. 
Central Asian Muslims comprised 30-40 per cent of the initial invading force, and the Soviets 
utilised Tajiks in particular as interpreters.190 This helped introduce new Islamist 
interpretations into the Tajik republic.191 As the war evolved in part into an ideological 
confrontation between communism and Islam, many Tajiks felt increasingly drawn to the 
latter. Islam, as an identity and mobilising force, appeared much more dynamic, powerful and 
egalitarian to Tajiks suffering in the poorest Soviet republic, dominated by ethnic Russians 
from faraway Moscow. The brutal manner in which the Soviets conducted the war – more than 
a million Afghans were killed – also led Central Asian Muslims to sympathise more deeply with 
the mujahidin cause.192 
 
Thus, the Afghan war played a key role in the emerging Tajik Islamist movement, whilst also 
serving as a bleak tutorial to all Tajik factions of the realities of intrastate war. During the Tajik 
civil war, the enduring Afghan conflict was often invoked as a worst-case scenario to be 
avoided at all costs.193 Importantly, the Afghan war also laid the groundwork for cross-border 
affiliations in the context of conflict. Afghan Tajiks were known to retreat into Tajik territory 
during combat with the Soviets; during the Tajik civil war, opposition militants retreated to 
bases in northern Afghanistan. Later, Afghan Tajiks would again make use of Tajik territory 
when pressed by the Taliban.  
 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost policies – combined with economic afflictions – 
contributed to regional tensions and potential threats to the status quo. The inability of the 
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Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) to cope with poverty and unemployment in the republic – 
which reached critical levels in the 1980s – fed popular resentment of the government (and, 
hence, the Leninabadis) and decreased the legitimacy of communism even further. (Whilst the 
communist regime did not admit to any unemployment, IMF figures later estimated Tajik 
unemployment in 1990 to be 22.8 per cent.194) Marginalised groups – i.e., factions outside the 
ruling Leninabad-Kulyab patronage networks – searched for alternative ideological rallying 
points, and turned to nationalism, democracy and political Islam. Popular frustrations over 
unemployment, corruption and environmental degradation – previously taboo topics – began 
to be aired. All of these grievances would gradually become politicised by Tajik intelligentsia 
and facilitate the formation of new political activist groups.195 
 
Leninabad power was further diminished by Moscow’s withdrawal of subsidies to the republic 
upon the breakup of the Soviet Union; this not only wrecked the economy, a Leninabadi 
responsibility, but also drastically reduced the amount of patronage the Leninabadis could dole 
out. Rubin notes that states dependent on external funding are ‘particularly susceptible to 
conflict among ethnic and other groups if subsidies decline’; in Tajikistan, where subsidies from 
Moscow made up 40-50 per cent (or, according to unofficial estimates, up to 80 per cent) of 
government expenditures, the CPT was forced to ‘search for new sources of political support, 
which it found in regionalism and patron-client relations’.196 In short, the power relationships 
amongst the regional elites within Tajikistan were not driven wholly by endogenous factors, 
but heavily influenced by decisions and developments in Moscow. 
 
A number of key civil war actors emerged in the late 1980s as a result of glasnost liberalisation. 
Rastakhiz, founded in 1989, focused on Tajik cultural renewal and was popular amongst the 
intelligentsia and students.197 A more important player was the Democratic Party of Tajikistan 
(DPT), founded in 1990, which explicitly advocated Tajik independence and the creation of a 
parliamentary democracy and market economy. La’li Badakhshan, also created in 1990, 
originated as a mainly cultural group for Pamiri elites, but later took on a more political cast, 
advocating greater autonomy for Gorno-Badakhshan. These new movements were largely 
secular and democratically oriented, with varying tinges of nationalistic appeals.  
 
Finally, the relaxation of official controls on Islam and the influx of new activist ideals into the 
republic would have a major impact on the post-independence landscape. The combination of 
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political repression, economic deprivation and a ‘stagnating’ official clergy encouraged many 
young Tajiks to investigate the ideas of Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood; the 
Salafi principles espoused by ideologues such as al-Banna and Qutb were gradually recast by 
Tajik Islamists, who recognised the strong local preference for traditional Islamic practices and 
a secular state.198 Under glasnost in the 1980s, Soviet authorities allowed a renewal of religious 
expression in the republic: mosques and madrassahs were reopened and contacts with foreign 
Muslim organisations permitted. Reportedly, the number of mosques in Tajikistan rose from 
17 in the pre-glasnost era to more than 4000.199  
 
With this new spirit in the air, in October 1990 an underground conference formally created 
the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP), or Hizb-i Nehzat-i Islami. Its aims included 
spiritual revival, political sovereignty for the republic and legal rights for its citizens, and the 
spread of ‘Islamic norms’ throughout society and politics.200 IRP leader Muhammad Sharif 
Himmatzoda stated at the time that the IRP wanted a democratic state, not an Islamic one; 
whilst tagged as ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘Wahhabist’ by opponents, the IRP never officially called 
for the establishment of an Islamic state or imposition of shari’a, mainly because it did not 
believe this to be a feasible goal.201 Yet the IRP, along with other opposition groups, struggled 
to gain recruits; political Islam as an ideology had not spread far beyond urban areas. A 
notable exception were the Gharmis, a traditionally deeply religious group, who in their 
political opposition to the regime drifted more heavily toward the IRP.202 
 
The deeply conservative communist regime itself was so enamoured of the status quo that 
unlike other Central Asian regimes, it remained hostile to the republic-based nationalism 
sweeping through the entire Soviet Union. Whilst other republic leaderships incorporated 
nationalistic sentiments in their attempts to stay in power, the Tajik elite  
 
fell back on its Soviet phraseology and reiterated its commitment to 
‘internationalism’ in the framework of the Soviet Union. This was done even 
after the collapse of the Union. The leadership’s lack of political perception 
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In sum, the political and economic dislocations of the 1980s shaped the strategic environment 
by spawning a number of new actors and ideological currents that would play a pivotal role in 
the civil war. Without this prolonged period of gradual liberalisation and disintegration, it is 
unlikely the contest for power in the post-independence era would have featured so many 
players, or that some of them would have been so influential. However, it is worth 
remembering that similar political and social processes were ongoing in the other Central 
Asian republics, which managed to transition to independent statehood without major 
conflict. The drawn-out death throes of the Soviet Union shaped the outbreak of war in 
Tajikistan in many ways, but they did not make conflict inevitable. 
 
 
2.7  The Kulyabi Mafia Before the War 
Finally, a closer look at the development of organised crime networks in the Kulyab region 
helps explain the nature and origins of the PFT, whose behaviour is the focus of this 
dissertation. Criminal groups ran rampant in the Soviet ‘shadow economies’ that emerged in 
the stagnant 1970s and gradually opening 1980s.204 In Central Asia, traditional forms of 
authority and political interaction were overlaid with the illicit connections and networks 
typical of organised crime and government corruption. As defined by Rubin, ‘“Clan” connotes 
the use of the idiom of kinship to cement solidarity within the parallel economy and patronage 
networks of Central Asia… “Mafia” connotes the use of violent sanctions within those same 
networks’.205 
 
Local and regional mafias ran the shadow economies, exploiting state resources for criminal 
gain and establishing parallel, independent socioeconomic structures and personal 
‘fiefdoms’.206 Economists estimated that the black market (which was especially strong in 
agricultural products) accounted for more than a quarter of the Tajik GDP.207 The shadow 
economies produced local authority figures who had significant wealth and local legitimacy but 
no place in the official structures of the Soviet system. Instead, these criminal networks 
formed symbiotic relationships with various political actors, providing funds, goods and a 
source for coercive threats in exchange for official protection from arrest or interference (a 
common dynamic throughout the Soviet Union, it could be seen as ‘Brezhnev’s solution for a 
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stifling centralized economy’).208 These connections would later be used to mobilise men and 
arms when war broke out.  
 
Criminality also expanded with the emergence of an unemployed, anti-social pool of Tajik 
youth. Birth rates in the republic were high, and in 1980, 60 per cent of the population were 
youths under sixteen: 
 
Some of these jobless youths began to drift to the cities in search of work 
but for the most part they were unable to integrate into urban life. They 
remained on the margins of society and were easily drawn into anti-social 
behaviour. Soldiers returning from service in Afghanistan became a ready 
source of narcotics; small arms, too, began to circulate illegally. Sports 
groups specialising in martial arts acquired great popularity at this time; 
many of them had a criminal character. Thus, a youth sub-culture developed 
that was beyond the control of the authorities. It was characterised by a 




In time, this pool of marginalised and aggressive men would be tapped for political as well as 
criminal violence. 
 
In Kulyab, a substantial criminal organisation had emerged by the time of independence, in 
part due to the added opportunities and connections resulting from the ‘alliance’ with the 
Leninabadis.210 Among the leading criminal bosses was Sangak Safarov. 
Born in 1928, Safarov, because of his connections, age and life experience, 
was the leader of a number of neighbourhood communities in the city of 
Kulyab... Safarov headed a cluster of traditional male unions, or gashtaks, 
which provided him with human resources for political and military action. 
Across Kulyab, Safarov was respectfully known as bobo Sangak, i.e. the 
‘grandfather’. Contrary to some speculations, Safarov was not a ‘thief-in-
law’—the highest informal rank in the Soviet underworld. Nonetheless, his 
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authority amongst criminal figures not only in Tajikistan and Central Asia, 
but also elsewhere in the Soviet Union was exceptionally high.
211
 
Safarov spent more than twenty years in prison for murder and other offences. He then spent 
most of the 1980s running a bar (always helpful for illicit activity and networking) in the city of 
Kulyab. He was well known in Dushanbe as a leader of the ‘Kulyabi mafia’, which accumulated 
money and influence by enforcing protection rackets, collecting debts, engaging in extortion 
and the like.212 Safarov had good connections with corrupt local and national elites as well as a 
broad base of local supporters through his leadership of several gashtaks. His political leanings 
were foreshadowed by his chairmanship of Oshkoro, a Kulyabi political organisation created in 
1989 to promote Kulyabi interests within the context of an opening political arena (its slogan 
was ‘Kulyab for the Kulyabis’).213 He was thus well placed to organise an armed force from 
amongst both his criminal and traditional networks of associates when the regime’s call for 
help came in 1992.  
 
Other than the illicit nature of their economic activity, the Kulyabi mafia did not significantly 
differ from other solidarity groups at the time. It was an informal network of men with 
common interests and associations, with a social structure apparent to its members. As Roy 
notes, 
 
…the much-decried mafia can be seen as just a solidarity group oriented 
towards ‘business’. The war in Tajikistan has shown the inter-relatedness of 
these different kinds of networks: Sangak Safarov, head of the Kulyabi 
militias, and Yakub Salimov, minister of the interior from 1993 to 1994, were 
‘mafia’ figures allegedly involved in smuggling and racketeering during the 
Soviet era, but they immediately became military leaders of the Kulyabi 
faction, because their mafia was simply the expression of Kulyabi solidarity 




The criminal groups that formed an important basis for the PFT did not emerge from a 
vacuum; they had a long and established history within Kulyab before independence and civil 
war. The criminals who fought in the war should not be seen solely as disenfranchised, 
unproductive and sociopathic members of society (although undoubtedly some were); many 
were members of informal but organised social networks that generated significant sums of 
                                                                 
211
 Nourzhanov (2005), 115. 
212
 Kilavuz (2009b), 701. 
213
 Kuzmin (2001), 178; Abdullaev and Akbarzadeh (2002), 2; Moscow News, 9/4/93(b). 
214
 Roy (2007), 100. 
 69 
money and local status in the pre-war era.215 With the disappearance of the Soviet 
mechanisms that the Leninabadis used to maintain ‘social control’, the Kulyabi mafia groups 
became even more potentially powerful. Thus, an examination of the pre-war Kulyabi mafia 
helps dispel the notion that the PFT engaged in victimisation simply because its members were 
criminals and ‘dead-enders’ accustomed to individualistic and irrational violence.  
 
 
2.8  Conclusion: Zones of Conflict and Centres of Gravity 
A key assumption within the strategic approach is that strategic discourse and military 
engagements cannot on their own account for an actor’s strategy and behaviour. It is 
necessary to examine their strategic environment and the broader historical and structural 
context to their use of violence. This chapter has examined seven aspects of pre-war Tajik 
society and politics that were the most influential upon the outbreak of conflict, the 
mobilisation of conflict actors and the organisation of violent behaviour during the war.  
 
All of the factors noted above resulted in violence being limited, for the most part, to four 
zones of conflict within the country. Civilian victimisation was prominent in each of these four 
zones. They were: 
 
• Dushanbe and nearby raions (e.g., Hissar and Kofarnihon). Here the violence consisted 
largely of urban warfare between militias. 
• Khatlon, in particular the Vakhsh river valley and the flatlands of Kurgan-Tyube. There 
was a wider range of violence here: urban warfare in Kurgan-Tyube city, armed clashes 
between militias on the kolkhozy, and ethnic cleansing of villages and farms. 
• The Tajik-Afghan border, on the southern edge of Kurgan-Tyube. The conflict here was 
complicated by the presence of Russian Border Troops and Afghan mujahidin. There 
were armed clashes between militias, attacks on the thousands of refugees penned up 
against the Amu Darya, and gunfights between the Border Troops and infiltrators from 
Afghanistan. 
• The Karategin and Tavildara valleys, east of Dushanbe. These were opposition 
strongholds, and the site of several government offensives to eliminate their militias. 
 
The civil war proved to be fairly chaotic, with largely autonomous field commanders operating 
in an ad hoc and opportunistic manner. As the war progressed, however, several targets 
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emerged as key centres of gravity for the opposing forces in each region: 
 
• Dushanbe and the larger regional towns (Kurgan-Tyube city, Kofarnihon, Pyanj, 
Gharm). The towns emerged as key targets for various reasons: for example, 
Kofarnihon and Gharm because they were opposition strongholds, and Pyanj because 
it was a key border crossing. 
• The kolkhozy in Kurgan-Tyube, where much of the population was settled and large 
amounts of food, fuel and other resources could be plundered. 
• Major infrastructure targets such as the Nurek dam, which were attractive for the 
leverage they would provide to whoever controlled them. 
• The major river valleys, such as Vakhsh and Karategin. Control of the valleys meant 
control of most of the population and arable land, and often the only transport routes 
through the countryside and to the borders. 
 
In sum, the conflict was shaped not just by the political aspects of the conflict nor by the 
resources commanded by each side, but by the physical environment in which they operated 
and the normative characteristics that determined the targets of armed force. Bearing this in 
mind, the dissertation now turns to the events of the civil war itself and the emergence of the 
PFT as a conflict actor. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A STRATEGIC HISTORY OF THE TAJIK CIVIL WAR 
 AND THE POPULAR FRONT OF TAJIKISTAN 
 
The complexity and obscurity of the Tajik civil war has hindered the development of strategic 
case studies of the conflict and its combatants, thus necessitating the construction of an 
expanded strategic history before evaluating dynamics of civilian victimisation. This chapter 
presents this strategic history both as an empirical contribution to the literature and as a 
necessary step in the five-step strategic approach outlined in Chapter 1. Before turning to the 
specifics of PFT targeting choices, and having already considered the strategic environment in 
which they operated, it is necessary to consider their actual strategic behaviour over the 
course of the conflict. 
 
This chapter thus focuses on the emergence and development of the PFT, whilst also providing 
an original overview of the conflict’s key events. I address and answer a number of questions 
critical to understanding the wartime behaviour of the PFT, including: 
 
• What were the origins of the PFT? 
• Who were its leaders and members? 
• Why and where did it fight? 
• What war-fighting strategies did it pursue? 
• How was it supplied and organised? 
• How did it change over time? 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, I have divided the time period under discussion into two 
phases. Phase I represents the first year of the war (1992-93), which featured the most intense 
fighting and concluded with the dissolution of the PFT following its victory in Dushanbe.  Phase 
II covers the following four years of irregular warfare and political-criminal violence (1993-97), 
during which PFT members both challenged and supported the new regime. The chapter 
concludes with a summary evaluation of the PFT as a combatant force and conflict actor. 
 
 
3.1  Phase I: 1992-1993 
This section presents the events of the war from the outbreak of conflict in May 1992 until the 
transition to cross-border warfare in 1993. It covers the emergence of conflict in Dushanbe, its 
transmission to southern Tajikistan, and the eventual Kulyabi victory in Kurgan-Tyube and the 
capital. It includes the full trajectory of the PFT’s existence, from its initial formation during the 
Dushanbe demonstrations to its dissolution in March 1993. 
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3.1.1  The Outbreak of Conflict and the Creation of the ‘National Guard’ 
The years immediately preceding Tajik independence in 1991 saw the gradual coalescence of 
two political blocs: 1) the status-quo-seeking Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT), propped up 
by the Leninabad-Kulyab elite alliance; and 2) an array of ‘opposition tendencies’ and 
marginalised groups, prominently (although not exclusively) featuring Gharmi and Pamiri 
elites.216 Brutally suppressed demonstrations, such as those in Dushanbe in February 1990, 
indicated that the regime’s mechanisms of ‘social control’ were slipping.217 However, the CPT 
remained intransigent, and fatally decided to support the failed hardliner coup attempt against 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on 19 August 1991.218 This set in motion a series of 
protests, counter-protests, and parliamentary responses that culminated in the sacking of the 
republic’s hardliner president and the declaration of Tajik independence on 9 September 
1991.219  
 
Independence was a shocking – and not particularly welcome – development for many 
Tajiks.220 As recently as March 1991, a majority of Tajiks had voted against national sovereignty 
in a public referendum.221 Even the opposition parties largely favoured reform and greater 
autonomy, not the instant destruction of the political and economic system within which 
Tajikistan was embedded. As noted by Rubin, Tajikistan ‘became nominally independent 
without a clear national identity, an integrated territory, a viable economic base for the 
livelihood of its people or the finances of its government, or genuine national security 
forces’.222 Nevertheless, the fragile new state managed to hold a presidential election in 
November 1991, which was won by Rahmon Nabiev, a Leninabadi and former First Secretary 
of the CPT who had already been installed as an interim leader by parliament. Nabiev used his 
victory (which was disputed by the opposition) to maintain the communist hold on power and 
crack down on Islamist and democratic opposition groups.223  
 
The spark for a long chain of events that would culminate in civil war came in March 1992, 
when Supreme Soviet Chairman Safarali Kenjaev arranged the dismissal of Interior Minister 
Mamadayaz Navjuvanov, a Pamiri.224 This key political loss spurred opposition groups to rally in 
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Shahidan Square in central Dushanbe; they exploited their members’ regional ties to bring in 
followers from the countryside.225 Their primary demands were new elections, the 
establishment of a true multiparty system, and an end to political persecution.226 However, 
many rural residents drawn to the demonstrations were motivated by economic rather than 
political issues (e.g., the terrible state of the rural economy and their months of unpaid labour 
since independence). This opposition rally was then matched by a pro-regime demonstration 
that was organised in nearby Azadi Square.227 Dushanbe ‘became paralysed by the two 
demonstrations’, as tens of thousands of people flowed in from rural areas, most of them 
encouraged by their local kolkhoz directors, mullahs or other local leaders.228  
 
Whilst the IRP used its rural mullahs to mobilise thousands of young men, Nabiev and Kenjaev 
turned primarily to criminal actors to mobilise rural support. Sangak Safarov, the notorious 
Kulyabi criminal, organised the arrival in Azadi Square of thousands of Kulyabis.229 They were 
armed with sticks and Soviet flags; their opposition counterparts similarly lacked firearms.230 
Soviet Tajikistan had had low levels of gun ownership outside the police and armed forces, and 
it was only in the coming days that the proliferation of small arms would take hold and fuel 
spiralling levels of violence.231 
 
Perhaps the best characterisation of this process of mobilisation comes courtesy of Kilavuz, 
who conceptualises it as ‘network activation’ by political elites willing to utilise their 
connections with ‘violence specialists’ in order to further their own interests.232 In this case, 
the connection between the president of the republic and a notorious crime boss was 
relatively straightforward: Nabiev’s prime minister had worked closely with Safarov and 
Kenjaev to organise support for the Nabiev presidential campaign.233 In this way, the corrupt 
crucible of the Nabiev regime produced a powerful political-criminal network that was easily 
activated when Nabiev and Kenjaev were under threat. 
 
On 2 May 1992, Nabiev established a ‘special battalion’ to guard the presidential palace and 
parliament, and authorised the disbursement of 1,800 Kalashnikovs to pro-regime 
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demonstrators.234 The rationale for this act was simple: there was no national army, and MVD 
police forces, dominated by Pamiris, could not be relied upon to protect the regime.235 Former 
Soviet troops still based in Tajikistan – primarily, the 201st Motorised Rifle Division in Dushanbe 
(10,000 soldiers) and the Border Security Forces on the Afghan border (7,500 men, under the 
Russian KGB) – were ordered by Moscow to stay neutral.236 Thus, Nabiev’s only reliable option 
for protection was this ‘special battalion’, also referred to as the ‘National Guard’, assembled 
from the ranks of the pro-regime demonstrators. The National Guard was commanded by 
Safarov himself, and many of its members were criminal associates from Kulyab. It formed the 
kernel of what would eventually become the Popular Front of Tajikistan, and thus its creation 
was one of the pivotal moments of the conflict. It provided a sheen of legitimacy and an early 
organisational structure for the Kulyabi militias as well as a defining narrative of self-defence 
and protection of the republic.  
 
On 5 May, with an estimated 100,000 people participating in the capital’s mass rallies, the first 
armed clashes occurred.237 The catalyst appears to have been a confrontation in a village 12 
miles from Dushanbe, in which local residents tried to block buses carrying Kulyabis to the 
capital; several militiamen and fifteen civilians were killed.238 News of the deadly incident 
‘electrified’ the rallies and sparked clashes between the rival camps, with between 14 and 60 
people killed that evening.239 Violence in the city spiralled as militias fought for control of key 
ministry buildings.240 However, the chaos and casualties, and the shared desire at that time to 
avoid all-out civil war, prompted talks between the opposition and the regime, and a truce was 
quickly called. On 7 May, Tajik Radio announced that an agreement had been reached to form 
a coalition government, or Government of National Reconciliation (GNR).241 One-third of the 
ministries (including the most powerful ministries) were given to the opposition. Nabiev, with 
curtailed powers, remained president (largely in the interests of stability) but Kenjaev and 
other CPT hardliners were forced out.242  
 
The GNR agreement was widely seen as a victory for the opposition, and reflected facts on the 
ground: opposition forces had taken control of much of the city.243 However, some opposition 
members objected to Nabiev staying in power, and the agreement was also quickly rejected by 
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the Leninabadi and Kulyabi regional governments.244 The GNR was essentially doomed to fail: 
the political struggle between CPT leaders and the opposition continued, now within a singular 
government, leading to paralysis and continued hostility. 
 
With the GNR agreement, thousands of armed demonstrators from both camps began to 
return to the countryside – including the National Guard.245 Already on 13 May, two days after 
the GNR was signed, people were killed during demonstrations in Kulyab and ‘repression was 
under way against opposition supporters’ by returning members of the National Guard.246 The 
new defence minister stated that ‘in all the countryside the people are taking sticks in their 
hands, and defending their villages’.247 In short, political violence from the capital was 
effectively transmitted to rural areas in the southern regions.248  
 
 
3.1.2  The ‘War of the Kolkhozy’ and the Emergence of the PFT 
It was perhaps predictable that the southern regions would bear the brunt of fighting during 
the war, as their political/demographic mix of Gharmis, Kulyabis and Uzbeks made them the 
most contested area of the country. In addition, whilst the conflict originated amongst regional 
elites, the supporters of each faction were not neatly divided by regional origin when war 
broke out: there were Gharmis who supported the communist regime and Kulyabis who 
favoured the opposition. Thus, Sangak Safarov and his returning National Guard members 
began by attacking opposition supporters within Kulyab, along with any associates who 
disputed his claim to leadership.249 By the end of June, support for the opposition had been 
largely eliminated in Kulyab, thus helping the region to become more homogenous in terms of 
its political and strategic identity.250 This had the practical result of shifting most of the fighting 
to Kurgan-Tyube, where a greater mix of regional and political loyalties persisted. There, 
armed groups and self-defence detachments quickly and often violently established ‘influence 
spheres’ encompassing villages and kolkhozy in the countryside.251  
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Safarov became the leader of the Kulyabi forces that emerged from the National Guard and 
came to be known as the Popular Front of Tajikistan (PFT). At the same time, Kenjaev was 
organising mostly Uzbek militias around Hissar into what he called the Popular Front of 
Tajikistan-Hissar. (The two groups would later formally merge.) Safarov invoked the language 
of self-defence, even as his men slaughtered civilians, by saying that his units were ‘defending 
the constitution and laws violated in May’ and ‘fighting against the threatened creation of an 
Islamic state’.252 Officially, the immediate aims of the PFT were the end of the GNR coalition 
and the return of a secular, authoritarian government; however, the true aims of Safarov and 
his fellow field commanders were widely perceived to be ‘power and money’.253 His forces 
were supplied with automatic weapons and, later, armoured vehicles, some of which were 
either stolen or bought from Russian army units (particularly in Kurgan-Tyube).254 Arms were 
also obtained in Uzbekistan, in exchange for cotton and aluminium, via the criminal 
connections of PFT commanders in western Tajikistan.255  
 
Throughout this phase of the conflict, the network of separate militias that would evolve into 
the PFT was only loosely coordinated and heavily dependent on illicit activity. The militias were 
assembled locally, often as ‘self-defence units’, and usually around a core of men returned 
from the Dushanbe demonstrations or a local crime boss or strongman. Initially they formed 
‘local rag-tag bands’, engaging in brief clashes and threatening civilians, but they grew in size 
and scope of activity throughout the summer, partly thanks to weapons and coordination 
provided by Safarov and Kenjaev.256 Men joined the militias for various reasons: to obtain 
vengeance, to maintain loyalty to a solidarity group, to engage in plunder and rape, to obtain a 
higher status or position in their region.257 Many were criminals and engaged in criminal 
behaviour. Others were coerced into joining, under threat of death.258 As the summer wore on 
and the local economy ground to a halt, the need for food and other necessities became a 
leading motivation to join ‘raiding parties’.259 Presumably some militia members were 
influenced by the grand political and ideological narratives of the conflict, but fieldwork 
amongst former combatants suggests that personal and emotional motivations dominated 
their decision to join militias.260 
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A brief examination of some of the leading ‘field commanders’ in both Kulyab and Hissar 
illustrates the political-criminal nexus that underpinned the PFT. One of Safarov’s key deputies 
in Kurgan-Tyube was Faisali Saidov, a former Soviet army veteran who became known for his 
‘pathological, unbound hatred of Gharmis and Pamiris’ following the murder of his father.261 
Mahmud Khudoberdyev, a tank commander in the Russian 201st division who deserted his post 
in Kulyab, also became a leading PFT field commander after the deaths of family members. 
Yaqub Salimov, a Kulyabi from the Vakhsh valley who became one of that area’s most powerful 
commanders, had served four years in prison for racketeering.262  Ghaffor Mirzoyev ‘gained a 
reputation as a cruel field commander with strong connections in the criminal world in 
Tajikistan and Russia’.263 The PFT also benefited from having a number of kolkhoz and district 
government chairmen in Kurgan-Tyube as field commanders, as their ready-made solidarity 
groupings allowed them to tap into organised sources of fighters and resources in the heavily 
contested Kurgan-Tyube region.264 Finally, the most notorious of the Hissari field commanders 
was Ibodullo Boimatov, a half-Uzbek mafia figure who utilised his illicit connections in 
Uzbekistan (for example, with the Uzbek mafia boss ‘Salimboi-bacha’) to acquire arms and 
armoured vehicles for the PFT.265 Like a number of other field commanders, Boimatov had 
been a driver before the war (running a bus route between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Akiner 
notes that this occupation gave the men mobility, enhanced information-gathering, and more 
opportunities for building networks, all of which would prove useful when war broke out.266 
 
On the other side, the IRP was also arming its followers in the countryside (with assistance 
from Afghan warlords Ahmad Shah Massoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar).267 Russian Border 
Troops reported repeated confrontations at the Afghan border, as Tajiks and Afghans 
attempted to smuggle small arms and ammunition into the country.268 Some Pamiri MVD units 
– already equipped and armed – abandoned any pretence of ‘restoring order’ and fought on 
behalf of the opposition.269 The nominal umbrella organisation for the opposition units was the 
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Front for the Salvation of the Homeland (also referred to as the Committee for National 
Salvation), created on 21 June 1992 and headed by DPT leader Shadman Yusuf.270  
 
Initially, forces on both sides were organised within local ‘headquarters’, featuring various 
local power brokers (such as police chiefs, administrative officials and religious figures), who 
were supposed to direct the activities of these local ‘self-defence units’. However, the 
headquarters proved largely inept at organising anything beyond defensive operations and 
incapable of providing basic necessities to the population, and field commanders on both sides 
took charge, rapidly acquiring significant authority and status.271  
 
With no national army to restore order, these self-defence units confronted each other across 
Kurgan-Tyube. During the summer of 1992, the war was to a large extent a ‘war of the 
kolkhozy’.272 By 20 June, it was reported, the region had been carved into ‘influence spheres’ 
by armed groups on both sides.273 As Matveeva writes, ‘When civil war broke out, defences 
were organised along kolkhoz boundaries, with groups who were a minority in a given kolkhoz 
fleeing for protection of a kolkhoz where ‘their’ group was in majority (for example, Gharmis in 
a majority Kulyabi kolkhoz)’.274 Olivier Roy provides a more detailed explanation, using the key 
Turkmenistan kolkhoz as an example: 
 
The Gharmis were in the majority and the kolkhoz was an opposition 
stronghold (Mullah Nuri had a mosque there). The Kulyabis, who were in the 
minority, lived in the mahalla of Maskinabad. In June 1992, the Gharmis 
expelled the Kulyabis, who went over to the Moskwa kolkhoz, which was 
majority Kulyabi. The territorial limits of the two kolkhoz became the front 
line in the fighting that lasted from June to November 1992, with the 
digging of trenches and the mounting of ambushes, until Kulyabi troops 





It is worth recalling here the relatively homogenous composition of settlements in the south. 
                                                                 
270
 Olimova (1999). Auten (1996) translates the organisation’s name as the ‘Front for National Salvation’; BBC 
translations of contemporary media accounts call it the Committee for National Salvation. BBC/Tajik Radio, 
26/6/92(b). 
271
 Akiner (2006), 13; Nourzhanov (2005), 116; BBC/Mayak Radio, 8/9/92. See also: Kaldor (2007), 98-99. 
272
 Roy (2007), 95. See also: UPI, 28/6/92; BBC/Russia’s Radio, 30/6/92; BBC/Ostankino, 2/7/92; Moscow News, 
2/7/92. 
273
 BBC/Itar-Tass, 23/6/92. 
274
 Matveeva (2009), 13. 
275
 The kolkhoz remained in Kulyabi hands after the war, and was renamed the Haqiqat (Truth) kolkhoz. Roy (2007), 
95. 
 79 
By one estimate, only 20 per cent of villages in Kurgan-Tyube were evenly mixed with residents 
of Gharmi and Kulyabi origin; the rest had a strong majority of one with a smaller minority of 
the other (in addition to some villages which were largely Uzbek).276 This facilitated the 
mobilisation of militias as well as targeting decisions: according to field research by Kilavuz, 
villages whose residents were of mixed origin (Gharmi/Kulyabi) were able to avoid violence 
longer than more homogenous villages: 
 
Some informants reported that in evenly split villages, when the Kulyabi 
fighters came, the Kulyabi members of the kolkhoz talked to them and 
convinced them not to attack their village. When Garmi fighters came, the 
Garmi members of the village did the same thing. In this way they were able 




It appears, however, that only one or two villages in Kurgan-Tyube were able to maintain 
neutrality and avoid violence throughout this phase of the war.278 
 
Opposition militias also managed to impose a ‘blockade’ on the Kulyab region. This was easier 
to accomplish than one might expect: much of the region was linked to the capital and to 
Kurgan-Tyube by only a handful of roads, due to the mountainous terrain.279 Whilst this 
succeeded in cutting off supplies to Kulyab – including food, which quickly raised fears of 
famine – the blockade also antagonised further the Kulyabi faction and bolstered their 
legitimising narratives of self-defence. 
 
The opposition also still controlled Dushanbe. In late August, hundreds of protesters (many of 
them refugees from the southern regions) seized control of the presidential palace and took 
hostages, demanding an end to the conflict and the resignation of Nabiev.280 On 7 September, 
Nabiev attempted to fly to Khujand but was blocked from leaving by ‘opposition forces’. Their 
identity was murky; whilst many referred to them simply as ‘opposition members’ (a safe 
enough assumption) other observers at the time and since claimed they were actually 
members of the Youths of Dushanbe City, a criminal-political collective.281 After several hours 
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of ‘discussions’, Nabiev signed a letter of resignation, apparently under duress. Akbarsho 
Iskandarov, the centrist parliamentary speaker from Badakhshan, became acting president. 
Dushanbe became increasingly unstable and violent, as former communist members of the 
coalition government fled, more radical members of the opposition grew in strength, and the 
city itself was carved up amongst paramilitary gangs.282  
 
 
3.1.3  The Triumph of the PFT 
The week-long drama in the capital provided the final spark to transform the low-intensity 
conflict in the south into all-out civil war. On 3 September, competing demonstrations in 
Kurgan-Tyube city descended into violence between Kulyabi and opposition militias, and the 
city quickly became the new front line in the conflict in the region. More than 100 people were 
reported killed that week, and thousands of refugees from the city surrounded the 
encampments of nearby Russian and CIS military units.283 As Tajikistan prepared to celebrate 
the first anniversary of its declaration of independence, the official death toll from four 
months of violence in the southern regions exceeded 1,000 lives.284 
 
On 6 September, for all intents and purposes, the Kulyabi militias ‘declared war’ on Kurgan-
Tyube: 
 
…conservative leaders in Kulyab supporting President Rakhmon Nabiyev 
have called on the people to take up arms against the opposition which 
controls Kurgan-Tyube… In a declaration read out on republican radio, the 
leader of Kulyab, Rustam Abdurakhimov, has said that weapons will be 
handed out to those who will fight with participants in unlawful actions in 




Abdurakhimov was not an official figure in the Kulyab regional government, but rather a field 
commander in the Kulyabi militias and a pre-war associate of Safarov (his identification as the 
Kulyab leader at this point in time is telling).286 By 18 September, the situation was 
deteriorating rapidly, with armed clashes in the outskirts of Kurgan-Tyube city, at a number of 
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kolkhozy in the region, and around the Russian military outpost at Lomonosovo.287 A new front 
line opened between the city of Nurek, taken by Kulyabi militias, and Kofarnihon, an 
opposition stronghold a few dozen kilometres up the road to Dushanbe.288  
 
Kulyabi PFT militias, after suffering numerous losses throughout September, gained a major 
advantage when they were able to seize four tanks from the Russian garrison at Lomonosovo. 
(Opposition forces claimed that the Russian unit allowed the Kulyabis to take the tanks and 
other weapons.289) The acquisition of even four tanks, in a conflict characterised by small arms 
and few defences, sharply escalated the fighting; as one observer noted, ‘In such a poorly 
armed war, a single tank can make the difference between victory and defeat’.290 The Kulyabi 
militia turned these tanks not toward military or government targets, but against the city of 
Kurgan-Tyube. In the ensuing destruction, hundreds were killed in the city, civilians fled the 
town en masse and opposition forces were forced to retreat.291 By 6 October, Kulyabi forces 
had taken control of Kurgan-Tyube city, and began to expand their military activities 
southward.292  
 
By this time, it was impossible to say with any accuracy how many people had died. When 
asked to estimate the number of casualties, Deputy Premier Jamshed Karimov stated, ‘I 
believe that today not a single competent body is able to say what the number is, as in 
conditions when management has been lost in most regions, it is practically impossible to 
count’.293 As September drew to a close, officials in Kurgan-Tyube put the death toll in the 
conflict to date at 5,000 – a steep jump from the 1,000 deaths estimated at the beginning of 
the month.294 The Tajik Red Crescent appealed for aid to cope with an estimated 200,000 
internally displaced people, half of whom were children, as winter approached.295 Of particular 
concern for the entire republic was the failure to bring in the annual cotton harvest (one of 
Tajikistan’s key economic activities): only 155,000 tonnes had been collected through October, 
compared with 556,000 tonnes at the same time the previous year.296 
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In early October, Safarov and Kenjaev apparently agreed on a tactical alliance, uniting the 
Kulyabi and Hissari militias under the banner of the Popular Front of Tajikistan.297 On 24 
October 1992, Kenjaev helped lead 1,500 PFT militiamen, accompanied by tanks and armoured 
vehicles, from Tursunzade into Dushanbe and seized the city centre with little resistance.298 
Opposition armed forces initially retreated to Kofarnihon, but by the end of the day ‘fierce 
fighting’ broke out in Dushanbe as militiamen flooded into the city to combat the coup.299 
Russian TV called the battle ‘nothing less than a slaughter’, with civilians caught in the 
crossfire.300 General Ashurov of the Russian 201st MRD brokered talks between the opposing 
sides, and in the end they agreed to convene a special parliamentary session to discuss a 
political solution to the conflict. PFT militiamen were partly disarmed and allowed to leave 
Dushanbe.301 It was estimated that 100-500 people, including civilians, had been killed in the 
city during the two days of fighting.302 
 
Akbarzadeh claims the coup attempt was the first attack on Dushanbe following Uzbekistan’s 
decision to allow PFT forces to discreetly use their territory for training and organising attacks 
on the capital.303 Others observed at the time that Uzbek support was hardly discreet, as most 
of the prisoners taken in the battle were Uzbek and the buses that carried Kenjaev’s forces 
into the capital had license plates from the Surkhandarya region of Uzbekistan.304 Uzbek state 
support for the PFT was largely a function of: 1) antipathy toward political Islamist movements 
such as the IRP, given the strong Islamic activist currents within the Uzbek portion of Ferghana; 
2) the desire to champion Uzbek minorities in Tajikistan, who were targeted by opposition 
forces and anxious about the Tajik nationalism they espoused; and 3) the fear that a nationalist 
Tajik regime would agitate for the return of Samarkand and Bukhara.305  
 
Despite the failed coup, during the first ten days of November the PFT made significant gains – 
thanks largely to improved weaponry and armoured capability, and covert support from 
Uzbekistan – that consolidated its hold on the southern districts and extended its reach into 
the southwestern corner of the republic. The long-contested Turkmenistan kolkhoz in Vakhsh 
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and the towns of Kolkhozabad to the south were captured.306 The Pyanj and Kumsangir 
districts on the Afghan border, home to some of the last opposition holdouts in the south, 
were attacked in a major offensive.307 The PFT also pushed into the southwestern districts of 
Kabodiyen and Shaartuz, creating a new wave of refugees which flooded into Dushanbe 
(bringing the total number of refugees in the country to an estimated 400,000).308 Itar-Tass 
published estimates that at this point Safarov had between 5,000 and 10,000 militants at his 
disposal, rampaging around southern Tajikistan.309 Closer to the capital, clashes were reported 
in the outskirts of Dushanbe and in Hissar. The Hissar-Dushanbe railroad line was blown up, 
cutting the capital off from vitally needed food supplies and bringing Central Asian rail traffic 
to a halt.310  
 
The rapid gains made by the PFT gave it a strong political position leading into the special 
parliamentary session that had been negotiated during the failed October coup. Convened in 
Khujand on 16 November, this two-week session radically changed the political situation in the 
republic. The assembly approved the transformation of Tajikistan into a parliamentary 
republic, with the parliamentary chairman serving as head of state.311 Safarov apparently 
exercised his influence in the selection of a new government, rejecting Nabiev as ‘too weak’.312 
Parliament then chose Emomali Rahmonov, a Communist Party official from Kulyab, as the 
new Tajik head of state. Rahmonov had served as chairman of the Kulyab Regional Executive 
Committee for less than a month, after his predecessor was allegedly personally killed by 
Safarov.313 Born in Danghara, he had grown up in Safarov’s mahalla and was widely seen as ‘a 
tool in the hands of Safarov’.314 As of 2013, however, he still serves as Tajik president.  
 
The new government was dominated by Kulyabis – a major shift in the political dynamics of 
Tajikistan, considering the historical dominance of Leninabad, but an unsurprising one given 
the leverage enjoyed by the Kulyabi faction. As noted by Rubin, ‘Those who held the guns, 
rather than those who controlled the factories and party personnel committees, came out on 
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top’.315  The inclusion of such individuals as Yaqub Salimov – a well-known criminal and Kulyabi 
PFT commander, who was now appointed Interior Minister – also indicated where power lay at 
this stage of the conflict. Gharmis and Pamiris were largely excluded from the power-sharing 
arrangements, losing all the gains they had mustered with the GNR coalition. Parliament also 
decided to approve a measure that would merge Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab into a single 
administrative region (‘Khatlon’) with its centre in Kurgan-Tyube city. However, it is probably 
more accurate to say that Kulyab, victorious in war, annexed Kurgan-Tyube. Kurgan-Tyube’s 
cotton and agricultural operations were very attractive to the relatively poorer Kulyab region, 
and the merger would also dilute Uzbek dominance in Kurgan-Tyube.316 
 
The day after the new government was agreed, hundreds were reported killed by Kulyabi 
forces. The town of Shaartuz was attacked by Kulyabi fighters with tanks (reportedly 
accompanied by Uzbek helicopters and armoured vehicles), prompting thousands of refugees 
and opposition militia to flee toward the Afghan border.317 By December, 150,000 Tajiks were 
living in miserable refugee conditions along both sides of the Tajik-Afghan border; hundreds 
were dying of cold and hunger, or from drowning in the icy Amu Darya river trying to flee the 
fighting.318 More than half a million refugees suffered within Tajikistan, out of reach of 
international aid agencies.319 Dushanbe also remained dangerously unstable, with the 
economic blockade of the capital now stretching into weeks and sporadic gunfire and artillery 
attacks in the western outskirts of the city.320  
 
On 10 December, Dushanbe fell to the PFT. Yaqub Salimov, the new interior minister and PFT 
field commander, led an armoured convoy out of Hissar and into Dushanbe, largely 
unhindered.321 The official element of the armed group was an ‘Interior Ministry special-
purpose battalion’, recently formed in Termez, Uzbekistan, comprising former MVD and KNB 
units that had fought in Salimov’s PFT militia or otherwise remained loyal to the pro-
communist cause; additional PFT militia entered the city alongside them.322 Tanks and 
armoured vehicles were rumoured to have been provided by the Uzbek government, but may 
have been acquired illicitly from Uzbek sources by the Tursunzade field commander, Ibodullo 
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Boimatov. Observers also reported seeing Uzbek soldiers guarding installations in Dushanbe 
and, later, Uzbek aircraft assisting in operations against opposition militia (the appearance of 
combat aircraft constituted the clearest evidence of Uzbek state involvement, as Tajikistan did 
not possess such airpower itself). Salimov’s forces quickly took control of key government 
buildings and sites, and several hours later Rahmonov flew into the city to formally assume his 
duties as head of state.323 Opposition militia that escaped from Dushanbe intact fled to Gharm, 
or south toward the Afghan border; hundreds of PFT militiamen pursued them in both 
directions.324  
 
The PFT takeover of Dushanbe led to months of atrocities and ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the capital. 
The US Department of State Human Rights Report stated that ‘armed pro-government gangs 
began combing the capital for people originating from the regions of Garm or Badakhshan, 
kidnapping and killing many. The new Government spoke out against these acts of retribution 
but did not act effectively to control them’.325 Officials at Amnesty International stated that 
they had 
 
received what we regard as reliable and consistent reports from a number 
of sources that in and around Dushanbe, in the period from 10 December 
[1992] to approximately the end of February, scores, possibly hundreds of 
people, most of them unarmed civilians, had been extrajudicially executed 
either by government law-enforcement personnel or by pro-government 
paramilitary forces, or had ‘disappeared’ after being taken into custody by 
such forces. The victims were reported to be mainly people originating from 




Essentially, the PFT and other paramilitary forces who entered Dushanbe wreaked their 
revenge on Gharmis and Pamiris, setting up dozens of roadblocks throughout the city and 
killing, raping and torturing civilians. Estimates of the final death toll ranged from 2,000 to 
5,000.327 Casualty figures, always difficult to accurately compile in any conflict, were made 
more so in this instance by the fact that civilians were usually taken away for ‘interrogation’ 
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before being shot, and not all bodies were publicly discarded in the city streets or outskirts 
(some victims were taken to Hissar before being killed).328  
 
At the end of December, Rahmonov announced that 20,000 people had died in the civil war 
overall, a figure impossible to verify but seemingly within the bounds of probability.329 A week 
later, however, Russian television would announce the death toll as 60,000, and shortly after 
that an independent human rights organisation in Tajikistan claimed 100,000 people had 
died.330 Such announcements demonstrated the degree to which casualty estimates were still 
largely guesses; unfortunately, the passage of time would not improve their credibility, as 
there is still no agreement today on how many people died in Tajikistan in 1992.  
 
 
3.1.4  Regime Consolidation and the Dissolution of the PFT  
The ‘hot’ phase of the war was seemingly winding down, with opposition militias in full retreat 
into the Pamir mountains and northern Afghanistan, but armed clashes and retributive civilian 
victimisation continued. At this time, Safarov was estimated to command at least 35,000 
militiamen, by far the most powerful military force in the country.331 His stature in the new 
regime was signalled by his appearances alongside President Rahmonov in TV programmes 
addressing security issues, and Rahmonov publicly stated that it was only due to the PFT that 
his regime had come into power.332 In mid-December, Rahmonov announced that the new 
Tajik national army would be based on the structures of the PFT.333 The rationale for this was 
two-fold: it would provide the national army with experienced and well-armed fighters whilst 
also bringing the irregular fighters and their weapons under state control. 
 
In January 1993, the official narrative focused on ‘life returning to normal’ for Tajiks 
throughout the country. Refugees began to return to their homes, the railways reopened, and 
phone lines to the south were restored.334 Rahmonov informed his Central Asian neighbours 
that Tajikistan no longer required peacekeepers, but humanitarian aid.335 Yet violence and 
instability continued to plague the republic. The disarmament of armed groups – a key 
requirement for stabilisation yet difficult to achieve in an environment of continued violence 
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and crime – failed miserably, with only 4 per cent of the estimated 30,000 illicit weapons in the 
country surrendered to authorities before a 4 January deadline.336 The Tajik-Afghan border 
region remained unstable, with tens of thousands of refugees still camping (and dying) on both 
sides of the border and continued attempts at infiltration by militants from the Afghan side.337 
Despite the successes announced by the government, conditions were poor even in pro-
government areas: Khujand, for example, reintroduced rationing, and Kulyabis were suffering 
from disease and malnutrition.338 
 
By March, however, Rahmonov felt secure enough to order the disbanding of armed militias 
(including the PFT) and the return of refugees to their homes.339 Safarov acceded to both 
measures. In support of the first, he publicly urged armed groups to disarm and return to a 
peaceful life or join the new Tajik army.340 Whilst this indicated the official end of the PFT as an 
armed group – an existence that was somewhat illusory to begin with, given the high level of 
autonomy of its constituent militias – its field commanders and members would continue to 
operate jointly and play a pivotal role in the armed conflict going forward, as shown in the 
following sections.  
 
Not all the PFT field commanders were content with the subsiding of hostilities. Faisali Saidov 
did not approve of the return of Gharmi and Pamiri refugees to Kurgan-Tyube and would not 
be dissuaded from conducting ethnic cleansing operations, which complicated refugee 
repatriation.341 In this, he was supported by a number of other PFT commanders who resisted 
the return of refugees both from a desire for revenge and from more pecuniary motivations: 
as the victors in the war, they felt entitled to claim resources and political positions in the 
southern regions, a process that would be impeded by the return of refugees to their 
homes.342 On 29 March, Safarov arranged to meet Saidov in Kurgan-Tyube, presumably to 
discuss their dispute. In a shocking development, the two men quarrelled, one man drew a 
weapon on the other, and in the massive shootout that followed Safarov, Saidov and seven to 
fifteen bodyguards were killed.343 The government declared 31 March to be a day of mourning, 
and thousands in Kulyab grieved the loss of their Bobo Sangak, who had protected them from 
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men seemingly even worse than himself (Rahmonov reportedly attended both funerals and 
‘could not control his tears’).344  
 
The regime nevertheless moved forward with the creation of new national security forces, 
with significant help from Russia and Uzbekistan.345 Russia was concerned, first and foremost, 
about maintaining some semblance of control along the Tajik-Afghan border, the first line of 
defence against the Islamist militants and organised narcotics trade emanating from 
Afghanistan and South Asia (once past the Tajik border, both militants and criminals had few 
impediments in crossing the Central Asian republics and entering Russian territory).346 In 
addition, emerging Russian policy on the ‘near abroad’ prioritised the protection of Russian 
populations and the maintenance of relative stability in the former republics. This security 
assistance was emblematic of the wider net of financial assistance provided by Russia and 
Uzbekistan to the faltering Tajik state. Western diplomats at the time estimated that 50 to 70 
per cent of the Tajik state budget was funded by Russia, and some considered Tajikistan at this 
point to be virtually a Russian-Uzbek protectorate.347 Rahmonov himself said that if not for 
‘Russia and Boris Yeltsin personally, and Uzbekistan and Islam Karimov personally, then 
Tajikistan would already have ceased to exist’.348  
 
Finally, the regime reached a new political accommodation with the Gorno-Badakhshan 
autonomous region in March 1993, according to which the Pamiris would disarm illegal militias 
and forgo any moves toward greater sovereignty, whilst the regime would resume the 
provision of essential goods and refrain from sending state or paramilitary forces to the region 
(with the exception of Russian Border Troops).349 This agreement was to some extent mere 
window dressing: government forces could not access the Pamir highlands for much of the 
year anyway, and the region enjoyed a sort of de facto sovereignty during the following years, 
surviving on the proceeds from narco-trafficking and humanitarian aid from the Aga Khan 
Foundation.350 However, Rahmonov also had to cope with a new source of instability: 
rebellious elites and popular anger in Leninabad. Frustration with the appointment of Kulyabis 
to northern political and security posts, alongside continued dire living conditions, led to mass 
demonstrations and unrest (culminating in a 1997 assassination attempt on Rahmonov in 
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Khujand).351 Some even threatened secession, which was somewhat plausible given the 
economic power of Leninabad and its close ties with Uzbekistan, but Russian opposition to any 
moves that might lead to the breakup of the Tajik state kept Leninabad in check and tensions 
at a low boil.352  
 
Phase I of the civil war essentially drew to a close in the spring of 1993, with Kulyabi victory in 
the capital and the southern regions, the opposition forces in retreat and disarray, and 
Rahmonov’s initial attempts at regime consolidation solidly backed by Russia and Uzbekistan. 
Members of the PFT, no longer a formal entity, melted into the new political and security 
structures, their illicit and profitable connections intact. Yet the lack of a political settlement 
between the regime and the opposition, and the imminent resurgence of opposition militias, 
meant that the war could not truly be said to have ended. Instead, it entered a new phase of 
asymmetric warfare and warlord challengers to the regime, as the following section details. 
 
 
3.2  Phase II: 1993 – 1997 
Phase II of the Tajik civil war was characterised by irregular warfare and asymmetric stalemate 
between the Kulyabi regime and Islamist opposition forces, and by continuing political and 
security challenges to the regime by field commanders and warlords. PFT members were 
involved in the former as members of the new Tajik security forces, and in the latter as some 
of the most powerful warlords and private militias that foiled regime consolidation efforts. 
Both facets are described in this section. 
 
After consolidating control of Dushanbe, the new Kulyabi regime sought to eliminate 
opposition forces – but it proved impossible to destroy their bases within the commanding 
heights of the Pamirs and politically problematic to pursue them across the border into 
Afghanistan. The most intense fighting of the civil war was over, but the conflict did not end: 
Rahmonov’s regime fully controlled only 40 per cent of Tajik territory.353 Government security 
forces came under frequent attack in the east and at the border, and hundreds of Tajik 
politicians, policemen and Russian servicemen were assassinated around Dushanbe.354 Fighting 
                                                                 
351
 Nourzhanov (2005), 123; Lubin, et al. (1999), 50-51; US Department of State (1997), 128; UN Security Council 
Reports: (June 1996), 2, (September 1996), 4; Human Rights Watch (1998); AFP, 15/5/96; AP, 15/5/96; BBC/Khovar, 
15/5/96; BBC/Interfax, 1/8/96; BBC/Voice of Free Tajikistan, 3/8/96. 
352
 Roy (2007), 141-42; Akiner (2001), 39-40. 
353
 Paoli, et al. (2007), 954. 
354
 On terrorist attacks and targeted killings in and around Dushanbe, see: UN Security Council Reports, June 1994 
and December 1995; US Department of State (1996), 106; BBC/Tajik Radio, 24/1/94; UPI, 9/3/94; AFP, 11/3/94; 
AFP, 11/4/94; BBC/Itar-Tass, 23/4/94; BBC/Itar-Tass, 4/6/94; AFP, 15/6/94; Washington Post, 16/6/94; UPI, 
21/6/94; AFP, 23/6/94; UPI, 24/7/94; AFP, 27/7/94; Prague Post, 24/8/94; AP, 15/9/94; AP, 6/10/94; AP, 31/12/94; 
 90 
generally followed a seasonal pattern, intensifying in the spring and summer and receding in 
the winter, when mountain passes and roads were closed by snow and movement throughout 
much of the country was restricted.355 
 
IRP leaders formed a new entity, the Movement of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan (MIRT), to 
incorporate the broad range of Islamists opposed to the regime and to develop additional 
sources of foreign support. Led by Said Abdullo Nuri, its main base of operation was northern 
Afghanistan, in particular the Kunduz and Takhar provinces.356 It is during this phase of the war 
– exile in Afghanistan – that the Islamist opposition is commonly seen as becoming more 
militant, even radical, but not wholly fundamentalist or Wahhabist.357 Later, opposition leaders 
created an umbrella organisation, comprising both Islamist and non-Islamist groups, called the 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which represented the opposition in peace negotiations with 
the Tajik regime.  (The date of its founding is variously reported as 1993 or 1994.358) For the 
sake of consistency, opposition armed forces will be referred to as UTO forces throughout this 
chapter. 
 
From Afghanistan, the UTO dispatched fighters through a series of interlocking valleys to 
mountain bases in the Karategin and Tavildara valleys in Tajikistan (an arduous four-day 
journey on foot) and recruited new members from among the 60,000 Tajik refugees still 
scattered across Afghanistan’s northern provinces.359 As of early 1993, they claimed to have 
thousands of men under arms (outside estimates ranged from 4,000 to 30,000).360 They 
received training, arms and funding from Afghan warlords, Arab groups posing as ‘relief 
organisations’, state actors such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 
directorate, and the proceeds from narco-trafficking.361 From all appearances, the Islamists 
appreciated the limits of their military action: they did not have enough men, military capacity 
or popular support to depose the regime in Dushanbe.362 Thus, their aim in perpetuating 
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consistent small-scale attacks against military targets was to generate political pressure on the 
regime and its Russian patrons, with the ultimate objective of securing a political solution that 
would allow their return to Tajikistan. According to Lynch, 
 
The UTO was aware that it could not ‘win’ through military means. In 1995, 
Qadi Akbar Turajonzoda made this position clear: ‘When we mention that 
we will continue our struggle and when we talk of military activity, we mean 
that we will only use our military operations as a lever to pressure Russia 




Negotiations thus became a new variable driving and shaping the continued violence. Whilst 
they were a welcome development on the political and diplomatic front, each round of talks 
was heralded by a wave of assassinations, border incursions and government counter-
offensives.364  
 
The following sections elaborate the ongoing conflict at the Tajik-Afghan border and in the 
mountains of eastern Tajikistan, and the security challenge to the regime represented by PFT 
warlords. They thus establish the context within which PFT field commanders and members 
operated during Phase II of the war – both with and against the regime – in advance of more 
detailed discussion of their victimisation activities in this time period (in Chapter 4).
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Map 3.1:  Southern and Eastern Tajikistan
365  
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3.2.1  Guerrilla Warfare in Eastern Tajikistan  
Eastern Tajikistan had been spared direct fighting during Phase I of the conflict, but this 
changed dramatically after the fall of Dushanbe and the eastward retreat of opposition 
militants into their mountainous valley strongholds (especially, the Karategin and Tavildara 
valleys). The continued presence of opposition militants in Karategin and Tavildara posed a 
significant problem to the government, not only because it precluded complete control of the 
republic’s territory but because the valleys enjoyed an excellent strategic position along the 
major roads linking Dushanbe with Gorno-Badakhshan and southern Kyrgyzstan. In these 
mountainous valleys, UTO militias ambushed government forces, occasionally taking and killing 
hostages, and were subjected to artillery and air strikes in return.366 Opposition field 
commanders directed terrorist and guerrilla operations involving groups of up to several 
hundred men, and maintained close ties with opposition forces in northern Afghanistan. The 
low-intensity conflict in the Gharm and Tavildara regions continued throughout Phase II, with 
an estimated 2,500 opposition militants engaged in ambushes and sporadic clashes with 
government security forces.367  
 
The conflict in eastern Tajikistan reached its height in 1996, and played a key role in pushing 
the regime toward concessions in the peace negotiations. In January, as the Ashgabat round of 
peace talks reconvened, several hundred opposition militants launched a major offensive to 
try to capture Tavildara – officially, in response to government provocations; but more likely, 
to gain leverage at the negotiating table.368 The opposition enjoyed significant military 
successes during the campaign and managed to control the town of Tavildara and the 
surrounding area for long stretches between May and August.369 By September, hundreds of 
militants and troops had been killed, Tavildara had changed hands multiple times, and nearly 
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all of its 4,500 residents had fled.370 Opposition militias also went on the offensive in the 
Karategin Valley, capturing Jirgatal, Tajikabad and Komsomolabad in September.371 However, a 
ceasefire – later known as the Gharm Protocol – was agreed on 16 September, with the 
government tacitly acknowledging opposition control of the Karategin Valley from Gharm to 
the Kyrgyz border, and the opposition agreeing to safe passage on the Dushanbe-Osh road 
running through the Karategin.372  
 
In late October, however, fighting flared again.373 Militants repeatedly clashed with locally 
deployed government troops in eastern Tajikistan, with each side accusing the other of 
provocation. By early December, the opposition controlled a string of major district seats along 
the Dushanbe-Osh highway, from Komsomolabad in the west to Jirgatal in the east – and 
enjoyed a simultaneous political success, as an influential Leninabadi opposition party agreed 
to cooperate with the UTO against the Kulyabi-dominated regime. This set the stage for a 
successful Rahmonov-Nuri meeting on 10 December, which proved pivotal in rapidly advancing 
progress toward a peace accord. By 15 December, fighting had eased throughout eastern 
Tajikistan, and remained at a low level throughout the final months of the war as the regime 
and the opposition grew closer to a final power-sharing agreement. 
 
 
3.2.2  Irregular Warfare on the Tajik-Afghan Border 
The Tajik-Afghan border had been the scene of confrontation between Russian Border Troops 
and Tajik militants and smugglers throughout Phase I of the war, with Russian officials claiming 
that in 1992 more than a thousand infiltrators had been detained and hundreds of guns 
seized.374 (It should be noted, however, that statistics supplied by the Border Troops may have 
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been exaggerated – a caveat that should be kept in mind throughout this section.375) After 
Tajik opposition militias were routed and fled to northern Afghanistan in late 1992/early 1993, 
the border became the frontline between Islamist militias and the state armed forces 
supporting the Rahmonov regime. These were primarily the Russian Border Troops, backed by 
the 201st division, along with a CIS joint peacekeeping force comprising small numbers of 
Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Kazakh forces. 
 
Cross-border attacks intensified as the Islamist opposition reconstituted itself in northern 
Afghanistan in 1993. A typical attack consisted of an artillery barrage against a Russian border 
post from opposition positions in Afghanistan, followed by an infantry assault with anywhere 
between 30 and 150 men; the Russians typically repelled such large-scale attacks, however, 
thanks to helicopter and fighter air support.376 The aim of these attacks was not simply to kill 
Russian servicemen or destroy border posts but to facilitate the infiltration of militants across 
the border into Tajikistan, either to link up with groups operating in Gharm and Tavildara or to 
establish new strongholds on Tajik territory (or, as time went on, to participate in narco-
trafficking and smuggling activities).377 Attacks occurred along a wide stretch of the border, 
from the flat riverlands around Pyanj to the mountainous terrain around Shurabad and 
Kalaikhum. The length of the border (1,400 kilometres) and the terrain posed considerable 
difficulties for the Border Troops, as noted by its chief of staff Alexander Tymko: ‘The border is 
not protected by border guards who form a human chain. They are defending certain key 
locations, and these groups have been able to infiltrate’.378 The situation was rendered even 
more difficult by the fact that on the Afghan side, there were no government border troops at 
all, just warlord militias who tended to side with the UTO. There was also the added 
complication of continuing attempts at refugee repatriation, with tens of thousands of Tajiks 
still living in camps in northern Afghanistan.379  
 
In response to the border attacks, Russian forces began firing artillery into Afghanistan, with its 
attacks on Kunduz on 18-19 June 1993 representing the first significant Russian military 
operation in Afghanistan since its humbling withdrawal in 1989. According to the Afghan 
government, these attacks caused many civilian casualties and set crops on fire. 380 In early 
July, the Russian Border Troops announced that since January, 300 militants and 9 Russian 
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border guards had been killed in border clashes.381  
 
On 13 July, the most notorious border clash of the war occurred when several hundred Tajik 
and Afghan militants attacked the lightly armed Moskovsky border post and the nearby village 
of Sarigor, killing 25 Russian border guards and 100 Tajik civilians.382 The attack was seen as a 
‘national tragedy’ within Russia, and caused considerable distress coming only a few years 
after their previous traumatic engagement in Afghanistan.383 It is likely that the UTO hoped 
such a dramatic attack would spur a Russian withdrawal from the country, and indeed many 
within Russia questioned continued involvement in another Central Asian ‘quagmire’.384 For 
the most part, however, Russian politicians and military leaders demanded the deployment of 
additional troops and aircraft as well as bombing missions inside Afghanistan in order to 
eliminate the UTO guerrillas.385 The incident was an important test of Russia’s new ‘near 
abroad’ military doctrine, and a failure to respond would undermine the doctrine’s credibility 
not just in Central Asia but in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions as well. Yeltsin gave Russian 
military forces ‘carte blanche’ to retaliate against militant groups in northern Afghanistan; 
fighter planes, tanks and armoured vehicles were quickly dispatched, along with the first of 
what would become an additional 10,000 troops.386 Russian forces initiated a series of artillery 
bombardments of villages in Takhar province (opposite the destroyed border post), with 
hundreds of Afghan civilians reported killed and thousands having to flee.387 Throughout the 
following month, Russian planes continued to bomb villages in both Takhar and the Afghan 
Badakhshan province, killing hundreds.388 At the same time, Russia pushed for political 
negotiations – both Tajik-Tajik and among the region’s states – to resolve the conflict, as it 
became more and more apparent that a military solution was unlikely. 389  
 
By December, the number of border attacks for 1993 had risen to 370.390 These were, 
however, increasingly staged from the Tajik side of the border as well, as opposition militants 
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re-established a presence in southern Tajikistan (partly under the shield of refugee 
repatriation). By the end of the year, militants were conducting guerrilla attacks on targets 
further inside southern Tajikistan.391 In some cases, opposition militants were able to control 
small border regions for weeks before being repelled by Russian and Tajik forces.392 In 1994, 
Russian and Tajik border forces continued to clash frequently with Tajik and Afghan militants: 
30 Border Troops were killed and 42 wounded; 321 militant border infiltrations were repelled; 
and there were 94 serious armed clashes, with border posts coming under fire 237 times.393 
Occasional government counteroffensives proved tactically successful yet strategically 
insufficient (in that they did not decisively remove the militant threat).394 Russian commanders 
estimated at the time that there were around 2,500 – 5,000 opposition militants inside 
Tajikistan and another 10,000 in northern Afghanistan.395 Their presumed aim at this time, 
having maintained and in some areas expanded their presence on Tajik soil, was to hold onto 
enough territory in the mountainous border region to establish strongholds for prolonged 
guerrilla warfare in southern Tajikistan, and to bring their ‘government in exile’ (headed by 
Nuri) back into the republic.396  
 
In April 1995, the opposition launched a major offensive, with hundreds of militants engaged 
in multiple and coordinated attacks on border forces in Badakhshan.397 Russian commanders 
believed the opposition’s objectives with the offensive were: 1) to establish strongholds in 
Badakhshan and use the region as a ‘bridgehead for a subsequent offensive on eastern and 
then central Tajikistan’, and 2) to either sabotage or gain new leverage for the planned fourth 
round of peace talks.398 The Russian Border Troops were able to dampen the offensive after a 
week, using helicopter gunships to destroy militant positions. Forty-one Russian and Kazakh 
servicemen and at least two hundred militants were killed during the offensive. The scale and 
ferocity of the offensive sparked fears that the low-intensity border conflict was on the verge 
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of escalating, but the April offensive proved to be the most intense fighting of the year, as 
border attacks returned to their previously consistent but containable level.399 Around 700 
militants were killed at the border between January and November 1995.400 
 
In September 1996, however, events across the border in the interminable Afghan civil war 
shook the contours of the border conflict drastically. In a dramatic turn of events, Kabul fell to 
the Taliban, the Pakistan-aided movement of former religious students and refugees. This 
development sent shock waves throughout the region, as the reality of a fundamentalist 
Islamic and Pushtun-controlled state alarmed Russia, Iran and the Central Asian regimes. 
Yeltsin, Karimov and Rahmonov feared continued Taliban expansion into the former Soviet 
space, or at the very least a ‘contagion effect’ amongst their impoverished and dissatisfied 
populations, as well as a flood of refugees, arms and drugs from Afghanistan.401 Tajik 
opposition leaders were also distressed: their Afghan patrons (Massoud and Hekmatyar) were 
disempowered and chased north toward the Tajik border, and the reinforcements that Russia 
now considered sending to the border would complicate the UTO’s cross-border insurgency.402 
This radical change in the broader strategic environment induced a shared anxiety amongst 
the warring Tajik factions, and facilitated progress in the fitful negotiation process.403 The Tajik-
Afghan border region continued to be a source of infiltration and general instability, but it 
gradually ceded its role as a frontline in the Tajik civil war. 
 
 
3.2.3  The Security Challenge Posed by PFT Warlords 
The Rahmonov regime had limited control over a number of PFT field commanders who had 
acquired significant resources, followers and local authority during Phase I of the war.404 With 
the official dissolution of the PFT, these commanders took on formal or informal leadership 
roles within the new security structures but operated with a great deal of autonomy for 
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several years. A number of events reveal the challenge posed by these former PFT 
commanders to the regime’s authority and their destabilising influence on local regions. 
 
For example, in 1995, rival army brigades in Kurgan-Tyube engaged in a spate of tit-for-tat 
attacks as they competed for control over local resources. Both brigades were former PFT units 
that had been incorporated into the new security forces and posted in Kurgan-Tyube. The First 
Brigade was led by noted PFT field commander and ‘Uzbek protector’ Mahmud Khudoberdyev. 
The Eleventh, also known as the Faizali Brigade, was led by Izatullo Kuganov; it was known for 
engaging in attacks and criminal violence against civilians during government 
counteroffensives in eastern Tajikistan.405 Reports at the time claimed that the two units were 
fighting for ‘spheres of influence over local resources, primarily cotton, wheat and oil 
products’.406 On 12 June, Kuganov was assassinated, most likely by members of the First 
Brigade.407 Skirmishes between the two army units continued for several months before a 
‘serious military confrontation’ between them erupted in September, killing 40 combatants, a 
number of civilians and one UN observer.408 Government mediators and police eventually 
calmed the situation.  
 
A more serious security challenge arose in January 1996, when the large opposition offensive 
in Tavildara was compounded by a dual mutiny by Khudoberdyev and another former PFT field 
commander, Ibodullo Boimatov, who controlled Tursunzade (the extent to which they 
coordinated their actions was a matter of debate).409 They each demanded the resignation of 
specific government officials and an end to official corruption, although undoubtedly less civic-
minded aims – such as control over aluminium and cotton resources – played a role in their 
surprising show of strength.410 Khudoberdyev’s forces advanced within 15 kilometres of 
Dushanbe before the dual rebellion was halted by political concessions.411 These events were 
extremely worrisome for the Rahmonov regime – already coping with the conflict against the 
Islamic opposition and increasing unrest in Leninabad, it could not afford to be challenged by 
powerful local warlords as well. Lynch argues that this was a key event pushing Rahmonov to 
seek improved progress in negotiations with the UTO.412 
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Finally, events in the western city of Tursunzade in January 1997 revealed the ongoing 
challenge posed by field commanders even as negotiations with the UTO were rapidly reducing 
the threat from the opposition.413 Over the previous year, the city had seen increasing violence 
amongst competing political-criminal bosses and their militias, owing to its strategic location 
near the Uzbek border and its hosting of the world’s third-largest aluminium smelter – an 
excellent source of lootable funds and hard currency. In early January, Tursunzade police chief 
Kadir Abdullaev – also known as a local warlord – allegedly raided the brigade headquarters of 
Colonel Khudoberdyev in Kurgan-Tyube. At least, this was the justification provided by 
Khudoberdyev when he led his special-purpose battalion to Tursunzade and drove Abdullaev 
and his militia out of the city after several days of fighting. Khudoberdyev was ordered to leave 
the city by President Rahmonov but he resisted for several days, claiming his only purpose was 
to liberate Tursunzade from criminal elements and restore order. Rahmonov was further 
humiliated when, several days after Khudoberdyev finally withdrew, a Presidential Guard unit 
was blocked by Tursunzade civilians (mostly women) from taking up positions around the 
disputed aluminium smelter. Khudoberdyev was then ordered back to Tursunzade to oversee 
the establishment of a new status quo amongst the competing field commanders and the 
disarmament of local militias.  
 
The incident highlighted the powerlessness of the regime in the face of local field commanders 
and militias, and the ongoing competition amongst sub-state actors for the resources and 
strategic locales in the republic. As such, it serves as an excellent illustration of the blending of 
criminal and political motives and use of force during this phase of the conflict. It also raised 
the temperature at the Tajik-Uzbek border, as Uzbekistan protested the spillover of fighting 
onto its territory during the January fighting. Finally, the events served as a prominent 
reminder of the ongoing violence experienced by civilians throughout the country, as local 
disputes amongst strongmen victimised the population just as keenly as actual war-fighting 
between the regime and the opposition.  
 
It should be noted, however, that former PFT commanders were not the only source of such 
instability: the saga of former UTO military commander Rizvon ‘Rambo’ Sadirov and his 
brothers, who kidnapped dozens of people – including foreign observers and aid workers – 
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during 1996-97 before being eliminated, is another example of entrepreneurial conflict actors 
wreaking havoc in a still-anarchic strategic environment.414 
 
In sum, Phase II of the war featured a wide array of combatants and battlegrounds, within an 
overriding strategic environment of irregular warfare and asymmetric stalemate. Observers 
sometimes mistake the ultimate futility of this phase of the war for strategic insignificance, but 
the death and displacement of thousands of militants and civilians indicate the continued 
severity of the conflict for its participants.  
 
 
3.2.4  The 1997 Peace Accord 
Finally, in June 1997, Rahmonov and Nuri signed the General Agreement on the Establishment 
of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, officially ending the war and setting the terms for 
post-war power-sharing and disarmament.415 The accords established a national reconciliation 
commission and provided for new parliamentary elections. During the transition period, 30 
percent of government ministries would be allocated to the UTO, and UTO forces would be 
integrated into government armed forces; in practice, this meant that UTO field commanders 
continued to preside over their longstanding militias, now with the imprimatur of official 
status.  
 
The agreement did not put an immediate end to the low-grade violence that still wracked the 
country; as discussed in Chapter 7, it was only after several years of postwar co-optation and 
consolidation tactics that the country became generally stabilised.416 Nevertheless, the accord 
was considered a huge diplomatic and political accomplishment, given the previously obdurate 
stances of both the Tajik regime and the opposition. (Tadjbakhsh’s statement that the ‘case of 
Tajikistan can be considered as one of the most successful of UN peacemaking efforts, a model 
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of conflict resolution and reconciliation’, is a typical evaluation of the Tajik peace process.417) 
Compromise was enabled partly by exogenous factors (including the mutual threat posed by 
the Taliban takeover and the consistent pressure applied by Russia, Uzbekistan and the UN) 
but also by the internal strategic landscape: UTO military successes in the east and repeated 
warlord rebellions were weakening the regime, whilst both sides had begun to fear that the 
Tajik state might collapse entirely under the weight of continued conflict and deprivation – an 
outcome that suited no one.418 
 
An additional element of the peace deal may go further to explain UTO acquiescence: the 
transfer of substantial state economic assets to UTO leaders. Unlike other post-Soviet states, 
Tajikistan had not yet undergone significant privatisation, and was thus in a position to offer an 
array of properties and industries as an inducement to peace.419 For example, Qazi 
Turajonzoda, in addition to becoming first deputy prime minister, acquired a cotton-processing 
plant, a shopping centre, and control over wheat imports from Kazakhstan. Other field 
commanders were not granted property, but were tacitly allowed to continue their narco-
trafficking activities.420 The peace agreement required approval from both sides not just on the 
distribution of political and military power but on the division of economic assets and 
activities. This aspect of the negotiations is, however, generally overlooked in Tajik conflict 
resolution case studies, although the use of targeted economic incentives is an increasingly 
noted factor in political economy treatments of negotiated conflict settlements.421 
 
The Leninabadi, Hissari and Uzbek members of the ruling power structure generally opposed 
the terms of the accord as they feared that it would be they – and not the Kulyabis – who 
would be forced to make way for UTO appointments in the new government.422 When this did 




3.3  Conclusion: Key War-Fighting Characteristics of the PFT 
This chapter aimed to provide a fuller understanding of the PFT as a conflict actor, in advance 
of discussing its victimisation activities in particular. Having reviewed the key events of the civil 
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war and the PFT’s role within them, it is possible to answer the questions noted in the 
Introduction regarding the nature of the PFT (specifically, its origins, membership, aims, 
strategies, organisation and evolution). These key findings are summarised here. 
 
First, with respect to the origins of the PFT, the group emerged most directly from the National 
Guard created by President Nabiev in May 1992, led by long-time mafia boss Sangak Safarov 
and staffed by his criminally-minded comrades from Kulyab. A second branch emerged in 
Hissar under the leadership of Safarali Kenjaev. More broadly, the origins of the PFT can be 
said to have rested in the regime’s need for a private security force within the context of 
destabilising political conditions, as well as the historically corrupt connections that allowed it 
to draw upon ‘violence specialists’ who could quickly fulfil this function. This initial 
mobilisation was crucial to the rapid development of the PFT as a conflict actor. 
 
Second, PFT leaders and field commanders were a mix of corrupt political officials (such as 
Kenjaev) and career criminals (like Safarov and Salimov). They were mostly Kulyabi or Uzbek 
men, and had held positions of local authority or usefulness (formal or informal) prior to the 
war. The broader PFT membership was diverse, reflecting the wide variety of motivations for 
joining the militias (from enthusiastic desire for violence, revenge and looting to unwilling 
coercion).  
 
Third, with respect to aims, the official raison d’etre of the PFT was the defence of the secular 
republic against the Islamist opposition. In truth, ‘power and money’ were equally likely 
motivations for Kulyabi and Hissari actors vying with rival blocs in the context of political and 
economic disintegration. PFT militias fought primarily against Gharmi, Pamiri and sometimes 
Uzbek militias, in Kulyab, Kurgan-Tyube and Dushanbe. The decentralised nature of the conflict 
meant that some militias fought mostly for defensive aims – to protect Kulyabi kolkhozy, for 
example – whilst others fought aggressively to achieve control over territory in Kurgan-Tyube 
and to seize the capital and other vital targets. PFT militias also engaged in retributive ethnic 
cleansing in the autumn and winter of 1992.  
 
Fourth, the PFT pursued a strategy of militia-based irregular warfare during much of 1992: 
small bands of lightly armed men contested other militia, with little regard for civilian 
casualties, across the rural south. With the acquisition of Russian tanks and additional support 
from Uzbek sources, the PFT was eventually able to engage in slightly more conventional war-
fighting, taking the cities of Kurgan-Tyube and Dushanbe and provoking the flight of hundreds 
of thousands of refugees in the south.  During Phase II, some former PFT commanders pursued 
 104 
what might be called a ‘warlord strategy’ of fighting, in that they invested considerable time 
and resources maintaining their private security forces and loyal constituencies as a means of 
retaining their personal authority and defying the regime. In general, PFT strategies were 
dictated by their limited resources and operating conditions as well as the extremely 
decentralised nature of war-fighting throughout most of the conflict. 
 
Fifth, the PFT was supplied largely via criminal means, with additional support from Uzbek and 
Russian sources (the exact nature of which was hotly contested). The PFT was loosely 
organised within Kulyabi and Hissari camps, with militias operating independently much of the 
time, although a greater degree of coordination and organisation was evident in the later 
stages of 1992. Local solidarity networks and groups were the primary organisational 
mechanism for militias. During Phase II, PFT warlords continued to support themselves via 
criminal enterprises and organised their resources in a manner similar to legitimate solidarity 
groups. 
 
Finally, with respect to the evolution of the group, the PFT was dissolved in the spring of 1993. 
Many of its leaders and members joined the new Tajik security forces, whilst some opted to 
remain outside official structures. In either case, many remained involved in criminal violence 
and occasional challenges to the regime’s authority, as will be detailed in the following 
chapters. 
 
In short, the PFT possessed a number of war-fighting characteristics that are typical in civil war 
non-state actors: mobilised and organised according to local solidarity network mechanisms; 
supplied by criminality and state allies; led by local authority figures; and pursuing asymmetric 
strategies of warfare, heavily dependent on victimisation and clearly adaptable in the event of 
weaponry advances.  However, the PFT is distinguished by the overwhelmingly criminal 
character of its leaders and membership, as well as by the fact that its opponents were also 
non-state militias (and not a strong state security force). All of these features had important 
implications for the PFT’s use of civilian victimisation, as the following chapters will detail. 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide an expanded strategic history of the Tajik civil war 
and the PFT and thus enable a more fine-grained analysis of the civilian victimisation that 
occurred during the conflict. Having now presented the variables that structured the strategic 
environment, an accounting of the actual events of the war, and an explication of the PFT as a 
conflict actor, it is possible to turn to the first step in our analytical framework: constructing a 
meaningful and useful typology of victimisation in Tajikistan and situating the PFT within it.  
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CHAPTER 4 
A TYPOLOGY OF CIVILIAN VICTIMISATION IN TAJIKISTAN  
AND THE ROLE OF THE POPULAR FRONT  
 
 
This chapter aims to answer the first element of the central research question posited by this 
dissertation: how did the Popular Front of Tajikistan victimise civilians? It commences the 
interrogation of the Tajik war case study by constructing a typology of civilian victimisation in 
Tajikistan and situating the PFT within it. It distils from the just-provided strategic narrative a 
categorisation and aggregation of the countless acts of barbarism embedded in the Tajik 
conflict, and elucidates a group-level analysis of the PFT role within such behaviour. This 
chapter represents a wholly original contribution to the study of the Tajik war and civilian 
victimisation, and sets the stage for the subsequent chapters’ exploration of incentives and 
outcomes. Its main findings are: 1) civilian victimisation in the Tajik war can be primarily and 
usefully categorised within three broad areas: targeted violence, displacement and crime; 2) 
the PFT played the most significant role in civilian victimisation during both phases of the 
conflict, largely due to their victory in Phase I and their incorporation into government and 
security structures in Phase II; 3) criminal and political violence cannot be easily or 
meaningfully separated in the case of Tajikistan, but rather were manifested symbiotically 
throughout the war. 
 
In 1994, Human Rights Watch referred to Tajikistan as, quite simply, a ‘human rights disaster 
area’.423 Following the brutality of the first year of the war, when massacres and ethnic 
cleansing were a frequent tactic of non-state armed forces, civilians continued to be victimised 
by paramilitaries and government forces. Throughout the country, corruption, poverty, 
displacement and crime meant that many Tajiks lived in conditions of constant insecurity and 
frequent violence.424 In Dushanbe, the murder rate skyrocketed and civilians (especially 
women) shunned the streets after dark in order to avoid gangs of drunken armed men.425 In 
rural areas, impoverished residents were forced to ‘pay tribute’ or otherwise support militias 
on both sides of the conflict; those who refused risked death.426 Returning refugees in the 
countryside were subjected to revenge killings, kidnappings and rape.427 Criminal groups 
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fought over the arms and drugs trade, or black market competition, or political patronage. 
Even international observers fell prey to murder and assault.428 The extreme brutality of the 
first year of the war was not matched, but its effects persisted.  
 
To capture this broad range of transgressive behaviour, I have borrowed the concept of 
‘spheres of civilian suffering’ from Slim (2008), which he uses to demonstrate that 
 
…civilians are not only killed violently in war, but also endure a range of 
terrible conditions which can kill them slowly or cause long-term suffering of 
various kinds. I organize this range of suffering into a typology of seven 
spheres of suffering which include the direct killing and wounding of civilians 
in violent attacks and sexual violence as well as the main forms of indirect 
suffering and death that war brings about by forced movement, 




One benefit of this dissertation’s inductive, case-study approach is that one may prioritise 
those categories of action that have actually occurred without having to account for every 
potential type of action that might have occurred. Thus, rather than import the Slim 
categorisation wholesale, I have used it to inform the creation of a typology of the most 
common forms of civilian victimisation during the Tajik civil war: targeted violence; 
displacement; and crime. 
 
Targeted violence includes acts of physical and sexual violence against civilians based on their 
regional or ethnic origins. It presumes such attacks to be instrumental, in that perpetrators are 
not attacking their victims randomly but are purposely targeting Gharmis, Pamiris, Kulyabis or 
Uzbeks. I have sub-divided this category of victimisation, based on the most prevalent types of 
attacks, to include: massacres during the ‘war of the kolkhozy’; attacks on population centres; 
ethnic cleansing in Dushanbe; and civilian victimisation during government military operations. 
 
Displacement refers to the mass refugee flows created during the conflict as well as attacks 
upon refugee populations. This was an especially significant form of victimisation in Tajikistan, 
given that nearly 1 million Tajiks were displaced at some point during the conflict. I address 
this category within four aspects: the mass refugee flows during the first phase of the war; 
victimisation during refugee resettlement; the victimisation of refugees in the Afghan camps; 
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and the creation of new refugee flows during government operations in eastern Tajikistan. 
 
Finally, I consider the ways in which the near-anarchic conditions of lawlessness and crime 
victimised Tajik civilians during the conflict. In particular, I address the impact of the Tajik war 
economy; the emergence of the narcotics trade; and the predatory effects of organised crime 
networks and official corruption. 
 
In sum, my typology of civilian victimisation during the Tajik civil war can be visualised thusly: 
 
Table 4.1.  Typology of Civilian Victimisation During the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997) 
Targeted Violence Displacement Crime 
Massacres during war of 
kolkhozy 
Refugee creation during 
Phase I 
Victimisation within war 
economy 
Attacks on population centres Victimisation of resettled 
refugees 
Narco-trafficking 
Ethnic cleansing in Dushanbe Victimisation of refugees in 
the Afghan camps 




New refugee flows in eastern 




This categorisation proves useful not only for examining what types of victimisation occurred, 
but for exploring the instrumental and strategic nature of much of the violence. In short, the 
typology also helps establish what types of victimisation did not occur – for example, ethnic 
slaughter on the scale of genocide, or the establishment of concentration/forced labour camps 
– and thus facilitates a discussion of how particular material or normative incentives, in 
combination with the strategic environment, generated particular forms of victimisation (the 
subject of Chapter 5). 
 
Following the discussion of the typology of victimisation, I consider the role that the PFT 
played in perpetrating it. It must be remembered that the PFT was not the only actor in the 
Tajik conflict to victimise civilians; nevertheless, its victory in the war and subsequent 
embedding in governance structures gave PFT members a level of power and influence that 
greatly facilitated their ability to target and abuse the population. To aid in differentiating their 
roles, I separate them into four positional groups and consider the ways in which each group 




4.1  Targeted Violence 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, much of the violence directed toward civilians 
during the Tajik civil war was rooted in the desire – whether for strategic or personal reasons – 
to inflict harm upon a particular group of people. As Gharmis, Kulyabis and Pamiris are all Tajik, 
this cannot be termed ethnic violence; even the Uzbek communities within Tajikistan are not 
as differentiated on a practical level as one might think, given high rates of intermarriage and 
shared language and customs. I thus use the term ‘targeted violence’ to capture the 
instrumental targeting of particular groups based on their regional or ethnic origin.  
 
 
4.1.1  Massacres During the ‘War of the Kolkhozy’ 
As described in Chapter 3, the conflict during the summer of 1992 can be fairly characterised 
as a ‘war of the kolkhozy’ (to use Roy’s term). Self-defence units in Kurgan-Tyube, comprising 
Gharmi, Kulyabi or Uzbek militiamen, attacked each other within the rural collective farms and 
villages that made up most of the southern region. There was virtually no separation of 
military and civilian spheres; people’s homes were the battleground and the population, if 
unable to flee, was caught in close proximity to the fighting. The kolkhozy were attacked not 
only to kill civilians – although they were killed in large numbers – but to acquire resources and 
control over swathes of territory. Often, after dispersing the population and looting their 
goods, villages were set afire or levelled. For example, Rubin notes that the PFT, during their 
push into southwestern Tajikistan in November 1992, ‘systematically destroyed and looted 
Gharmi villages’.430 
 
Both sides to the conflict committed horrific atrocities against the civilian population. Roy 
notes, ‘This was a savage war: massacres, rape, torture, looting and summary executions. The 
lower Vakhsh valley was the scene of Serb-style ethnic cleansing’.431 Human Rights Watch 
observers reported: 
 
During the course of the fighting, both sides committed atrocities, including 
murder, disappearances, hostage-taking, and burning and looting of homes. 
In June and July 1992, thousands of Kulabis and Uzbeks temporarily fled 
[Kurgan-Tyube], taking refuge in Kulab and Uzbekistan, respectively. Once 
they had fled, many of their homes were burned and looted. By August, 
however, the Popular Front and its supporters had gained control of most of 
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the oblast and forced out hundreds of thousands of Gharmis and Pamiris, 
most of whom were perceived to have supported the opposition. The 
victorious Kulabis and Uzbeks engaged in widespread looting and burning of 




The US State Department also stated: ‘Both old guard and opposition elements have been 
responsible for extensive and continuing violations of human rights, including summary 
executions of captives, disregard for civilian or non-combatant status, hostage-taking, torture, 
rape, looting and wanton destruction of civilian and state property’433  
 
It is not uncommon for particular types of atrocity or mutilation to become iconic acts in 
specific conflicts (for example, the amputation of limbs in Sierra Leone, mass rape in Bosnia, 
and ‘corpse messaging’ in the Mexican drug war). Whilst often invoked as evidence of the 
irrational barbarity of perpetrators, such acts also fulfil an instrumental purpose in spreading 
fear and terror amongst the population.434 In the case of Tajikistan, according to some 
accounts, victims were disembowelled and their stomachs stuffed with manure, with the 
bodies then left for their families to find.435 Such atrocities were instrumental in fuelling not 
only terror but retributive violence, as noted by a Kulabi field commander: 
 
And you have to understand one more thing – your enemy does not deserve 
to tread this land. I realised that when I saw my family – mother, wife and 
three kids – dead. Not only dead – before killing them, Islamists had 
performed despicable atrocities on them. Now, when an enemy falls to my 
hands, it is not enough for me to kill him. I want him to die slowly and 
painfully …He screams, choking with blood, and I recall the dead bodies of 
my children with bellies stuffed with manure and pity only one thing – that I 




Atrocities were also committed as provocations. According to Kilavuz, ‘Militias made use of 
atrocities in order to elicit support. One informant said… “They killed a person from one side 
and told that the other side did this. For example, they killed a Kulyabi and said that this was 
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the work of Garmis”… Militia groups increased support for themselves by making people fear 
others’.437  
 
Militias on both sides targeted not just civilians associated with adversary factions, but civilians 
amongst their own populations who were deemed insufficiently supportive (a common 
dynamic in civil wars with identity-based constituencies438). In some locales young men were 
forcefully recruited into militias, both pro-government and opposition, and civilians were 
forced to provide money and other resources to support armed groups.439 For the most part, 
civilians were forced to cooperate with any militia that threatened them, and regional 
affiliation was not enough to spare those who did not ‘cooperate enough’, for example by not 
providing enough money or refusing to fight.  
 
As noted in the last chapter, it is difficult to say how many Tajiks were killed in massacres and 
attacks in the rural countryside. The deaths were not tabulated by any agency, and mass 
graves were still being discovered the following year.440 However, the devastation caused by 
this form of civilian victimisation was undeniably massive: it spurred hundreds of thousands to 
flee their homes, affected nearly every village in Kurgan-Tyube and brought the rural economy 
to a halt. 
 
Strategically, this type of civilian victimisation was effective in the sense that it allowed self-
defence units to acquire resources and territorial control, and enabled small bands of armed 
men to conduct ‘ethnic cleansing’ operations that led thousands to flee. However, the ‘war of 
the kolkhozy’ was more or less a stalemate until the PFT acquired better weaponry and 
funding in the autumn of 1992. Thus, civilian victimisation on its own did not provide enough 
strategic success to allow either side to prevail in the first months of fighting. 
 
Finally, one other aspect of the ‘war of the kolkhozy’ – the opposition’s blockade of Kulyab – 
also represents a form of civilian victimisation. The aim of the blockade was to put pressure on 
Kulyabi forces to submit, and to cut off support for Kulyabi militias operating in Kurgan-Tyube. 
Kulyab, one of the poorest regions of Tajikistan, had historically depended on areas now 
controlled or contested by the opposition (Kurgan-Tyube and Gharm) for food; its situation 
was even more precarious that summer as mudslides had wiped out much of the crops it did 
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produce.441 Famine quickly became a very real threat. However, the opposition’s blockade 
strategy had a negative, unintended consequence, in that it provoked even greater hostility 
from the Kulyabi population whilst also generating narratives of self-defence amongst Kulyabi 
combatants.442 As one analyst dramatically observed, ‘The people of Kulyab rose up to fight 
the new regime…The Kulyabis realized that they were fighting for survival and were prepared 
to stake everything on it’.443 Thus, the overall effect of the blockade was mixed. It successfully 
victimised the Kulyabi population, but not enough to force the surrender of Kulyabi militia 




4.1.2  Attacks on Population Centres 
Given the highly rural nature of Tajik society, it is not surprising that most of the violence in the 
first phase of the war took place amongst collective farms and villages. However, there were 
also several notable attacks on cities and towns that caused many civilian casualties. As noted 
in Chapter 3, these included the fight for the city of Kurgan-Tyube in September-October 1992: 
 
There has been pitched fighting with mortars and APCs in the Kurgan-Tyube 
Oblast centre. The front line between the warring sides is city streets and 
residential districts. Every hour the number of killed and wounded grows, 
every housing estate has been turned into a closed fortress where the 
residents defend their families and homes themselves. The dead are being 




This urban-type warfare culminated in the PFT’s use of tanks against the city, which led to their 
victory. Similar fighting took place in Nurek in November; Krasnaya Zvezda reported that the 
city looked ‘like wartime Stalingrad’.445 Later, in the second phase of the conflict, the city of 
Tavildara in eastern Tajikistan would be shelled by opposition forces and remain the scene of 
constant fighting throughout the summer of 1996, leading the entire population of the town to 
flee. 
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In each case, these cities and towns were viewed as key targets by the conflict actors. Kurgan-
Tyube was the seat of government for the whole region; Nurek was the site of an important 
road and large power station; and Tavildara was the heart of the opposition’s territory. The 
importance of controlling such centres of gravity led conflict actors to disregard the possibility 
of harm to the civilian population. In each case, such neglect paid off, even if only temporarily 
(as we have seen, Tavildara changed hands half a dozen times in 1996). 
 
By far the most notable urban assaults, however, were committed in Dushanbe. The Tajik 
capital experienced a number of serious episodes of violence: the outbreak of war in May 
1992; the coup attempt in October; and the final PFT taking of the city in December. Dushanbe 
was the ultimate centre of gravity during the first phase of the war; the opposition essentially 
lost the war when they lost the capital. 
 
An unfortunate aspect of intrastate conflict is that civilian population centres often feature as 
centres of gravity, and the Tajik war was no different. It is possible that thousands of civilians 
were killed in the fight to control these cities and towns. Strategically, however, the decision to 
target cities despite their civilian population was an effective one in the end for the PFT. Their 
use of tanks and artillery against Kurgan-Tyube and Dushanbe in the autumn and winter of 
1992 is, in essence, what led to their victory. 
 
 
4.1.3  Ethnic Cleansing in Dushanbe 
Following the PFT capture of Dushanbe in December 1992, Gharmis and Pamiris in the capital 
were targeted by paramilitary forces. Human Rights Watch, which sent observers to Dushanbe 
in early 1993, reported that ‘In the first few weeks after the current government came to 
power, pro-government paramilitary forces came to Dushanbe and committed appalling 
human rights violations, including summary executions, capturing and beating or torturing 
presumed supporters of the opposition, and terrorising civilians’.446 On the floor of the US 
Senate, Senator Bill Bradley urged his government to exploit its full range of diplomatic tools to 
end the ethnic cleansing, explaining:  
 
I have received direct appeals from those who claim that genocide is being 
perpetrated against the peoples of the Pamir… Davlat Khudonazarov [the 
former opposition presidential candidate] and his family have received 
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numerous death threats. His vice presidential running mate, Aspiddin 
Sakhibnazarov, in fact was killed, as was the head of Tajik television. 
Reports of people being dragged from their apartments, pulled off buses 





Civilians were openly targeted based on region of birth, which was noted on their ID papers; 
Pamiris were also easily singled out as their use of a different form of Persian meant they had 
difficulty pronouncing certain Tajik words.448 As early as 16 December, reports appeared in the 
international media of atrocities directed at civilians associated with the opposition (in this 
case, the execution of twenty Pamiris outside a cinema by uniformed Kulyabi militia); scores 
were reported killed in the first week after the pro-communist takeover, and several hundred 
more by the end of the month.449 It is believed several thousand were killed by the time the 
campaign eased in February.450 
 
Victims were often seized during inspections of public transport by paramilitary forces, or 
following raids on individual flats and homes.451 Areas known to house Gharmi and Pamiri 
communities were specifically targeted: in the outlying neighbourhood of Awul, for example, 
nearly all the houses were burned down, several dozen residents were shot to death, and its 
streets were used as a dumping ground for several hundred bodies of those arrested 
elsewhere.452 The selective targeting of particular constituencies was made even more obvious 
by the return to Dushanbe of groups associated with the new regime: mere weeks after the 
takeover, with the city under curfew and armed gangs roaming the streets, Uzbek refugees 
nevertheless began returning to Dushanbe because ‘it’s safe now’.453 Their presumed loyalty to 
Rahmonov, Kenjaev and other leading figures indeed gave them a shield of safety that the 
defeated constituencies did not have. 
 
Officially, the new regime announced that no one would be arrested or detained for political 
reasons. But as Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported at the time, ‘In actual fact, however, what is 
happening in Dushanbe looks a lot like a reign of terror with which neither the official 
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authorities nor the disarmed self-defence units can cope’.454 President Rahmonov himself said 
that the regime ‘is not in control of the situation and does not know who is doing the arresting 
and the killing’, and that ‘armed groups have infiltrated the interior ministry and are terrorising 
the city’.455 Yet despite official denials, the politically motivated character of the ongoing 
civilian victimisation in the capital was clear, as evidenced by the assassination of the head of 
the opposition faction in parliament, the arrests and murders of opposition journalists, the 
obvious regional/ethnic dimension in the atrocities perpetrated by pro-government forces, 
and even seemingly minor developments such as the government decision to no longer sell 
airline tickets to Pamiris.456  
 
Beyond that, it is difficult to discern the exact identities of the perpetrators, other than their 
general association with pro-government forces (as opposition units in the city had fled or 
been disarmed) or criminal syndicates allied to figures in the new regime. It may be true that 
some perpetrators without such ties took advantage of the chaos surrounding the government 
takeover to engage in civilian victimisation, as Rahmonov and others claimed. This may 
account for the statements by Salimov and other government sources, on 17 December, that 
groups ‘of unknown origin’ from Hissar had been ordered to leave Dushanbe.457 It is not clear, 
however, which groups are being referred to here, and by any account civilian victimisation in 
the city did not abate with their departure. Security in the city was given over to MVD forces 
and paramilitaries, but the PFT was also openly operating in the city, and the perpetrators of 
atrocities were presumed at the time to be loyal to various warlords instead of the Ministry of 
Interior (they were referred to as ‘bandits in uniform’).458 Regardless of the individual identity 
of perpetrators and victims, the general shape and pattern of violence in the city was evident: 
the victims were overwhelmingly Gharmi or Pamiri, or somehow associated with the Islamo-
democrat opposition, and the perpetrators operated with impunity because of their 
association with political or criminal authorities.459  
 
Compared to the previous types of civilian victimisation, this type of ethnic cleansing campaign 
in Dushanbe had less strategic value. The PFT had already taken Dushanbe and Rahmonov had 
been installed; the opposition militias had fled the area. Thus, these attacks were likely 
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4.1.4 Civilian Victimisation During Government Military Operations 
This category of victimisation refers to civilian suffering due to government counteroffensives 
and other military operations following the Kulyabi victory – in other words, after official 
government security forces had been reconstituted in early 1993. In includes both collateral 
damage incidents and purposeful victimisation by security forces. Whilst the term ‘collateral 
damage’ generally connotes civilian casualties that are an unintended result of a military 
operation, I argue that in the Tajik case these can still be considered targeted violence because 
the military targets were located in areas that were homogenously affiliated with the 
opposition (the Karategin Valley and northern Afghanistan).  
 
As described in Chapter 3, the ongoing military confrontation between opposition militants 
and Tajik and Russian security forces in Phase II of the war led to civilian victimisation as a by-
product of kinetic operations in two specific locales: eastern Tajikistan and the Tajik-Afghan 
border region. Hundreds of Tajik and Afghan civilians were killed from 1993 to 1997 in 
collateral damage incidents – largely due to indiscriminate bombing, with security forces 
targeting militant positions in or near villages, although the opposition also launched rockets at 
border posts that occasionally hit nearby villages instead.460  
 
In addition, government security forces – and particularly the paramilitary forces that 
accompanied them, many of them former PFT units – engaged in purposeful victimisation of 
the population as they conducted counteroffensives in eastern Tajikistan.461 As described in a 
1995 US Department of State report: 
 
[T]he August-September [1994] campaign in Tavildara saw many excesses 
committed by both sides in the abuse of civilian populations and the 
confiscation of humanitarian aid. Neither government forces nor the 
opposition have complete control over all elements ostensibly loyal to them. 
Government forces, most notably the Faisali Brigade [a former PFT militia], 
swept the countryside in Vanch and upper Garm, according to one witness, 
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‘like an army of occupation’, looting, confiscating crops and beating and 





Another representative incident was reported by the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 
(UNMOT) in 1995: 
 
[O]n 13 May, a Special Operations Regiment of the Government entered the 
village of Khakimu, near Komsomolabad (south of Garm), and began 
shooting at the local population, causing the death of one person and 
injuring two others, including a child. This followed an attack on a defence 
post of the Special Operations Regiment in the village of Chorsada, near 
Khakimu, on the same day, allegedly by members of the opposition. Five 




Continued fighting in the Gharm and Tavildara districts also displaced thousands of civilians (as 
discussed further below) and disrupted the supply of basic provisions and aid to all of eastern 
Tajikistan, resulting in an internationally recognised humanitarian crisis.464 Both sides also 
utilised land mines, and whilst most of these were placed in less-populated areas, such as 
mountain valleys – thus endangering mostly combatants, a number of whom were killed by 
mines during the war – civilians were also killed as they strayed into mined areas to collect 
firewood or herd livestock.465  
 
Whilst both sides committed violence against civilians, the government security forces were 
generally perceived to be the worse offenders. This was a function of two aspects of the 
conflict: 1) government forces possessed and used heavy weapons and aircraft, often 
indiscriminately, and included many inexperienced and unsuitable men in their frontline 
militias; and 2) the immersion of opposition forces in local communities tempered their 
violence against civilians (although their guerrilla activities indirectly caused civilian suffering, 
via government retaliation and interrupted aid deliveries). As an ICRC delegate noted, ‘The 
opposition is living in small groups, living among the population. They don’t want to alienate 
the locals, and [so they] treat them well. The government force tends to be young and 
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inexperienced, untrained boys…’466 Broadly speaking, this dynamic followed the pattern 
predicted by insurgency theory: non-state armed forces, reliant upon the civilian population 
for shelter and support, are less likely to target civilians. However, opposition forces still clearly 
demonstrated an ability to victimise civilians either directly – for example, killing 
uncooperative villagers – or indirectly, such as by stealing aid shipments. The fact that the 
scope of their civilian victimisation was less than that of the government’s does not negate the 
question of why they would target civilians at all, a conundrum that will be analysed in Chapter 
5.  
 
In sum, targeted violence afflicted civilians during the civil war in a number of different forms 
and locales. In some cases it served an effective strategic purpose; at other times, it appeared 
to be a function of either neglect or more nefarious criminal and personal motivations.  This 
examination of the multiple manifestations of targeted violence should demonstrate, 




4.2  Displacement and Refugees 
The victimisation of refugees during this period was multifaceted, owing to the complex 
arrangement of displaced civilians throughout Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan. Four types 
of refugee victimisation can be aggregated from countless incidents of violence and neglect: 1) 
displacement and ethnic cleansing during the most contested phase of the war, in 1992; 2) the 
targeting of resettled refugees in Tajikistan after the Kulyabi victory; 3) the victimisation of 
Tajik refugees in northern Afghanistan; and 4) the creation of new refugee flows in eastern 
Tajikistan as a result of ongoing insurgency.  
 
The 200,000 Russians who fled Tajikistan during 1992 should also be considered refugees and 
civilian victims of the conflict. However, as they were removed from the conflict zone, they are 
not discussed further here. 
 
 
4.2.1  Displacement and Ethnic Cleansing in 1992 
The displacement of civilians was a key feature of the first phase of the civil war. Massive 
refugee flows were triggered by fighting: Russians fled Dushanbe with the outbreak of conflict; 
Uzbeks fled Kurgan-Tyube as they were targeted by both opposition and pro-government 
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militias; and Gharmis, Pamiris and Kulyabis fled their homes ahead of the ravages of enemy 
self-defence units. During 1992, up to 1 million Tajiks were displaced. Many sought refuge in 
Dushanbe, straining its capacity to function; Uzbeks tended to seek shelter in Leninabad or 
Uzbekistan, whilst the Russian refugees tended to leave the region altogether. Pamiris often 
sought to return to Gorno-Badakhshan, but the addition of thousands of refugees to the 
already impoverished region generated a humanitarian crisis. 
 
Perhaps the most desperately affected, however, were the Gharmi refugees who were driven 
out of Kurgan-Tyube toward Afghanistan in late 1992. Following the PFT military success in 
taking the city of Kurgan-Tyube, PFT units swept south through the Kurgan-Tyube region, 
driving both opposition militia and Gharmi civilians before them. The attacks and deprivation 
suffered by the refugees at the hands of Kulyabi militia were clearly intentional.467 The leading 
Kulyabi field commander in the border region, Akhmazhan Alimov, was quoted as saying: 
‘Their condition is their problem. When they moved here to live in our region they had 
nothing. That’s how they should leave us, that’s how it will be done’.468 Safarov, while officially 
denying the PFT was engaged in ethnic cleansing, was quoted as saying ‘that Muslim 
fundamentalists could either disarm or escape into Afghanistan, “because if they stay our 
people will kill every one of them”’.469  
 
With no safe access to Gharm itself, the refugees gathered together in large numbers in the 
southern districts of Tajikistan, where they received little aid (the Tajik government denied 
access to southern Tajikistan to the International Committee of the Red Cross and Medecins 
Sans Frontieres, both of whom did operate in northern Afghanistan).470 The chairman of the 
Lenin kolkhoz in Kumsangir raion claimed that 50,000 refugees had gathered on the farm’s 
territory – twice the usual size of the population – and that 100 children a day were dying of 
‘cold, hunger and disease’, as the refugees were forced to sleep in the open winter air and 
food and medicines had virtually run out; he also warned that the entire district faced 
starvation unless food was urgently delivered.471 
 
The situation deteriorated even more rapidly after the November offensive against the 
Shaartuz and Kumsangir raions: tens of thousands of refugees were trapped between warring 
militias, subjected to atrocities by vengeful Kulyabi fighters, used as cover by fleeing Islamic 
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militants, and often so desperate to escape that they braved the river crossing into northern 
Afghanistan (one of the few places in the world more war-torn and destitute than southern 
Tajikistan).472 In mid-December, UNHCR reported that 5,000 people a day were attempting the 
freezing swim across the border; thus far, 90,000 had crossed, with tens of thousands more 
waiting behind them.473 As time went on, rafts and barges were constructed and more 
frequently used. Afghan mujahidin welcomed refugees and militants on the opposite side of 
the river, and at times even sent out boats to fish refugees out of the water in ‘a kind of 
Dunkirk’ operation.474 Hundreds drowned, however, including women and children. Michael 
Semple, then the Oxfam director for Afghanistan helping to provide relief to Tajik refugees in 
northern Afghanistan, identified them as victims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Kulyabi militia, and in 
late December he stated that children were freezing to death every night in the refugee 
encampments.475 With virtually no fuel available on the Afghan plains, refugees were forced to 
dig underground bunkers to survive the sub-zero temperatures.476 The chaos at the border was 
exacerbated by repeated attempts at infiltration into Tajikistan by Afghan militants allied with 
the opposition; whilst the Russian Border Troops largely stood by and let refugees flow out of 
Tajikistan, they tried to prevent infiltration in a series of deadly confrontations.477   
 
This type of purposeful refugee creation clearly had a strategic purpose: to obtain control over 
the entire region of Kurgan-Tyube, by removing enemy civilians and the opposition militants 
who sheltered amongst them. It also allowed the PFT to acquire significant resources, given 
the many agricultural enterprises in southern Kurgan-Tyube, including those in the southwest 
corner which had not yet been touched by war. Thus, this particular type of civilian 
victimisation was strategically successful. With control over the region and the elimination of 
opposition militias in southern Tajikistan, the Kulyabi victory was assured. 
 
 
4.2.2  Victimisation of Resettled Refugees  
However, with the winding down of the first phase of the war, it became clear that one of the 
most important achievements for normalisation and a return to economic productivity was the 
return of refugees to their regions. Between January and March, tens of thousands of refugees 
began to return from Dushanbe, Leninabad and northern Afghanistan. There were a number of 
logistical obstacles to this process, which the regime attempted to overcome by providing 
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refugees with funds to travel and reconstruct their homes, but the major impediments were 
the result of civilian victimisation during the war: namely, fear of retributive violence, and the 
fact that many villages had been destroyed or resettled, thus leaving refugees with no homes 
to return to. (It was estimated that 150,000 homes had been destroyed in the southern 
regions.478) A number of confrontations and deaths occurred early in the resettlement process, 
leading Sangak Safarov to suggest that in some areas refugees would have to resettle 
elsewhere to avoid violence.479 A government official said, ‘It will take more than a few months 
to heal the wounds here…It’s difficult for people to go back to living next to each other after all 
the killing’.480 Reconciliation was made even more unlikely by the fact that the regime 
continued to place the blame for the entire conflict on the Gharmi and Pamiri opposition, 
consistently referring to them as ‘enemies of the people’ (a phrase borrowed from the Stalinist 
era of purges and repression).481 This did little to promote a reversal of the process of 
demonisation of the communities associated with them. 
 
Safarov, despite his apparent tolerance earlier in the conflict for ethnic cleansing, was now 
motivated to facilitate the return of refugees in Khatlon, in part because he was uneasy about 
Uzbek dominance in the region as long as Tajik refugees remained displaced, but also in order 
to reduce the potential pool of militant recruits amongst the enormous refugee population in 
northern Afghanistan.482 In late January, he accompanied Salimov to Pyanj in order to help 
make arrangements for the return of refugees.483 In February, he met with Afghan Uzbek 
warlord General Dostum to try to speed up the return of Tajiks from northern Afghanistan (his 
personal appearance was meant to reassure refugees that government guarantees of their 
safe return were credible).484 On 24 March, Safarov visited Kabodiyen raion in Kurgan-Tyube to 
help defuse tensions generated by the return of refugees: 8,000 people had been ordered to 
return to Kabodiyen by authorities in Dushanbe, but no food or shelter had been provided for 
them; at least 15 died from the poor conditions and others were attacked by local residents.485 
It was on the heels of this trip to Kabodiyen that Safarov met with Saidov, however, a meeting 
that ended in both their deaths. 
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Nevertheless, the end of widespread conflict hastened the return of refugees, and by May 
1993 some 500,000 refugees had returned to their homes.486 However, tens of thousands of 
Gharmi and Pamiri refugees remained displaced and continued to experience purposeful 
victimisation before, during and after resettlement, which greatly hampered the process.487 
Their vulnerability and the lack of any real constraints on armed groups made them easy prey 
for victorious Kulyabis – often formally or informally tied to state security forces – who were 
eager to wreak revenge or steal property and goods. For example: 
 
On Sunday [28 March 1993] militants from the pro-government Popular 
Front in Tajikistan did not let some 300 refugees return to their homes in 
Khatlon region. Witnesses claim that when the militants heard that the 
refugees were returning to Turkmenistan state farm, once a stronghold of 
the Islamic Renaissance Party, they started beating up the men and raping 




News of attacks in the countryside quickly filtered back to Dushanbe and other areas where 
refugees concentrated (including northern Afghanistan), effectively undermining attempts by 
the regime to return people to their homes.489 As one Gharmi refugee stated, in an account 
typical of the time, ‘Some people have come from the village to tell us that if we do return, we 
will be killed’.490 Even when people could be convinced to resettle, the dire economic situation 
and the lingering physical effects of victimisation became a further obstacle.491 
 
Every few miles along almost any road in Kurgan-Tyube, a traveller passes 
another village that has been destroyed – street by street, house by house. 
Only mud-packed walls with thin whitewashed plaster exteriors are still 
standing. Before they were destroyed, the houses were looted. Everything 
was stolen – furniture, window frames, electrical sockets… They even carted 
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Events in the village of Zarbador, the subject of several contemporary media reports, 
illustrated well the patterns of ongoing civilian victimisation in southern Tajikistan.493 Formerly 
a prosperous Gharmi farming village near Kurgan-Tyube city, most of its 2,500 residents fled 
toward the Afghan border after it was attacked by Kulyabi militia over the course of two days 
in the summer of 1992 (the first day, everything of value was looted; the second, residents 
were shot and buildings torched). In 1993, the villagers began to return – but so did the 
Kulyabi militias, now transformed into government security forces like the locally based Faizali 
Brigade. Ostensibly searching for opposition militants, they killed the few men who had 
returned. In 1994, the village was occupied solely by women and children – 500 young people, 
many of them orphans, and 50 women to look after them. With frequent visits by militiamen, 
it was deemed far too dangerous for their male relatives to return, and the villagers struggled 
to survive with little food and shelter and little capacity to rebuild or plant crops. They received 
little international aid thanks to corrupt local officials. Victimisation by the security forces was 
openly indiscriminate: the commander of the Faizali Brigade, Izatullo Kuganov, admitted that 
they seized returning refugees randomly, because even if they were not opposition members 
they would eventually confess to knowing others who were.494 (Kuganov, it may be 
remembered, was himself killed by members of Khudoberdyev’s brigade in 1995.495) The 
village had also acquired a new ‘boss’, a Kulyabi from a neighbouring village who maintained a 
sense of calm, if not normality or prosperity. 
 
The continued displacement of Gharmis and Pamiris hampered efforts to ameliorate the dire 
social and economic effects of the war. Gorno-Badakhshan struggled to cope with tens of 
thousands of refugees at a time when it already had problems feeding its own native 
population; the situation was exacerbated by continued fighting in eastern Tajikistan, which 
blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid.496 Refugees generally found it difficult to work or 
provide for themselves, whilst in their former lands crop harvests decreased dramatically.497 
Displaced populations also became a political issue, with the IRP claiming the dislocation of 
many of its supporters – and thus their inability to vote – made any elections held during this 
time invalid.498 Nuri, the head of the IRP, also stated that the existence of the refugee 
populations legitimised the ongoing insurgency:  
 
                                                                 
493
 Toronto Star, 10/4/94; NPR, 12/5/94; Christian Science Monitor, 19/5/94. 
494
 Christian Science Monitor, 19/5/94. 
495
 US Department of State (1996), 105. 
496
 BBC/Multiple sources, 17/3/93; BBC/Multiple sources, 15/6/93; BBC/Itar-Tass, 31/1/95(a); Irish Times, 10/4/95; 
What the Papers Say/Pravda, 20/6/97. 
497
 Ruesch (1994); BBC/Itar-Tass, 4/12/93; Moscow Times, 11/11/96. 
498
 BBC/Tajik Radio, 30/8/94(b); BBC/Itar-Tass, 8/10/94; AFP, 7/11/94(a); Inter-Press Service, 8/11/94. 
 123 
[Tajik refugees] are part of Tajik society and have every right to live in their 
country and be fully active, in both financial and spiritual terms. That is why 
as long as the Dushanbe regime prevents them returning to their country 
and living a peaceful life in their own homeland, they have the right to 




In sum, the victimisation of Gharmi and Pamiri refugees during this period was in essence a 
continuation of the ethnic cleansing campaign they had endured during the first year of the 
war. Despite official policies meant to encourage refugee resettlement, the reality was that the 
government did not provide enough resources to aid refugees in resettlement nor sufficient 
protection to keep them safe as they did so. However, attacks upon returning refugees 
gradually lessened, with the US State Department and Human Rights Watch noting a reduction 
in the number of attacks each year from 1994.500 This reduced the scope of refugee 
victimisation, but not the ill effects for those who remained unable to return to their homes or 
who continued to suffer harassment or violence once they did so. In particular, young male 
Gharmis – the target constituency for the IRP – continued to be singled out for harassment, 
arrest and beatings, and the overall drop in refugee victimisation during these years may 
merely reflect the wholesale flight of many young Gharmi men to Afghanistan or Russia.501 
 
 
4.2.3  Refugee Victimisation in Afghanistan 
The victimisation of refugees occurred not only within Tajikistan, during the process of 
resettlement, but in northern Afghanistan, where tens of thousands of Tajiks were stranded 
following the intense fighting of 1992 (estimates of their numbers ranged from 60,000 to 
90,000, the latter coming from UNHCR).502 Living conditions within the hastily assembled 
refugee camps were bleak and unforgiving – and politically volatile. Roughly half of the 
refugees were under the protection of UNHCR in the Sakhi refugee camp near Mazar-i-Sharif, 
in Balkh province, which was controlled by the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum. He 
offered both Uzbek and Gharmi refugees sanctuary but limited their access to militant 
recruitment and training. These refugees began to be repatriated relatively quickly; they were 
moved in groups of several hundred people from Mazar to Termez and onward to Khatlon.503 
The other half of the refugee population clustered in three camps – Ameirabad, Bogh-i-
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Sherkat, and Sherkat – in neighbouring Kunduz and Takhar provinces, at the mercy of local 
Afghan warlords (notably, Hekmatyar and Chughai in Kunduz, and Massoud in Takhar). In these 
locales, they received aid from Arab and Iranian sources and were recruited for militant 
training by the IRP. 504 These refugees were repatriated at a much slower rate than those in the 
UNHCR camps: by August 1994, only about 5,000 refugees were left in the UNHCR camps but 
‘tens of thousands’ remained in other parts of northern Afghanistan.505 Some were reportedly 
subjected to cross-border shelling, both from Russian border forces targeting IRP positions and 
from militants firing upon Russian border posts.506 
 
The fear of what awaited them in their home communities kept many refugees from returning, 
despite the conditions they endured. A journalist who visited the Sakhi refugee camp near 
Mazar in late 1996 found that while the camp population had dropped significantly – from 
40,000 at its peak to 7,300 – most of the remaining refugees had no intention of returning to 
Tajikistan and were attempting to root themselves in their new surroundings. They were 
deterred by both the fear of victimisation and the lack of viable livelihoods in their destroyed 
home villages.507 
 
Compared to Tajikistan’s internal refugees, the Tajik refugees in northern Afghanistan faced an 
additional source of victimisation: their usefulness to the opposition’s insurgency campaign. 
The refugee camps were a primary source of recruits for the IRP, who also received funds 
under the cover of aid sent to the refugees by Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia.508 In addition, 
the trickle of repatriating refugees provided a means of cross-border infiltration for militants, 
and IRP leaders used the existence of large numbers of refugees to discredit elections and 
score political points during peace negotiations. All this meant that the opposition had little 
incentive to encourage the departure of Tajik refugees, and evidence suggests they actively 
discouraged repatriation by blocking access to international aid agencies, spreading tales of 
refugee victimisation in Tajikistan, and even threatening refugees who desired to return.509 
There were also reports of Tajik militants victimising Afghan civilians who objected to their 
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continued presence, which had brought not only airstrikes but trafficking routes to northern 
Afghan villages.510 
 
This utilisation of refugee populations by insurgents was not unprecedented. In the 1920s, the 
basmachi rebels exploited refugee populations in virtually the same locations.511 More 
recently, a similar dynamic occurred during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, when the Afghan 
mujahidin took advantage of an even larger cohort of refugees in Pakistan.512 Goodson used 
this case study to propose a ‘refugee-based insurgency model’, under which insurgents exploit 
the protections afforded to refugees under international humanitarian law to obtain funding, 
recruits and sanctuary.513 Tousley has noted the model’s applicability for the Tajik case as well, 
with the significant difference that the Tajik refugees were not as numerous or well-funded as 
the Afghans.514 Nevertheless, the Tajik case study provides additional weight for Goodson’s 
conclusion that refugee-based insurgencies prolong and internationalise conflicts, as it is 
doubtful that the Tajik opposition could have maintained its insurgency for as long as it did 
without the funds, manpower and physical cover that the refugee population provided. In 
short, the Tajik refugees in northern Afghanistan clearly demonstrate that the effects of 




4.2.4  Creation of New Refugees in Eastern Tajikistan 
Finally, refugee victimisation during this period also includes the creation of new refugee 
populations, primarily as a result of armed clashes in eastern Tajikistan. As early as March 
1993, government counteroffensives in the Karategin Valley were generating thousands of 
new refugees, as people fled further east with the arrival of government security forces and 
helicopters.515 The spike in armed clashes in Tavildara in August 1994 caused hundreds of 
civilians to flee from the area.516 But by far the biggest influx of new refugees came in 1996, 
during the fierce fighting that continued throughout the year between militants and 
government security forces in the Tavildara and Gharm districts. According to the ICRC and 
other agencies, the fighting generated 15,000 to 25,000 IDPs, who fled either further up the 
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mountain valleys or west to Dushanbe.517 It also led to 600,000 people needing emergency 
food assistance.518 As reported at the end of 1996: 
 
The ICRC regularly assists over 23,000 people displaced by the hostilities in 
central Tajikistan. Since May, the institution had been trying to reach the 
population cut off behind opposition lines in the Tavildara area. Some 5,000 
people are reportedly still living there, in urgent need of protection and 
assistance…The latest military developments have now also severed access 
to the population of the Garm Valley, estimated at around 270,000 and 
including hundreds of families who have been displaced by hostilities in 
Tavildara. Living conditions in this mountainous region are extremely 
precarious in winter, and children in particular are at the risk of 
malnourishment. Vulnerable groups are in desperate need of food and 
shelter… Because of the rugged terrain and harsh weather conditions, it is 
extremely difficult for outside aid to reach the victims of this conflict. In 
addition, for the time being, the road from Dushanbe to Garm has been cut 





The following March, with the Dushanbe-Gharm road still cut off, the ICRC reported that its 
humanitarian convoys to the region were having to ‘make a detour of about 1,600 km via 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, across rough roads and high mountain passes, in order to reach 
Garm from the east’.520 Even after years of conflict, the humanitarian infrastructure for 
assisting refugees and IDPs was incredibly fragile and civilian suffering was all too easily 
provoked. 
 
In sum, civilian victimisation in the form of displacement and the abuse of refugees was one of 
the most pervasive and challenging forms of civilian suffering during the war. It affected a huge 
number of people, in a country lacking the resources and sometimes the political will to 
address the situation. One of the key challenges in trying to counter this category of behaviour 
was the fact that it was often so strategically useful, helping conflict actors acquire territorial 
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control, resources, recruits, funding and revenge fulfilment. It was only when strong incentives 
appeared to counter this utility that progress was made in easing the plight of Tajik refugees.  
 
 
4.3  Crime 
The literature on civilian victimisation in warfare does not generally focus on crime as a 
mechanism for victimisation in its own right; rather, it is seen as part of the context of an 
overall atmosphere of lawlessness that facilitates the targeting of civilian populations. In the 
case of Tajikistan, however, it is clear that the activities of criminal actors were a leading 
source of violence directed at civilians. For this reason, I argue that criminality should be 
considered along with ‘political’ violence in discussions of civilian victimisation. 
 
Before independence, Tajikistan actually enjoyed the lowest crime rate in the Soviet Union and 
was considered extremely safe.521 Along with its Central Asian neighbours, however, Tajikistan 
was beset by a cluster of problems that led to a phenomenal increase in criminality after 
independence (according to the CIS Statistical Service, crime rose 37 per cent in Tajikistan from 
1991 to 1992).522 According to Mark Galeotti, the most salient factors in the rise of Central 
Asian crime were: 1) the unprecedented expansion of the drugs trade and associated 
protection markets; 2) entrenched systems of corruption inherited from the Soviet era; 3) 
strong clan and regional systems of governance undermining the central government and rule 
of law; 4) economic deprivation and crisis; and 5) deeply embedded organised crime 
networks.523  
 
In addition to these region-wide challenges, Tajikistan also had the unique problems 
associated with a brutal civil war and its devastating impact on state and society. As a result of 
both the civil war and widespread criminality, Tajikistan commonly came to be seen as one of 
the more dangerous spots in the world. Dushanbe was a haunted capital, deserted after dark 
except for roving bands of criminals and militia: a ‘balmy-aired playground for demobbed 
fighters who, drunk on vodka, celebrate by firing shots into the skies’.524 Robbery, extortion 
and kidnapping for ransom were common tools of predation for armed groups, many of which 
operated with virtual impunity.525 Competition and conflict over illicit sources of money and 
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power led to violence in which civilians were caught in the crossfire, as in 1995 when rival 
army brigades competing over control of the local cotton industry in Kurgan-Tyube engaged in 
armed clashes in which a number of civilians were killed, or the numerous small-scale clashes 
between mafia groups in Tursunzade and Hissar.526 Criminality was also a key feature of ethnic 
cleansing campaigns (such as when Pamiri neighbourhoods were targeted for looting in 
Dushanbe in early 1993) as well as ongoing refugee victimisation (such as extortion and theft 
directed at Gharmis at roadblocks in Khatlon).527 Even those who profited from criminality and 
corruption themselves – Tajikistan’s wealthy new class of ‘businessmen’ – became targets of 
criminality, particularly kidnapping and extortion.528 
 
This section considers criminality within three broad headings: victimisation within the Tajik 
war economy; narco-trafficking; and organised crime and corruption. Together, these three 
categories of criminality were responsible for a devastating level of violence and predation 
against Tajik civilians. The section concludes with a brief consideration of the interaction 
between ‘criminal’ and ‘political’ violence in war-era Tajikistan. 
  
 
4.3.1  Victimisation within the Tajik War Economy 
The emergence of a Tajik war economy had an enormous impact on civilians. As defined by 
Ballentine and Nitzschke, war economies ‘involve the destruction or circumvention of the 
formal economy and the growth of informal and black markets, effectively blurring the lines 
between the formal, informal and criminal sectors and activities’.529 Whilst in many ways the 
Tajik war economy offered coping mechanisms for survival (for example, with the expansion of 
the black market in food products), overall the removal or diminution of legitimate authorities 
in the socioeconomic sphere allowed newly powerful armed groups and warlords to victimise 
civilians by controlling their access to necessities and forcing them to partake in illicit economic 
activities.530  
 
Using Keen’s approach to war economies – i.e., observing the way in which conflict transforms 
rather than destroys political and economic life within a state – it is clear that the collapse of 
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Soviet-era systems and institutions, and their replacement with informal and criminalised 
mechanisms of governance during the civil war era, created numerous vectors for the 
victimisation of civilians at the hands of non-state actors and corrupt regime officials.531 As in 
other conflicts, the Tajik war economy did not centre around productive economic activity – a 
difficult proposition given the extent of the war’s destruction and disruption – but rather 
depended upon the illegal expropriation of resources from enterprises and individuals; 
extortion and the illegal taxation of goods, services and movement; the theft and diversion of 
international aid; dramatically rising profits from the narcotics trade; and other criminal 
markets, such as kidnapping and protection rackets. All of these activities victimised civilians, 
either directly or indirectly; and the absence of non-corrupt security structures meant that 
civilians – especially those on the losing side of the conflict – were left with virtually no 
protection from criminal violence and predation. 
 
The inability of the regime to rebuild much of the legitimate sphere of the national economy – 
60 per cent of which was destroyed in 1992-1993 – meant that economic inputs continued to 
be diverted into these flourishing illicit sectors and markets.532 According to one model, the 
Tajik shadow economy was worth 100 per cent – i.e., the same amount – as the official 
economy.533 As in many other locales, the Tajik war economy endured because whilst not 
beneficial to most civilians or the state as a whole, it generated substantial profits for corrupt 
regime officials and local strongmen. The revenues that once flowed in predictable patterns to 
regional elites, particularly the Leninabadis, were displaced by new funding flows that 
predominantly benefited Kulyabi government and security officials, local militias and mafias, 
and opposition militants. These beneficiaries sought to maintain this new system regardless of 
its deleterious impact on the Tajik state and population. 
 
At the same time, many civilians lived off the war economy, even if unwillingly, due to 
economic deprivation, high unemployment and high inflation (at times hitting 500 per cent).534 
According to Rueesch, ‘A minimum monthly wage can now barely purchase one liter of 
gasoline and a daily loaf of bread. In order to survive, the entire population is obliged to earn 
extra income from street peddling and other marginally legitimate activities’.535 In Gorno-
Badakhshan, near-starvation conditions encouraged participation in the burgeoning narco-
trafficking sector, to the extent that its economy became ‘entirely dependent upon this 
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trade’.536 In 1993, one successful cross-border drugs smuggling trip would net a Badakhshani 
the same amount of money that the average worker would earn in an entire year.537 As noted 
by a Tajik deputy interior minister, ‘[The] drug trade is the most profitable business in Central 
Asia and people will never give it up…Opium production is the sole source of income for many 
of these impoverished people’.538 Jackson sums up the sometimes positive aspects of 
organised crime in the region by saying:  
 
…corruption and trafficking are ‘security dichotomies’. Seemingly 
paradoxical, they can actually be positive for human society because they 
allow people to survive in poor economies when the state cannot 
adequately help them. In this sense, clandestine transnational activities 
may, particularly in the short term, actually be positive or even necessary 
for both individuals and even for state survival.
 539 
 
Indeed, the positive aspects of criminality in Tajikistan – and many other conflict states – have 
contributed to new debates on the normative interpretations of crime and of war economies 
generally, with scholars and analysts increasingly observing that within the context of conflict 
and deprivation it is difficult to assign inherent negativity to all criminal behaviour.540 
 
Nevertheless, the emergence of an informal and highly criminalised war economy during the 
civil war era led to numerous manifestations of victimisation amongst the civilian population. 
The enormous disruption that the conflict posed to the economic functioning of society led 
inevitably to new informal mechanisms that privileged newly strong actors – i.e., those with 
the military and monetary backing to enforce their will within the near-anarchic conditions of 
the Tajik conflict. Paramilitaries and corrupt officials constructed new economic and political 
systems to suit their needs, not those of the Tajik population, with the predictable result that 
civilians suffered high levels of deprivation, predation and violence. 
 
 
4.3.2  Narco-trafficking 
One of the most visible and significant forms of criminality at this time was the drugs trade. 
Tajikistan traditionally featured several areas of drugs production (such as the poppy fields 
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around Penjikent in Leninabad) but up until 1992 the country’s drug problem was limited to a 
relatively small amount of local trade and consumption. By 1993, however, Tajikistan had 
become a key transit state for the burgeoning trade in Afghan opium (and its processed form, 
heroin) which was now controlled by well-armed, organised and powerful mafia groups within 
Tajikistan.541 A number of factors contributed to the expansion of this trade in the region, 
including the breakdown of borders with the collapse of the USSR; increased migration and 
more globalised transport; increased production in Afghanistan, which in 1994 became the 
world’s leading supplier of opium for the first time (concomitantly with decreasing opium 
production in Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle region); attempts to improve counternarcotics 
in Iran and Pakistan, which increased the attractiveness of the northern routes; increased 
demand in Russia and Europe; and conflict and economic collapse in the origin and transit 
countries.542 As a UN Drug Control Program officer put it, ‘There are no incentives to stop the 
traffic, only incentives to start’.543 
 
These factors led criminal networks to establish new trafficking routes through Central Asia, to 
supplement A) the traditional ‘Balkan route’ that brought Afghan drugs through Iran, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, the Yugoslav republics, Austria and Germany, and B) the substantial trade through 
Pakistan, which continued into Iran via Balochistan or exited the country via seaports like 
Karachi. Now, opiates were smuggled across the Tajik-Afghan border – mostly through Gorno-
Badakhshan, where the border was barely guarded – and moved toward Osh through either 
the Pamirs or the Ferghana Valley; another route moved drugs westward into Uzbekistan. (The 
Osh route reached Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics, whilst the 
Uzbek route traversed Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Turkey. Afghan drugs 
were also smuggled directly into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.) A few years later, opiates 
began to be increasingly smuggled via less geographically arduous crossings into Khatlon, and 
in larger amounts along open highways (thanks to corrupt officials). 544 All along the various 
routes, the trade was facilitated by connections between ethnic, tribal or clan groups 
straddling the official borders.545 However, while voluminous, the flow of drugs along the 
Central Asian routes failed to permanently overtake those traversing Pakistan and Iran, and 
currently the European market is primarily served by the Balkan route while the Central Asian 
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traffic mostly services the now much-larger population of Russian addicts.546  
 
The drugs trade was immensely profitable in an otherwise impoverished region. Just a few 
hours’ work ferrying drugs through a mountain pass could earn a Kyrgyz man $70, or twice the 
average monthly salary (and much more than the $45/month paid to border officials).547 Each 
step of the trafficking route generated higher profits, so that opium obtained in exchange for 
food, alcohol or tools in northern Afghanistan could command $3,000/kilo by the time it 
reached Bishkek, and $6,000/kilo in Almaty, just a three-hour drive away (1995 prices).548 As 
long as the right people were bribed, there was little risk of seizure. Borders were sparingly 
manned in many places and counternarcotics agencies generally targeted smaller dealers, 
sparing the wealthy and well-connected criminal networks.549 
 
These sorts of profits help explain the volume of opiates flowing across the border. The 
Russian Border Troops reported their first seizures of raw opium at the border in 1992, with a 
grand total of 17 kilograms. This jumped to more than 250 kilograms in 1993 and 1994, and 
leaped to 1,720 kilograms in 1995 and 1,905 in 1996 (close to two tonnes).550 These estimates, 
however, should be assumed to be mere fractions of the actual amount of drugs that slipped 
through. From 1995, with the increased processing of opium within Afghanistan, heroin began 
to be trafficked as well.551 
 
The absence of sufficient and effective counternarcotics activity – due to a lack of resources, 
official corruption, cross-border challenges, and especially the connivance of police and 
security forces with narco-traffickers – helped the illicit drugs trade flourish.552 The drugs trade 
was also particularly attractive within Tajikistan due to economic deprivation and the lack of 
alternative livelihoods (and, at the elite level, due to the considerable wealth, autonomy and 
power that accompanied higher-level participation in the trade).553 In the early 1990s, as 
described by Wiegmann, ‘The situation… has been described for both regions [Kulyab and 
GBAO] as a bonanza for everybody willing to take up the opportunity. Everyone who wanted to 
could become engaged with drug trafficking. The drug trafficking business  was unorganized, 
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spontaneous and unregulated. It was driven by a large number of petty traffickers’.554 An IWPR 
report on the situation in those early days confirmed this description: 
 
Afghan traffickers were soon on the lookout for locals poor enough to 
consider doing the legwork of getting drugs from the border to the interior 
of the country. ‘At first they were polite and didn’t insult anyone, but they 
were persistent in looking for middlemen to dispose of the drugs’, recalled 
one local resident who gave his first name as Alikhon. ‘Many people agreed 




Over time, however, the business would become more organised and consolidated, as 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
The illicit drugs industry victimised civilians in several ways. First, it enriched and empowered 
actors who perpetuated the lawless and deprived conditions under which many were forced to 
live. As long as corrupt officials and non-government actors were able to maintain their status 
and control via illicit activity, civilians would continue to suffer from criminal violence, the 
absence of the rule of law, and economic deprivation. Second, it sustained and dispersed 
armed conflict in Tajikistan, in which civilians were caught in the crossfire. It funded opposition 
militant groups, allowing them to continue their cross-border insurgency, as well as local 
mafias who at times clashed with each other or with security forces. The development of 
trafficking routes in remote regions also spread the ill effects of the drugs trade through rural 
communities, in the form of both addiction and higher levels of crime and attacks on 
civilians.556 Third, the expansion of the drugs trade required additional manpower, particularly 
for smuggling activities at the beginning of the supply chain. Whilst many Tajiks participated in 
the drugs trade willingly, many were also coerced – either directly, through the threat of 
violence to themselves or the kidnapping of family members, or indirectly, by economic 
deprivation.557 If arrested, prison sentences were substantial, and during the 1990s many 
Tajiks smuggled opiates by swallowing them, which was medically dangerous.558 Finally, the 
drugs trade gradually increased addiction rates in the country.559 Between 1994 and 2003, the 
number of registered drug addicts in Tajikistan increased tenfold (from 653 to 6,799); the 
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country was estimated to have the eighth highest rate of opiate abuse in the world.560 The 
number of its actual drug addicts was almost certainly much higher, as only those addicts 
receiving treatment – a small fraction – were registered. In 2002, UNODC estimated the true 
number of addicts to be perhaps twelve times higher than official figures.561 It should be noted 
that this was a cyclical relationship: the drugs trade helped increase addiction rates, creating 
more demand, and thus boosting the drugs trade.  
 
In sum, narco-trafficking led to civilian suffering by perpetuating a violent and predatory 
environment, conditions of deprivation and coercion, and serious legal and medical risks. 
 
 
4.3.3  Organised Crime and Corruption 
The trade in illicit drugs may have received the most attention but the illicit trade of otherwise 
licit goods – such as cotton and aluminium, two of the largest industries in Tajikistan – were 
also significant enterprises at this time for Tajikistan’s organised crime groups. According to 
Galeotti, cotton smuggling was ‘second only to the drugs trade in Tajikistan’s criminal 
economy’.562 In July 1995, President Rahmonov blamed a ‘cotton mafia war’ for a spike in 
attacks on police and politicians, noting that cotton smuggling operations had increased 
fivefold over the previous year.563 Aluminium was another potential source of wealth for the 
country, but the fact it could be exported for hard currency made it a particularly attractive 
target for smuggling and embezzlement. In 1996, for example, it was estimated that half the 
total amount of aluminium produced in Tajikistan – 100,000 tonnes – was illegally exported by 
corrupt officials. 564 Competition over the Tursunzade aluminium smelter and its revenues led 
to armed clashes among former PFT commanders and local warlords for a number of years, 
before the regime finally took firm control of the facility in 2004.565 
 
Given the anarchic state of Tajik society, virtually any product or production site could become 
a target for illicit activity and the cause of violent competition. In April 1994, for example, eight 
people were killed when a dispute over control of a successful winery near Dushanbe turned 
violent: 
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The incident took place Thursday night, after the deputy police chief – who 
controls one local gang – invited his rival, the winery manager, to his house 
for the evening. The winery manager arrived with six of his relatives. A 
dispute apparently erupted between the police chief and the winery 
manager over control of the plant. Then the police chief’s supporters 
allegedly trapped the guests, killed them and burned their bodies. In 
revenge, supporters of the slain winery manager kidnapped the deputy 




All of those involved were reportedly former PFT members. Whilst the police, under unusual 
pressure from the Interior Ministry, did arrest one man, he was reportedly seized from jail by 
relatives of the slain men and they ‘literally tore him to pieces’.567 This incident encapsulates 
many of the features of violence during this period: the police chief-slash-gang leader; the 
localised and micro-level dispute; the extreme violence and post-death atrocities; blood feud; 
and the ultimate ineffectiveness of the police. 
 
Whilst such criminal competition tended to victimise civilians as bystanders, other forms of 
criminality led more directly to civilian suffering, such as the rampant speculation and theft in 
food supplies that exacerbated the country’s difficulties in feeding its population. The UN Food 
and Agriculture Organization placed Tajikistan on a list of twenty countries most threatened by 
starvation in December 1993, at the same time that basic foodstuffs were commanding sky-
high prices on the black market.568  
 
A key vehicle for civilian suffering was corruption, which was plainly visible not only in the 
disappearance of humanitarian aid before it reached civilians but in the expensive cars and 
houses flaunted by Dushanbe’s nouveau-riche. The gradual consolidation of Kulyabi control in 
the political and security spheres had not included the resumption of responsible governance; 
according to Roy, ‘The Kulabis methodically set about plundering official positions and sources 
of wealth for the benefit of their faction, and had no interest whatsoever in running the state. 
This predatory attitude destroyed the economy and led to their fellow regionalist factions 
[from Leninabad and Hissar] going into opposition’.569 Instead of working together to restore 
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order to the public’s political and economic affairs, competing patronage networks and 
regional clans fought over the ‘spoils of victory’.570 
 
The stark contrast between wealthy and corrupt elites and the bread lines and freezing homes 
of most of the population periodically generated unrest and demonstrations in Dushanbe and 
other cities. The May 1996 mass protests in Khujand and Ura-Tyube, for example, included 
calls for ‘better food supplies and more effective measures against crime’ as well as political 
aims such as greater autonomy and the removal of Kulyabi administrators and officials.571 
(Corruption and criminality also became a frequent charge levied against the regime by its 
leading bêtes noires, such as Khudoberdyev.) Corruption also stymied economic 
reconstruction, as profits from the few resources Tajikistan did possess (cotton, aluminium) 
were diverted to local warlords and corrupt officials. Nakaya notes, ‘Commanders of armed 
groups and district authorities grabbed agricultural farms by force and used profits from 
cotton production to buy properties made available through privatization, such as apartments, 
shopping centres and restaurants’.572 Corruption was thoroughly embedded in Tajik political 
and economic structures – including the law enforcement and security sectors meant to 
combat it – due to continuity with Soviet-era governance styles and the Kulyabi/PFT takeover 
of the state. 
 
Organised crime and corruption victimised civilians in a number of ways. First, organised crime 
groups and corrupt official actors – particularly, the new security forces – engaged in violent 
and predatory activities that directly targeted civilians or caused predictable collateral 
damage. Second, organised crime and corruption prioritised the accrual of private wealth to 
criminal and political actors, which in conditions of limited resources and capacity left little for 
the state to function or for civilians to survive. Third, the corruption of political and economic 
structures precluded the efficient and responsible reconstruction of the state, thus extending 
the dire and unstable conditions in which Tajiks suffered. 
 
In sum, the flourishing organised crime sector, and the corruption upon which it rested, 
compounded civilian victimisation from war-fighting by leaving Tajiks to languish in a poor and 
predatory environment, with little recourse to protection or productive activity within the licit 
sphere. 
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4.3.4  The Symbiosis of Criminal and Political Violence 
The prominent role played by corrupt and criminal actors at this time led to a pervasive 
perception that much of the ongoing violence was generated by criminal incentives as much as 
– if not more than –  political aims. A number of examples illustrate the intertwining of 
criminal and political factors. The armed groups clashing with the Russian Border Troops at the 
Tajik-Afghan border comprised narco-traffickers as well as opposition militants; many believed 
the conflict in its later stages was not truly about politics but over control of profitable 
smuggling routes, and that the real reason for Afghan support of the Tajik opposition lay in the 
opportunity for narco-profits.573 In Gorno-Badakhshan, shootings and violence – especially 
around Khorog – were attributed to both ‘the so-called self-defence detachments and open 
drug and mafia structures’.574 In 1994, clashes between militias in Kurgan-Tyube were 
attributed to criminal competition; when security forces were sent to stabilise the region, 
however, they predominantly targeted Uzbek groups and civilians, apparently in an attempt to 
assert Kulyabi dominance over political, economic – and criminal – affairs.575 A grenade attack 
in a Dushanbe market, initially thought to be terrorism, turned out to be related to ‘a dispute 
over payment for pies’.576 Armed clashes in Tursunzade were driven by competition not just 
between criminal mafias over control of local resources but by their politicised bosses over 
control of the levers of power in the city.577 The Boimatov and Khudoberdyev mutinies 
featured a blend of political and criminal motivations; as noted by Lynch, ‘While the objectives 
of these field commanders concerned control over local economic resources (such as the 
aluminium plant in Tursunzade) their political demands could not be discarded’.578 UNMOT 
noted that one of the challenges in investigating potential violations of interim agreements 
was that ‘it is often quite difficult in these cases to distinguish between political and criminal 
acts’.579 Even President Rahmonov acknowledged the criminal nature of violence during this 
time, when he claimed that a ‘cotton mafia war’ and not terrorism lay behind the targeting of 
police and politicians in 1995.580 (At the most extreme end of the spectrum, a few observers 
claimed that the civil war in Tajikistan had actually been fomented by drug dealers: ‘A million 
dollars invested in inflaming the conflicts brings them a billion dollars in profits’.581) 
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The pervasiveness of criminal violence and its dire effects upon the civilian population 
demonstrate the futility of trying to separate criminal from political violence in a conflict 
environment as anarchic and decentralised as Tajikistan. The mingling of criminal and strategic 
incentives for civilian targeting was commonplace, as within such an environment any violence 
toward civilians had multivarious outcomes – generally, enriching the perpetrator whilst at the 
same time terrorising the constituents of enemies or rivals, thus weakening their ability to 
respond. In addition, it is nearly impossible to delineate when criminal means become criminal 
ends – i.e., when criminality ceases to be a mere mechanism for funding political-militant 
activity and becomes an end in itself. Few armed groups are exclusively criminal or political: 
most manage comfortably a hybrid status of pursuing both criminal and political aims.582 This 
broad characterisation certainly appears to hold true for non-state armed groups in Tajikistan. 
 
There was one actor in the criminal sphere, however, that largely lacked any political 
characteristics: Russian servicemen, a notable source of criminal victimisation of Tajik and 
Afghan civilians. Often living in harsh and dangerous conditions, underpaid and ill-trained, they 
were frequently accused of robbing, assaulting and otherwise mistreating local civilians, and of 
participating in cross-border narco-trafficking (according to one counternarcotics official, ‘If 
you have enough money, you can pay Russian border guards to deliver your opium in 
helicopters’).583  
 
In sum, it is necessary to consider criminal violence in Tajikistan in order to present a 
comprehensive picture of civilian victimisation during this period. The conditions and 
opportunities created by the civil war generated a rapid and massive growth in criminal activity 
that affected civilians far beyond the violence associated with direct military clashes or 
continued ethnic cleansing. 
 
 
4.4  The Role of the PFT in Civilian Victimisation 
During the first phase of the war, PFT militias played a key role in all the types of civilian 
victimisation considered here. Along with opposition militias, they perpetrated massacres and 
ethnic cleansing in the countryside and targeted civilian population centres. They were 
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presumed to be behind much of the ethnic cleansing in Dushanbe following the Kulyabi 
victory, and they were heavily represented in the government security forces and 
paramilitaries who targeted civilians during military operations. PFT militias sparked massive 
refugee flows in southern and eastern Tajikistan, and victimised Gharmi and Pamiri refugees 
during the resettlement process. Although they did not directly victimise the refugees in 
Afghanistan, their continued predation within Tajikistan was a major impediment to refugee 
repatriation. Finally, PFT members were major contributors to the crime and lawlessness that 
plagued the country during the conflict. 
 
There is another aspect, however, to PFT involvement in civilian victimisation: the way in 
which they benefited not only from targeting enemy civilians, but from protecting their own 
constituencies from victimisation by the opposition.584 During the war, Tajik civilians had few 
options for protection and survival, other than to try to situate themselves under the umbrella 
of protection associated with specific political, criminal or militant actors. Indeed, one of the 
key elements of Safarov’s popularity lay in his avowed determination to protect civilians, as 
noted by a Russian journalist at the time: 
 
The moment [Safarov] appeared on the stairway of the House of 
Government a large crowd of women greeted the ‘Saviour of the nation’ 
with loud expressions of gratitude. Almost all speakers quoted bobo-
Sangak’s winged words addressed to the people: ‘I will not permit to 
slaughter you.’ I poignantly felt pity for these people: a criminal was their 
last defender against other criminals. Herein, perhaps, lies the key to his 




Khudoberdyev also set himself up as the ‘protector of Uzbeks’ in Kurgan-Tyube, creating an 
official but largely autonomous army brigade several thousand strong for this purpose.586 
According to Nourzhanov, Khudoberdyev ‘established a permanent base in Chapayevsk 20 
miles south of Qurghonteppa, organised taxation and conscription of the local population and 
by 1997 developed a well-equipped force of 2000 soldiers in barracks and 5000 in reserve, 
ready, as he put it, “to protect my people from violence”’.587 A slightly different protection 
dynamic was also seen in southern Tajikistan, where local Kulyabi officials and strongmen were 
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able to expand their areas of influence by offering limited forms of protection to returning 
Gharmi refugees.588 
 
There is already considerable consensus as to PFT victimisation during Phase I of the conflict, 
and these activities have been described in this chapter and the preceding one. Less well 
examined are the contributions of PFT members to civilian victimisation in Phase II of the 
conflict, after the official disbandment of the group. This section therefore focuses on PFT 
activities from 1993 to 1997, providing a new accounting and analysis intended to further the 
conceptualisation of non-state-actor victimisation during warfare. Specifically, it advances new 
ways of thinking about how non-state actors continue to victimise civilians after the most 
intense fighting of a conflict has subsided and the full range of activities available to them in 
doing so. 
 
The official disbandment of the PFT in 1993 did little to revoke the power and status of its 
leading commanders. The PFT had always been a loosely coordinated band of local strongmen 
and criminals, and many of its various factions now continued to operate largely 
independently in their own local areas. According to Marat, ‘Civil war field commanders with 
strong military authority and access to weapons were the most common actors to gain local 
authority in rural areas due to their ability to broker drug deals between Afghan and Tajik 
producers, and interested parties beyond the Central Asian region’.589 Their influence also 
grew because the perpetuation of the informal economy required local figures to coordinate 
and ‘police’ transactions and arrangements, and field commanders had the authority and 
resources to do so.590 In Gharmi (i.e., opposition) areas, however, PFT field commanders were 
likely to acquire authority due to threats and coercion. 
 
It should be noted that opposition field commanders shared similar features in the 
geographical areas they controlled or operated in. In 1996, a Democratic Party of Tajikistan 
spokesman said that ‘the IRP’s influence on field commanders was not that strong and that 
many of the units led by them were “unmanageable” and were interested primarily in 
smuggling drugs and weapons’.591 The primary difference between the two groups was that 
the PFT field commanders usually had advantageous connections to regime officials and thus 
greater protection for their activities.  
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In examining the activities of former PFT members from 1993-1997, it is helpful to consider 
two organising principles: splits amongst PFT factions, and the emergence of four broad 
occupational categories into which PFT members fell. 
 
The Kulyabi and Hissari branches of the PFT were never particularly close or coordinated; they 
were considered as a collective group mainly by virtue of the tactical alliance between Safarov 
and Kenjaev in the autumn of 1992. But tensions between the two factions noticeably 
increased in 1993 after Safarov was given the job of creating the new Tajik armed forces (as a 
result of which he talked openly about his upcoming appointment as defence minister592). This 
meant that the new Tajik army – which would provide enormous opportunities for personal 
enrichment and power – would be largely Kulyabi. At the same time, under Rahmonov, 
Kulyabis assumed many of the vacant government positions, leaving Uzbeks and other factions 
from western Tajikistan out of the new power arrangements. This generated considerable 
resentment, given the substantial contributions of these groups to the PFT victory.593 There 
was also an ethnic dimension to increasing tensions, as the PFT groups from Hissar and 
western Tajikistan were mostly Uzbek. Within a year, there were reports of armed clashes 
between Kulyabis and Uzbeks in the Hissar Valley, and Kulyabi security forces who were 
ostensibly trying to disarm militias in southern Tajikistan were accused of singling out and 
abusing Uzbek civilians.594 A large percentage of the Uzbek field commanders were either 
imprisoned or killed during or just after the war.595 
 
Factional tensions arose within the Kulyabi camp as well. These rivalries, broadly rooted in 
geographical origins, were characterised in several different ways. According to one observer: 
 
… Kulyab actually consisted of four valleys that were competing against 
each other and that would only unify as Kulyab against a common enemy: 
the Balzhuvansky, the Dashtidzhumsky, the Khovalinsky and the 
Sarikhusursky. ‘All these valleys have networks that reach up to the top, the 
President is from the first valley, and from the second is half the 
government; only the fourth does not have any positions in the Government. 
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New schisms and groupings would continue to emerge within Kulyabi politics. From the late 
1990s, Rahmonov consolidated his grip on power and increasingly packed his regime with 
people not just from Kulyab but from his own hometown; his Danghara faction was rivalled, 
however, by the Farkhor faction represented by two powerful figures, Mahmadsaid 
Ubaydullaev and Ghaffor Mirzoyev.597  (Characterisations of Kulyabi factions invariably seem to 
be rooted in the solidarity networks attached to specific locales.) Essentially, each faction 
attempted to maximise its power and profits at the expense of others. Kulyabi groups might 
unite in the face of competition from other regions, but amongst themselves fierce rivalries 
continued. 
 
The second organising principle for considering former PFT members at this time is their post-
PFT activities and positions. I argue that four broad categories can be discerned: 1) High-level 
government: those who took powerful positions within the ruling regime; 2) Local 
administration: those who acquired influential positions in key local areas outside Dushanbe; 
3) Security forces: the militias that were incorporated into the various security forces (even if 
in practice they remained highly autonomous); 4) Criminal militias: militia and mafia groups 
that remained outside the official orbit, even if they maintained connections with powerful 
figures.  
 
It should be noted that not all former PFT commanders fell within these categories. In at least 
one instance, a former PFT field commander headed up the Kulyab office of a well-known NGO 
supported by the Aga Khan’s foundation (the same NGO boasted a former UTO commander in 
charge of its Tajikabad office).598 International NGO positions were comparatively very well 
paid and thus highly sought after. However, it is not clear how many former militiamen chose 
this career path after disbandment.  
 
Table 4.2 shows where some of the most notable PFT leaders and field commanders fell after 
1993. Note that whilst many former PFT members joined criminal militias, their commanders 
tended to adopt more formal roles whilst still maintaining control over or ties with militia and 
mafia groups.  
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Table 4.2. Notable PFT Members: Their Post-PFT Positions  
High-ranking government Local 
administration 
Security forces Criminal militias 
Abdulmajid Dostiev Kadir Abdullaev Qurbon Cholov** Many PFT 
leaders had ties 
to criminal 
militias, but took 
on official roles 
as cover. 
Khoja Karimov Ibodullo 
Boimatov*** 
Ramazon Emomov   
Safarali Kenjaev* Jamoliddin 
Mansurov 
Suhrob Kasimov  





Yaqub Salimov**  Izatullo Kuganov*  
Mahmadsaid 
Ubaidullaev** 
 Saidshoh Shamolov  
* = assassinated / ** = survived assassination attempt / *** = presumed assassinated 
 
The remainder of this section briefly discusses each of these groups and their role in civilian 
victimisation following the official disbandment of the PFT. 
 
High-ranking government 
Given the PFT’s role in the Kulyabi victory in December 1992 and the elevation of Rahmonov to 
the presidency, it is not surprising that some of the most powerful figures in Tajikistan early in 
this period were former PFT field commanders. Moscow News reported candidly at the time 
that ‘the victory of the Popular Front over the opposition in the southern regions of Tajikistan 
was to result in division of the territory and posts in the new government between the criminal 
groupings’.599 Rahmonov adopted what Nourzhanov calls a carrot-and-stick approach to PFT 
leaders, forming alliances with ‘about a dozen’ of the strongest field commanders whilst trying 
to ‘neutralise’ lower-level militia leaders.600 By 1995, Rahmonov had greatly improved his grip 
on power: partly via the ‘Kulyabisation’ of the government and state agencies, and partly by 
coopting or removing most of the field commanders who could present a security threat to his 
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regime.601 He would increasingly engage in what Wiegmann calls ‘the career carousel’: 
abruptly shifting men from one government position to another, to forestall the development 
of powerful networks that might challenge his rule.602 
 
One former field commander who illustrated this evolution was Yaqub Salimov, who as noted 
earlier became Minister of Internal Affairs when Rahmonov became head of state. This was an 
incredibly powerful position, with authority over the police and special security forces 
(including combat-ready forces) as well as the units entrusted with countering organised crime 
and the drugs trade.603 Salimov made the most of this post, filling the security services with his 
own militia members, many of them criminals. He reportedly founded ‘the first large-scale 
Tajik drug trafficking group’.604 According to Nourzhanov, ‘The Sixth Department of the 
Ministry of the Interior in charge of combating organized crime was entrusted to an individual 
who had spent 17 years behind bars. The rank-and-file members of the police were little 
better: one-third of them were purged from the force after Salimov quit in August 1995’.605 
However, despite the power and influence he had acquired, Salimov was dismissed in 1995 
after becoming ‘increasingly out of control’ and insubordinate.606 He later fled the country, 
after supporting Khudoberdyev’s failed rebellion of November 1998, but in 2003 was 
extradited to Tajikistan, convicted of treason, banditry and abuse of office, and sentenced to 
fifteen years in prison.607 
 
Some former PFT leaders have managed to stay in power alongside Rahmonov, such as 
Mahmadsaid Ubaidullaev, the former PFT leader who as deputy prime minister controlled the 
cotton and aluminium industries before being forced to resign in the February 1996 
Khudoberdyev/Boimatov mutiny. Shortly after his removal he was appointed mayor of 
Dushanbe, a position he continues to hold today. He has also been the speaker of the upper 
house of the Tajik parliament since 2000, and has become known as the ‘second most 
powerful politician in Tajikistan’ after Rahmonov.608 One of the country’s wealthiest men, he is 
also alleged to be a major figure in the narcotics business.609 More typical, however, is the 
story of Khoja Karimov, a former PFT field commander who became a member of parliament 
(along with a number of other PFT members: in the 1995 elections, 42 of 176 deputies were 
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former PFT610). In 1995 he was arrested and charged with the wartime murder of three 
Supreme Soviet deputies.611 Like a number of other PFT figures, he had enjoyed immunity for 
his crimes until there was a political incentive to remove him.612  
 
As a group, these PFT leaders were now victimising civilians in two primary ways. First, by 
exploiting their offices to engage in corrupt and criminal behaviour, and contributing to the 
establishment of drugs and organised crime networks, they perpetuated the conditions of 
poverty, criminality and violence that led to civilian suffering during this period. Second, they 
created and presided over corrupt and brutal security forces that intimidated, robbed and 
assaulted the civilian population, and must share the responsibility for these abuses. 
 
Local administration 
Some PFT members saw more advantage in staying rooted in their local constituencies. A 
prime example here is Ibodullo Boimatov, whose exploits in Tursunzade were noted earlier. He 
had been a primary supplier of arms to the PFT-Hissar, via his criminal connections in 
Uzbekistan, and after victory in Dushanbe he claimed the mayorship of Tursunzade. 
 
[He] stayed in office for more than a year, safeguarded by a full battalion of 
the former PFT soldiers on his payroll. The money came from the 
Tursunzoda aluminium smelter that Boimatov treated as his property. These 
protectors of public order, as their commander coyly admitted, ‘occasionally 





In 1994, he was briefly removed from his post, reportedly for ‘turning his guerrilla force into a 
municipal police force’, but reinstated with Rahmonov’s support.614 However, in 1995 he was 
removed by Rahmonov and fled to Uzbekistan, where he regrouped and returned to 
Tursunzade in the coterminous mutiny with Khudoberdyev in January 1996. He briefly 
resumed the mayoral post before being chased back to Uzbekistan again, this time by another 
local warlord and former PFT field commander – the Tursunzade police chief, Kadir Abdullaev 
(who, as noted earlier, was himself later forced out of Tursunzade by Khudoberdyev).615 The 
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US State Department took note of the violence that accompanied this power struggle: 
 
Since mid-August [1996], an extended series of clashes between two groups 
seeking to control Tursunzade has resulted in at least 30 deaths; some of 
those killed were unarmed bystanders. These killings do not appear to be 
connected with the Government’s conflict with the opposition, but reflect 





Throughout Tajikistan, former PFT field commanders took up municipal positions and thus 
gained potential cover for their more nefarious activities (opposition commanders would do 
the same after the 1997 peace agreement).617 Their contribution to civilian victimisation was 
similar to that of the high-ranking government officials, in that they promoted an environment 
of poverty, criminality and violence, and their followers victimised civilians directly. Yet 
because they operated at a more local level, their victims were more likely to be their local 
constituents and the geographical scope of their influence was more limited. Boimatov and 
Abdullaev, for example, inflicted a substantial amount of violence and criminality on the 
residents of a city they both claimed to represent.  
 
Security forces 
The clashes between the army brigades led by Khudoberdyev and Kuganov in Kurgan-Tyube in 
1995 and Khudoberdyev’s subsequent mutinies in 1996 and 1997 (described in Chapter 3) 
illustrate well the perils associated with placing PFT field commanders at the head of official 
security forces staffed with their own militiamen. Throughout this period, Rahmonov had to 
fear challenges from largely autonomous army units. Fortunately for him, the security forces 
were usually focused on personal gain and local influence rather than political challenges to 
the regime. (Khudoberdyev would prove an exception to this again in the postwar era, as 
described in Chapter 7.) 
 
A typical example of this category was Suhrob Kasimov, who had led a relatively small self-
defence unit in 1992 but, being from Danghara, was promoted quickly by Rahmonov himself. 
He assumed command of one of the strongest security forces – Interior’s 1st Special Operations 
Brigade – and established a relatively autonomous personal fiefdom in the Varzob Valley, using 
                                                                 
616
 US State Department (1997), 124. See also: BBC/Interfax, 13/8/96; BBC/Itar-Tass, 17/8/96; BBC/Itar-Tass, 
23/8/96(b). 
617
 Nourzhanov (2005), 123; BBC/Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 21/4/93; BBC/Interfax, 14/7/95. 
 147 
his newfound power and funds to control local businesses and networks.618 In the postwar era, 
he played a key role in quelling two Khudoberdyev mutinies and engaged in ethnic cleansing 
activities in Kurgan-Tyube.619 He also headed the Tajik national football association for ten 
years (until replaced by Rahmonov’s son, Rustam, in 2012) and was known as ‘fantastically 
wealthy’ even after he retired his military command.620 Other former PFT field commanders 
were given influential positions in the border guards, where they could exploit the myriad 
opportunities for personal enrichment. These included Qurbon Cholov and Saidshoh 
Shamolov, who were reportedly involved in drugs trafficking whilst serving as high-ranking 
officers at the Tajik-Afghan border.621 Cholov was eventually imprisoned, whilst Shamolov was 
assigned a diplomatic post in China. Another former PFT field commander, Ramazon Emomov, 
was a senior officer in the border forces for ten years before being arrested for trafficking 
drugs worth more than $140,000.622  
 
The new security forces, which were predominantly led and staffed by former PFT and 
Kulyabis, contributed to civilian victimisation in a number of ways during this period. First, it 
should be noted that it is only in this category that one finds civilian victimisation as a result of 
combat operations, as these security forces played a key role in government counteroffensives 
against the opposition. One of the most notorious in this regard was the aforementioned 
Faizali Brigade, which targeted civilians during operations in Gharm and Tavildara (in addition 
to generating civilian casualties during its clashes with Khudoberdyev’s brigade in Kurgan-
Tyube in 1995).  Second, the various security forces in Tajikistan were consistently recognised 
as the prime source of human rights abuses during this period.623 Their powers to arrest and 
detain people combined with their de facto immunity from prosecution created huge 
incentives to abuse civilians for profit, revenge or other motivations. Extortion and kidnapping 
for ransom, for example, were commonly engaged in.624 Third, the security forces were key 
actors in the growing criminal networks afflicting Tajik society during this period. As noted 
earlier, much of the drugs trade relied upon the services or complicity of the formal security 
sector. Finally, the perversion of the traditional role of the security forces – the fact that they 
became a vector for victimisation rather than a tool for preventing it – not only facilitated 
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violence directed at the civilian population but contributed significantly to the growing 
‘criminalisation of society’.625  
 
Criminal militias 
Some PFT groups continued to operate as criminal militias completely outside government 
control, although they may have continued to take advantage of connections to high-level 
officials. No longer engaged in war-fighting, they turned to crime and victimisation in the 
service of personal survival and enrichment (although some continued to depict themselves as 
self-defence detachments). 626 Human Rights Watch reported in 1993: 
 
Various paramilitary groups – some believed to have emerged from the 
Popular Front – continue to threaten human rights and public order in 
Tajikistan by killing, seizing hostages, and robbing and occupying homes. 
Their targets have mainly been opposition activists and people of Pamiri and 
Gharmi origins, and they have threatened or carried out acts of violence 




The existence of such groups was noted even before the death of Safarov: ‘Some of bobo-
Sangak’s former confederates have refused to acknowledge his one-man leadership and now 
operate in the mountains on their own’.628 Southern Tajikistan was plagued by ‘relatively small 
groups of armed men who went around plundering farms, setting up checkpoints, kidnapping 
people for ransom, and extorting money in other ways. There were quite a few such gangs in 
1993, particularly in and around Kulob’.629 In Dushanbe as well, militias carved up urban turf 
and clashed frequently throughout 1993-1994, before a degree of political and criminal 
consolidation took hold.630 The US State Department noted that for 1994, 
 
There were a substantial number of extrajudicial killings, but fewer than in 
1993…The primary culprits are the paramilitary groups which were not 
disarmed or disbanded after the war. While the government has attempted 
to incorporate these groups into the recently created Ministry of Defense, 
many groups operated well outside government control as informal militias 
and private armies. According to credible reports, these groups operated 
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with the tacit approval of some high-ranking officials within the 
Government, including the Minister of the Interior and officials at the 
Ministries of Defense and Security. No government or security official, the 
majority of whom are ethnic Kulyabis, was prosecuted for an extrajudicial 
killing. If the alleged perpetrator of a crime was of Kulyabi origin, the 




This sense of impunity amongst Kulyabi militias was devastating for civilians, as it left them 
completely vulnerable to predation. As noted earlier, the government gradually neutralised 
many of the low-level ‘bandit groups’ over the next few years, but the more powerful criminal 
groups remained. 
 
The PFT members who formed such criminal militias were amongst the most direct 
perpetrators of civilian victimisation during this period. The fact that their motives were 
usually criminal or personal, rather than political or strategic, does not detract from the levels 
of violence and predation they inflicted upon civilians.  
 
In sum, the Tajik population suffered at the hands of many different perpetrators during this 
period, but by virtue of Kulyabi control of the regime and the security services it can be 
suggested that former PFT field commanders and members were amongst the worst 
transgressors in the postwar era. Refugee victimisation, except in northern Afghanistan, lay 
largely in the hands of the regime and security forces. Rampant criminality was encouraged by 
official corruption, de facto immunity for offenders, and abusive security forces – all of which 
were driven by the Kulyabi takeover and dominance of the institutions of state authority. 
Competition between militias attached to PFT or Kulyabi leaders led to armed clashes in which 
civilians died. Ethnic cleansing attacks against Gharmis and Uzbeks continued to occur in 
southern Tajikistan. 
 
In short, the ‘Kulyabisation’ of Tajikistan facilitated a range of activities that victimised civilians. 
The dominance of one regional faction and its refusal to share power not only perpetuated the 
civil war but limited the potential for the aspects of good governance that might have limited 
damage to the population (e.g., non-corrupt police and security services, a functioning licit 
economy, rule of law). The fragility of the early Rahmonov regime allowed criminality and 
violence to dominate the political, economic and social spheres, and the opportunities for 
corruption were so large that greater considerations of public welfare were put aside. The 
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enormous new opportunities for wealth that accompanied the burgeoning drugs trade fuelled 
the expansion of organised crime networks and corrupt patronage relationships. 
 
According to Barnett Rubin, ‘Neither side distinguished itself by humanitarian conduct in this 
war’ but ‘ultimately the side that won managed to commit more atrocities’.632 The fact that 
opposition militias also victimised the population should not obscure the leading role played 
by the PFT in civilian victimisation during the war. 
 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a typology of civilian victimisation during the Tajik civil war, and 
examined the role of the PFT in perpetrating such behaviour during both phases of the conflict. 
I argue that a comprehensive accounting of civilian victimisation should include not only 
massacres, ethnic cleansing and displacement, but the criminality and lawlessness that 
accompany periods of conflict. Finally, I suggest that the PFT, as the victorious party to the 
conflict and the leading figures of the postwar political and security structures, were fully 
immersed in victimisation behaviour and indeed were probably the leading transgressors 
during the conflict as a whole. 
 
Having identified the types of victimisation that occurred and situated the PFT within them – in 
other words, having clarified the kind of behaviour that the PFT engaged in – it is now possible 
to turn to a consideration of the incentives that drove them to participate in civilian 
victimisation. 
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WHY DID THE POPULAR FRONT VICTIMISE CIVILIANS?  




This chapter serves as the third step in the strategic-approach analysis of civilian victimisation 
by the Popular Front of Tajikistan. It addresses one of the primary elements of the central 
research question – why did the PFT engage in civilian victimisation? – by constructing an 
incentives-based model and applying it to the empirical evidence presented in previous 
chapters. It evaluates the range of incentives that existed for the PFT and concludes that whilst 
their relative strength varied over time, in general the incentives to victimise civilians were 
stronger than the incentives to use restraint in targeting behaviour. 
 
The rationale for approaching the drivers of civilian victimisation as ‘incentives’ rather than 
‘motivations’ is as follows. Whilst individuals may engage in violence for expressive reasons 
having to do with revenge, anger, greed or simple brutality, at the unit level one may assume a 
certain instrumental purpose to violence against civilians.633 For a non-state force, there is 
some purpose to its collective violence – even if it is something as basic as the continued 
existence of the group. This purpose combined with self-interest imperatives tends to lead to 
limits (however extreme) being placed on violent activity, such as in the consideration of 
targets, levels of brutality, geographical scope and time. Indeed, Chapter 4 revealed some of 
the limits of civilian victimisation – limits that cannot be explained by, for example, material 
capabilities alone. 
 
However, when it comes to the drivers of non-state actor behaviour, a certain opacity of 
motivation exists that renders their theorisation difficult.634 A non-state armed force may claim 
to be acting for political motivations rather than admit that greed or more salacious 
motivations drive their actions. Locally inspired groups may claim allegiance to transnational 
ideologies such as world communism or global jihad in order to obtain financing from foreign 
sponsors or raise their profile. A group may be motivated by a range of factors or competing 
interests – especially when internal divisions are prominent – and yet reduce this ideational 
brew to one strong explanatory narrative in order to attract popular support.635 In short, it is 
difficult to ‘prove’ motivation on the part of non-state actors – especially since, relative to 
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state armed forces, there is a lack of bureaucratic and official communications that can be 
parsed for true motives.  
 
Thus, it is analytically more transparent to speak in terms of incentives for behaviour rather 
than motivations. Incentives refer to largely exogenous factors that are present and available 
to influence an actor; by considering a range of incentives relevant to a particular decision, it is 
possible to convey the attractiveness of different options from the point of view of an actor. 
This approach still saves room for an actor’s ideational inclinations, as it assumes an actor’s 
preference structure (i.e., the way in which it prioritises its preferred outcomes, which is highly 
influenced by ideational as well as strategic elements) will affect its perception of desirable 
actions. However, the explanatory value of this approach does not depend on the 
‘truthfulness’ of ideological aims as personal drivers of behaviour, as would be the case in a 
motivation-based model.  
 
This approach further presumes that each option in a decision scenario – such as civilian 
victimisation vs. restraint – possesses a set of incentives and disincentives that are weighed 
against each other in some fashion, and that in the case of civilian victimisation by non-state 
actors these incentives and disincentives may be grouped into three broad categories: 
normative, strategic and criminal. Target selection has historically been influenced by a 
combination of these considerations.  Military commanders select targets for attack based on 
expectations of how eliminating or neutralising a given object or actor may contribute to the 
achievement of strategic and operational objectives; but their choice of eligible targets is 
constrained by both societal and state-based norms, which can be thought of as forming the 
‘left and right boundaries of military action’.636 In a strategic environment of intrastate 
warfare, criminality is also a major consideration, given the need for combatants to engage in 
illicit sources of funding and the competition over illicit extraction that often lies at the heart 
of such conflicts. 
 
Thus, as noted in the Introduction, it is possible to conceptualise an incentives-based model for 
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Table 5.1   Incentives for Civilian Victimisation by Non-State Actors 
 
 

































As discussed in Chapter 1’s literature review, these categories and variables have been drawn 
from a review of the academic literature in security, political economy and constructivist 
approaches, as well as empirical case studies. They represent possible factors involved in non-
state actor behaviour, but they will vary in strength and across time.  
 
The need for a range of incentives is evident from examination of the Tajik war, where civilians 
were targeted for an admixture of reasons, including: to acquire control over villages and 
territory; to steal or extort money and resources, thereby increasing one’s material and 
normative status; to reward followers and disadvantage the competition; to appease the 
desire for revenge. Many of the incentives for non-state civilian victimisation during this period 
stemmed from the lack of legitimate sources of money and livelihoods in the conflict economy, 
and the easy availability of weapons did little to discourage criminality and militancy. In short, 
to attempt an explanation of civilian victimisation by focusing on only one set of potential 
drivers would likely offer only a partial answer to this complex phenomenon.637 
 
This chapter considers each of the six categories of incentives in turn. For each one, I briefly 
describe the leading variables in general terms, based upon a thorough review of relevant 
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literature, before applying this incentives structure directly to the Tajik case. I conclude the 
chapter by evaluating the strength of the incentive categories over time, and the ways in which 
the interplay between the different incentives manifested itself in targeting behaviour. 
 
 
5.1  Normative Incentives for Restraint 
In the modern era, normative considerations of who may be targeted in war and in what ways 
are largely implemented and promulgated at the state level.  Principles such as distinction, 
proportionality and necessity have become enshrined in international humanitarian law (IHL) 
and the military doctrines of many states.638 If adhered to closely, they can be said to 
constitute a strategy of restraint in warfare vis-à-vis civilians, in the sense that effort is taken to 
constrain the use of force in such a way as to minimise civilian casualties, even in situations 
where this may compromise military effectiveness.   
 
The general principle in all armed conflicts – whether reinforced by international legal treaties 
or customary law – is that civilians enjoy legal protection and should not be targeted.639  The 
quid pro quo for civilians is that they retain protected status only so long as they refrain from 
participating in violent activity.640 All armed forces in an intrastate conflict are expected to 
distinguish between military and civilian targets and refrain from excessive and/or unnecessary 
force; both state and non-state actors should avoid attacks that intentionally target civilians as 
well as the indiscriminate, disproportionate or perfidious use of force.641  
 
Thus, international legal norms are not nonexistent in intrastate warfare, but they continue to 
be relatively weak compared to interstate conflict and conventional war, in part because non-
state forces often have little incentive to adhere to IHL.642 First, while non-state forces have 
fewer problems with distinction than state forces – as government and state military forces 
are easily identifiable – the requirement to clearly distinguish oneself as a member of an 
armed force separate from the civilian population conflicts with the requirement of 
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concealment and stealth faced by many insurgents.643  Second, their inherent weakness 
relative to state forces means that the type of targets and attacks permitted by international 
law are those that are most difficult for them to enact – i.e., direct attacks on usually well-
protected and/or well-armed government and military installations and personnel.644  Third, 
non-state forces will also have less incentive to follow IHL if the state does not.  States 
confronted with non-state adversaries are likely to kill civilians, either deliberately or due to 
difficulties in distinction with a non-state force embedded amongst the civilian population, 
thereby removing incentives for restraint from non-state forces.645    
 
In the case of the Tajik civil war, the general weakness of IHL in intrastate conflict was further 
enhanced, for two primary reasons. First, the historical and political development of Tajikistan 
– only recently liberated from the Soviet empire and its normative and legal constructs – 
meant that there was no longstanding tradition of Tajik adherence to IHL. Tajikistan had barely 
begun to immerse itself in the international legal order before war descended. Second, the 
Tajik civil war was a rare case of an intrastate war with no state armed force during its most 
intense phase. The first year of the war was essentially fought amongst non-state militias 
representing different political and regional factions, with little international attention or 
pressure to observe IHL and few viable mechanisms to transmit any such attention to the 
autonomous paramilitaries roaming the countryside. In short, the non-state participants in the 
conflict had not been steeped in the practice of IHL and would not have been concerned about 
possible sanctions for violating it, especially when all parties to the conflict were guilty of 
victimisation. 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the PFT possessed any consideration for IHL during Phase 
I of the conflict – perhaps unsurprisingly, given the largely criminal origins of its leadership and 
members. To the extent that leaders expressed any concern for the law, it was to emphasise 
their role in supporting the legally installed rulers of the republic, a status that bestowed upon 
them a heightened sense of legitimacy. Given the clear and open violations of IHL that they 
tolerated in the first year of the war – such as ethnic cleansing in Dushanbe and Kurgan-Tyube 
– it does not appear that the PFT made any serious effort to adhere to IHL in their war-fighting.  
 
One might expect that PFT members would have a greater appreciation for IHL during Phase II 
of the conflict, when they had been incorporated into new state political and security entities, 
hosted UN and other international observers, and seen Tajikistan increasingly commit itself to 
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international norms. As Chapter 4 showed, however, former PFT units continued to victimise 
civilians during government operations as well as via attacks on refugees and participation in 
criminal networks. It seems that during this phase the Tajik regime was more aware of the 
need to appear to adhere to IHL, but this did not necessarily translate into actually doing so. 
For example, the regime claimed before a January 1993 Karategin offensive that it would not 
utilise tanks or aircraft, specifically in order to minimise civilian casualties – but did so anyway, 
resulting in significant civilian casualties and displacement.646 
 
In sum, I argue that the normative traditions of IHL constituted an extremely weak incentive 
for the PFT throughout the Tajik conflict, as a result of the structural deficiencies of IHL in 
intrastate war as well as the particular political and strategic characteristics of the Tajik 
conflict.  
 
It is important to note that IHL, developed largely within the European and American 
normative systems, is not the only systematised source of normative restraints in warfare, 
particularly in parts of the world excluded from this process of norm development – such as 
the Islamic world, where a similar elaboration of the laws of war and limits on civilian targeting 
emerged concomitantly but distinctly.647 In addition, there is growing recognition of the 
importance of non-state actor ‘codes of conduct’ in modern warfare, many of which – from 
Mao to the Taliban – prohibit various forms of civilian victimisation.648 However, there is no 
evidence to suggest that either of these normative systems was relevant to PFT conduct. There 
is not a single reference in the literature or contemporary reportage to a PFT code of conduct, 
and no indication that they were influenced by traditional Islamic law of war. 
 
Systems of international law are not the only normative influence on target selection in 
warfare.  Societal norms, or expectations of behaviour rooted in sociocultural traditions as 
opposed to interstate political relations, also play an important role.  In particular, the 
prohibition of the killing of unarmed civilians – an apparently strong norm throughout history 
and across cultures – should provide protection to civilians in intrastate war regardless of the 
applicability of legal norms.649  
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It does not appear that societal norms themselves were weak during the Tajik war. Throughout 
the conflict, Tajiks – including the PFT – bemoaned the loss of civilian life and castigated the 
perpetrators. However, I argue that whilst societal norms against civilian victimisation 
remained strong, the strategic environment of intrastate war generated additional normative 
mechanisms that allowed perpetrators like the PFT to victimise civilians whilst claiming to 
abide by societal norms against unlawful killing. These mechanisms are discussed in the next 
section on the normative incentives for victimisation. 
 
Table 5.2.  Normative Incentives for Restraint 
International Humanitarian Law Weak 
NSA Codes of Conduct Weak 




5.2  Normative Incentives for Civilian Victimisation: The Construction of  
        Alternative Norms 
The fact that societal norms against the killing of civilians are regularly transgressed despite 
their apparent strength and endurance indicates that some alternative mechanisms must be at 
work that allow these norms to break down in times of conflict.  The incentives model used 
here considers five such mechanisms: norm-stretching; demonisation; defensive threat 
perceptions; ‘blood feud’ traditions; and utopian ideologies. 
 
Whilst social actors are generally hesitant to engage in outright violations of norms, they may 
engage in a process known as norm-stretching, in which the limits of acceptable action are 
pushed or recast – usually in response to what are framed as exceptional and dire 
circumstances.650 Normative injunctions against killing are generally superseded by norms 
allowing for self-defence in the face of severe harm or death to one’s self or family; this 
concept is often transmuted to allow for self-defence at the group or state level against 
existential threats.651 Norms that delineate the categories of ‘civilian’ and ‘non-civilian’ may 
also be reshaped to allow the targeting of traditionally exempt participants (such as foreign aid 
workers and journalists).652 Norm-stretching mechanisms thus enable conflict actors to 
perceive transgressive behaviour as a legitimate option. 
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Collective violence generally depends upon ‘us-them categorical distinctions’ for the purpose 
of mobilising and ordering the use of force as well as identifying targets of attack.653 This 
process of distinction may be thought of as demonisation when it depicts the adversary as not 
merely a situational opponent, or the perpetrator of a specific act that must be responded to, 
but as an undifferentiated host characterised by some salient feature such as race, religion, 
ethnicity or political belief.  Demonisation often goes hand-in-hand with the promulgation of 
self-defence rationales for violence; a key element in convincing one’s own constituency of the 
inherent wickedness of another group is to cast them as not just different but threatening, 
hostile and poised to attack.654 This normative process is especially important in civil wars, 
where adversaries are neighbours and countrymen with many similar elements of identity and 
shared experiences.655 (For example, it helps explain how the residents of cities such as 
Sarajevo and Baghdad, who had previously intermarried and lived in commingled 
neighbourhoods for decades, could fall prey to sectarian hostility promulgated by political 
actors.) Adversaries are also usually presented as ‘guilty’ of some horrific act or ongoing 
oppression, and thus deserving of punishment.656  In Rwanda, for example, Hutu extremists 
successfully depicted the Tutsis as unlawful oppressors in the years leading up to the 1994 
genocide. Minority groups may also be labelled as subversive elements, a type of disease 
threatening to destroy the body politic, as with the Jews in Nazi Europe or the Kosovo 
Albanians in Milosevic’s Serbia. The process of demonisation serves a key function in target 
selection by transforming what would otherwise be an act of murder into an honourable and 
necessary course of action, namely the punishment and removal of ‘guilty’ persons. 
 
A third key element in the overriding of social norms against civilian victimisation is the 
embedding of self-defence perceptions amongst conflict actors, a common process in 
communal conflicts featuring real or imagined security dilemmas on the part of specific 
constituencies.657 Self-defence arguments facilitate preemptive violence against communities 
seen as threatening as well as retaliatory violence against those associated with actual attacks.  
An emphasis on self-defence helps to mitigate consideration of the counterproductive effects 
of civilian victimisation by prioritising the need to counter an immediate threat – especially an 
existential threat – over the achievement of longer-term political objectives.  
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Societies with strong blood feud traditions in peacetime may have an additional mechanism 
for overcoming norms against victimisation during war. Revenge is a common driver of 
violence across all civil wars, at both the individual and group level. Blood feud traditions, 
however, encompass much more than revenge motivations: they represent a longstanding and 
usually strong system of norms intended to maintain justice and social harmony in local 
communities.658 Typically, the family of a killed or injured person assumes a moral imperative 
to attain some form of compensatory justice and is given some mechanism for obtaining it, 
which may include the causing of harm (physical or financial) to parties judged responsible for 
the original injury. When conflict arises in such societies, pre-existing notions of blood feud 
offer an established framework of justice and legitimacy that may help facilitate ‘norm-
stretching’ for the purposes of revenge. It should be noted, however, that blood feud 
traditions can themselves become warped during war, as their peacetime functions of 
restraint – for example, in excluding women and children from retribution – become eroded.659 
 
Finally, additional normative incentives for victimisation exist when utopian ideologies strongly 
influence conflict actors.660 Utopian ideologies promulgate radically revisionist and 
transformative agendas that seek the creation of an idealised socio-political order, anchored in 
narratives that view contemporary society as unjust, immoral and oppressive of some core 
constituency.  These narratives also offer mechanisms for radical transformation, usually 
centred around the moral and/or material rejuvenation of the constituency and the 
elimination of those elements which prevent or threaten such renewal.  Utopian ideologies 
may be rooted in religious beliefs, secular theories or ethnic particularism, but they are 
fundamentally political ideologies in that they seek to alter structures and relationships of 
power within a given society.  (Examples of utopian ideologies include communism, National 
Socialism, eliminationist ethnic movements, and modern salafi-jihadism.661) Whilst the specific 
content of utopian ideologies varies enormously, they share a number of characteristics in 
terms of the construction of alternative normative systems which influence the treatment of 
civilians in warfare.  They tend to incorporate extremely long timeframes and notions of 
unconditional victory, thereby undermining one of the key incentives for restraint (namely, to 
                                                                 
658
 The existence of blood feud traditions in pre-modern Europe points to their functionality in societies without 
formal legal structures, rather than their manifestation in specific and limited regions of the world. West’s 
Encyclopedia of American Law (2008). 
659
 Kalyvas (2006), 72. 
660
 Ideologies are defined as ‘systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated and coherent, that justify the exercise 
of power, explain and judge historical events, identify political right and wrong, set forth the interconnections 
(causal and moral) between politics and other spheres of activity, and furnish guides for action’. McClosky (1964), 
362. 
661
 For a comparison of jihadist, Nazi and Leninist ideologies, see MacDonald (2007). 
 160 
limit the scope and duration of war).662 They are dominated by narratives that demonise 
adversaries and promote self-defence justifications. The notion of belonging to a ‘vanguard 
force’ may cause groups to disregard their constituency’s reactions to civilian targeting, or 
misinterpret a lack of popular support as an indication of the population’s moral weakness 
rather than distaste for the group’s conduct.663   
 
I argue that four of these five alternative normative incentives account for the widespread 
victimisation of civilians in Tajikistan despite the apparent continuation of societal adherence 
to the idea that civilians should not be targeted in war. The PFT did not generally argue that 
they had the right to victimise innocent civilians – instead, they justified their behaviour by 
invoking a narrative of self-defence against a hostile and illegitimate adversary, one that was 
easily identified due to prewar cleavages. During the run-up to open conflict, political elites 
mobilised supporters based on their regional patronage connections, thus establishing 
associations between adversarial factions and specific regions: Gharmis and Pamiris with the 
opposition, Kulyabis with the pro-communists. Regional mobilisation thus shaped the 
organisation of violence and provided the foundation for an ‘us-them’ differentiation based on 
regionalism. As argued by Kilavuz: 
 
When the militias began to kill people according to their regional origin, the 
process itself made regional identity and regionalism one of the most 
important factors in war. Just being from Garm or the Pamirs became 
grounds for being killed by pro-government forces, while the opposition 
came to treat Kulyabis similarly. In order to create loyalty, the warring 
parties used regional identities and allegiances to create antagonisms 





The Kulyabi factions demonised their Gharmi and Pamiri opponents by emphasising their 
religiosity and alleged foreign connections, depicting them as traitorous and divisive 
ideologues who would plunge the country into chaos and war. Throughout the conflict, they 
maintained intense hostility toward what they saw as the potential Islamisation of the state. 
This should not be confused with hostility toward Islam; even during the Soviet era, traditional 
religious practices flourished in secrecy. Rather, Kulyabi factions perceived political Islam as a 
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threat for several reasons: first, because it represented a stark departure from the status quo, 
under which many of them benefited; second, because it could prove a potentially divisive 
factor amongst the country’s inhabitants; third, because it could be a vehicle for expanded 
Iranian influence in the country; and finally, because of the horrific example of neighbouring 
Afghanistan’s bloody conflict, in which radical Islamic forces played a key factor.665 Kulyabi 
leaders frequently utilised rhetoric that labelled their adversaries as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, 
even though Islamists in Tajikistan did not, for the most part, agitate for a strict shari’a state or 
an Iranian-style theocracy. For example, as Safarov himself stated on two occasions: 
 
This is not a resurgence of Communism, we just wanted to be free of Islamic 




We have stood up against Islamic fundamentalists in order to avoid the 
development of events following the Afghan example. We are in favour of creating 




According to Rubin and Kilavuz, pro-communist supporters referred to the Gharmi and Pamiri 
opposition as Vofchiks, a diminutive of Vladimir, slang for Wahhabi (there were no proper 
Wahhabis in Central Asia, but the term is often applied in the region to perceived 
fundamentalists). In turn, the opposition referred to government supporters as Yurchiks, short 
for Yuri, an allusion to the Russian-imposed and supported communist regime.668 In short, 
despite the apparent commingling and peaceful relations amongst regional communities in the 
pre-war era, once conflict mobilisation was initiated along regional lines there were sufficient 
markers of difference to be deployed in the effort to demonise adversaries and thus stretch 
the norms related to civilian targeting. 
 
Narratives of self-defence emerged as early as April 1992, when pro-communist demonstrators 
offered lofty rationales for their assemblage: they were there to ‘defend truth, justice and 
democracy’ and protect the republic from the illegal acts of the opposition, who were widely 
denounced as Islamic fundamentalists using unconstitutional means to set up an Islamic 
state.669 Then-President Nabiev encouraged the self-defence narrative, for example in his 
speech declaring the formation of the National Guard (the PFT’s precursor), in which he stated: 
‘What sort of government would it be if it could not protect itself?... I thank you for coming 
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here and leaving behind your homes to protect the [parliamentary] session and me, the legally 
elected president… for gathering in the square for the sake of truth and justice’.670 This 
defensive mandate facilitated the perspective amongst militia members that the opposition 
was an existential threat to the republic that must be stopped at any cost, thus weakening 
incentives for restraint in their use of violence. ‘The homeland is in danger’, Nabiev 
announced, invoking the ultimate threat and transferring the object of defence from himself 
alone to the entire nation.671 
 
For Kulyabis, these narratives of demonisation and self-defence were seemingly confirmed by 
the victimisation perpetrated by the opposition once war broke out, including the blockade of 
Kulyab and the atrocities committed in Kurgan-Tyube. The latter were a key factor in the 
motivations of a number of PFT commanders, including Faisali Saidov: 
 
In mid-June 1992 he was in charge of a 10-strong self-defence unit of a 
sovkhoz near Qurghonteppa. His 65-year-old father was arrested by the 
opposition at the city bazaar. Saidov immediately took 40 Gharmi peasants 
hostage and entered negotiations concerning his father’s release, which he 
was ultimately promised. Having set the hostages free, he discovered his 
father’s burnt and savagely mutilated corpse two days later. Saidov 
gathered his male family members, classmates and co-workers, and went to 




As described in Chapter 3, Saidov became known as one of the most brutal perpetrators of 
atrocities against Gharmi and Pamiri populations, before dying in a shootout with Sangak 
Safarov. Colonel Khudoberdyev was also apparently motivated to join the PFT by atrocities 
committed against his family by opposition militants.673 As the war and its attendant 
victimisation continued, moderate figures on both sides were eliminated in favour of more 
extreme and aggressive leaders (for example, Safarov himself killed Kulyab Chairman Rizoyev, 
who was apparently more conciliatory).674 This further polarised the conflict actors and their 
populations, and helped fulfil demonisation projections. 
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Such atrocities were particularly escalatory given the strong blood feud traditions in Tajikistan. 
As noted by Nourzhanov, the custom of ‘blood feud…made the conflict even more ugly and 
uncontrollable’.675 Tajik normative concepts such as nomus (honour) and nang (dignity) 
facilitated civilian victimisation and the escalation spiral by legitimising acts of vengeance 
against the perpetrators of atrocities; over time, ‘revenge became an increasingly important 
reason for violence’ among participants at all levels.676 This motivation for violence was openly 
noted at the time; a Kulyab official noted that men in the region were taking their families 
away from the area and then returning ‘to take revenge on the offenders’.677 
 
Finally, there was one normative incentive that did not feature strongly for the PFT: the 
presence of a utopian ideology. Whilst the PFT broadly supported the restoration of the 
communist regime, they were not hard-line communists themselves. Their support for Nabiev 
and later Rahmonov was pragmatic, not ideological; it was the manifestation of patronage 
politics, not ideational suasion. To the extent there was a PFT ideology, it was of the 
reactionary variety: bitterly opposed to the political and religious reforms represented in the 
IRP platform, which they mischaracterised as Wahhabism and used to justify their narratives of 
self-defence. Thus, I argue that utopian ideology was a weak incentive for the PFT during the 
Tajik conflict.  
 
In short, all but one of the normative incentives for victimisation were strongly present for the 
PFT during Phase I of the conflict. Their adversaries were successfully demonised thanks to a 
clear narrative of existential threat to Kulyabis, and notions of self-defence, justice and 
legitimatised vengeance all contributed to a process of norm-stretching that allowed 
perpetrators to bypass traditionally strong norms against civilian victimisation. This facilitated 
all of the victimisation behaviour that occurred during the first year of the war, from atrocities 
on the kolkhozy to ethnic cleansing and attacks on towns. In each case, the victims of such 
violence were somehow ‘deserving’ of their fate due to their membership in a hostile and 
threatening communal group. 
 
Some of these elements continued to play a role in Phase II of the conflict. Whilst the Kulyabis 
had won the war, the continued guerrilla warfare practiced by the UTO maintained a narrative 
of Gharmi treachery and hostility and, thus, self-defence justifications. This, coupled with 
lingering revenge motivations, facilitated continued victimisation of displaced populations and 
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the perpetration of atrocities during government operations. However, because much of the 
PFT membership had become embedded in official structures, they were forced to at least 
appear more respectful of civilian protection norms, even if in practice the victimisation of 
Gharmi and Pamiri communities continued apace. 
 
In sum, the normative incentives for victimisation can be characterised thusly: 
 
Table 5.3.  Normative Incentives for Victimisation 
Norm-stretching Strong 
Demonisation Strong 
Self-defence Narrative Strong 
Blood Feud Traditions Strong 
Utopian Ideology Weak 
 
 
5.3  Strategic Incentives for Restraint 
Non-state forces typically face significant strategic incentives for restraint in intrastate warfare 
– in other words, incentives based on utility and self-interest in the pursuit of victory. Three of 
the most important are considered here: legitimacy; strategic discourse effects; and sustaining 
resources. 
  
Lacking the resources available to state regimes, non-state forces usually require the support 
or at least the general passivity of the civilian population in order to engage in strategies of 
asymmetric warfare.678  Attacks on civilians may undermine popular support, as the non-state 
force may acquire a reputation for brutality and untrustworthiness whilst also diminishing the 
perceived legitimacy of its cause.679 A lack of legitimacy may not be crippling in the short term, 
as people tend to defer to threats of violence even if they do not agree with the actor’s aims or 
strategies, but it can be counterproductive in the long run and remains a highly risky strategy, 
as a number of examples attest. The best known case is that of the Algerian Islamists, who 
alienated a previously supportive public by killing thousands of civilians in the early and mid-
1990s, a key factor in their defeat. A more recent example is Al Qaeda in Iraq, whose atrocities 
were successful in sparking communitarian warfare but counterproductive in their enabling of 
tactical counter-alliances that nearly eliminated AQI. However, given the number of conflict 
actors who succeed despite victimising civilians and theoretically losing legitimacy, it would be 
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wise not to overemphasise causal connections and outcomes in this regard. Non-state actors 
can find ways to compensate for any loss of legitimacy sustained as a result of targeting 
civilians. For example, Hezbollah has developed an extensive network of social services for its 
constituency, providing it with an alternative source of legitimacy that allows it to maintain 
support even if it engages in actions that do not receive universal approval. Even Pablo 
Escobar, one-time head of the Medellin cartel in Colombia and one of the world’s foremost 
narco-traffickers, provided an array of social services in an attempt to garner some public 
support and legitimacy despite the thousands of deaths attributable to the cartels’ war with 
the Colombian state.680 Finally, even conflict actors with no apparent compensatory 
programmes can overcome a lack of legitimacy through their sheer brutality, as the case of 
Charles Taylor in Liberia attests. 
 
Second, restraint may appear a more attractive option given its effects on the kind of strategic 
discourse that tends to emerge within intrastate wars. Targeting decisions are not made in a 
vacuum but rather are influenced strongly by the targeting decisions of the adversary, 
particularly in intrastate wars where the civilian population becomes a key centre of gravity.681 
Restraint can have positive effects on strategic discourse from the point of view of the non-
state actor. First, it has the potential to incentivise the adversary – whether a state or non-
state actor – to adhere to restraint in return, thus allowing the group to fulfil a protection 
function for its own constituency (with all the positive impact on legitimacy and political 
support that that entails).682 In addition, restraint by the non-state force allows it to potentially 
benefit in terms of comparative legitimacy should the state actor victimise civilians itself 
(which is one of the reasons why non-state groups often try to provoke the state into using 
indiscriminate force amongst the population). Restraint may also attenuate popular support 
for the continuation of war-fighting by the state actor, whereas attacks on civilians may lead to 
popular pressure to continue fighting until the non-state force is eliminated. This may be seen 
in the case of Chechnya, for example, where earlier Russian reluctance to engage in drawn-out 
hostilities in the breakaway republic dissipated in the second Chechen conflict in part because 
of spectacular acts of terrorism and brutality on the part of Chechen Islamist militias.  
 
Third, restraint towards civilians may lead to a more sustainable supply of resources for the 
non-state armed force. As usefully summarised by Wolf, ‘insurgent movements can properly 
be considered as operating systems, requiring certain inputs from either local or foreign 
sources, which are organised and converted into the “outputs” characterising the active 
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insurgency. In general, insurgency requires inputs of recruits, information, shelter and food 
from the local environment’.683 Civilian victimisation interferes with the production of all four 
of these inputs: civilians are either unable or unwilling to provide such goods if they have been 
displaced, killed, injured or rendered fundamentally hostile. Whilst coercion often proves 
necessary in the acquisition of resources (as described below) the use of persuasive measures 
rather than violence is likely to ensure less disruption of the necessary inputs.684  
 
However, the Tajik case study serves as a useful example as to how such incentives may be 
weak within certain strategic environments. First, the Tajik civil war did not feature a 
conventional state actor during its most intense phase. This had a significant impact on both 
the competition for legitimacy and the dynamics of the strategic discourse. The PFT confronted 
non-state adversaries as seemingly hobbled as itself in terms of legitimacy, capacity and 
popular support. Whereas non-state forces usually attempt to compensate for their weakness 
vis-à-vis state forces by garnering greater credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of their 
constituencies and gradually increasing their ability to protect them, the PFT did not have the 
usual asymmetrical conundrum. It faced militias equally as weak in the early months of the 
war, and then gained in strength thanks to Uzbek and Russian support and its eventual 
incorporation into the regime after its victory in Dushanbe. Thus, it did not see the usual 
benefits in restraint that many non-state forces would. 
 
Second, all of the war-fighting militias had more or less ‘captive’ constituencies – e.g., the PFT 
and the Kulyabis, the IRP and the Gharmis – which meant that restraint was unlikely to yield 
any of the benefits in legitimacy and popular support posited by theories based in more 
politicised internal conflicts.685 For example, it was unlikely that a Gharmi kolkhoz would 
choose to support a more restrained PFT militia over a more brutal IRP militia, as their best 
hope of survival was an IRP militia regardless of its level of brutality. 
 
Third, the normative aspects previously cited – such as demonisation and blood feud traditions 
– combined with the unique strategic environment of the Tajik war created ideal conditions for 
the ‘socialisation of barbarism’.686 With a predominance of non-state conflict actors operating 
outside the boundaries of the laws of war and international sanction, and a target field largely 
lacking in non-civilian targets, the potential for reciprocity of restraint was low. Instead, an 
escalatory cycle of atrocities emerged, as indicated by the exponential rise in casualty 
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estimates and engineered migrations throughout 1992 and early 1993. 
 
Finally, whilst civilian victimisation did indeed interfere with the supply of resources – as 
shown by the Kulyabis’ desperate need for food following the war of the kolkhozy – in the 
near-anarchic conditions of the war, victimisation was also a key mechanism for obtaining 
resources. Civilians were forced to join militias, tortured for information, and their homes and 
food seized by force. In the context of an evaporating national political order and competition 
with other non-state militias, the highly criminalised PFT militias were unlikely to favour more 
time-consuming persuasive methods over coercion. 
 
In short, the strategic incentives for restraint were weak during Phase I of the conflict, due to 
the unusual features of the Tajik strategic environment. However, these incentives were 
comparatively stronger during Phase II of the conflict, when PFT actors became largely 
embedded within official structures and diplomatic mechanisms. As the strategic discourse 
shifted to a more typical state/non-state format (i.e., the Tajik regime vs. the UTO), legitimacy 
became a more important factor to the regime; as diplomats brokered one ceasefire after 
another, reciprocity became a more viable concept within the discourse. The devastated state 
of the Tajik economy and agricultural sector also made a compelling case for restoring instead 
of destroying rural livelihoods. However, the relatively stronger incentives for restraint in 
Phase II should not obscure the continuing and large-scale victimisation of civilians, as 
described in Chapter 4. Evidently, strategic restraint was not strong enough to overcome the 
multivariate incentives for victimisation.  
 
Table 5.4.  Strategic Incentives for Restraint 
Legitimacy Weak in Phase I / Moderate in Phase II 
Strategic discourse effects Weak in Phase I / Moderate in Phase II 
Resource sustainability Weak in Phase I / Moderate in Phase II 
 
 
5.4  Strategic Incentives for Victimisation 
The strategic incentives to target civilians may be the most powerful group of incentives 
considered here, for the simple reason that they encompass those factors that are perceived 
to help non-state forces achieve their aims. Non-state forces are often militarily weak and 
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forced to utilise asymmetric strategies of warfare.  This creates a set of strategic incentives for 
civilian victimisation.687 
 
First, a militarily weak non-state force may find it prohibitively difficult to attack well-protected 
government or military targets with any degree of consistency or success.688 Should this be the 
case, there is a greater incentive to attack softer and more vulnerable targets, namely civilians.  
This allows a non-state force to maintain its war-fighting status at a lower short-term cost, 
both in terms of funding and manpower. In some cases, violence is barely necessary at all – the 
mere fear of what might transpire is enough to provoke mass flight. Given that non-state 
armed groups tend to operate under serious financial constraints, the cheaper tactics of 
victimisation – especially compared with the cost-intensive mechanisms of a ‘hearts and 
minds’ strategy – are attractive.689  
 
Second, non-state forces will often seek to prolong the conflict – either to maximise the time 
available to attain significant military strength, or to gradually wear down the opponent’s 
political will to continue fighting.690  For a militarily weak force, attrition is one of the few 
strategic options available, and targeting civilians may be the only means of keeping the 
conflict alive.  The potential counterproductive effects of attacking civilians are overridden by 
the need to keep fighting – if the non-state force is unable to sustain the conflict, then any 
long-term impact of civilian targeting is largely irrelevant. 
 
In some cases, it appears increasingly evident that some non-state forces actually do not seek 
victory or an end to conflict but rather a sustained level of violence and disorder in order to 
maintain local autonomy and/or pursue illicit activities. Le Billon notes the existence of 
‘aggressive-symbiotic relationships’ between governments and rebels in a number of conflicts, 
where ‘opposing parties may have an interest in prolonging a profitable military stalemate in 
order to preserve economic interests that could be threatened by a total victory and 
subsequent peace’.691 In essence, the development of a profitable war economy creates 
incentives amongst its participants to perpetuate it, even at the expense of the wellbeing of 
the population and the state as a whole.692 Thus, stalemate – not only victory – can also be an 
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incentive for victimisation, as prolonging this type of intrastate conflict indefinitely will 
inevitably require predatory treatment of civilians. 
 
Third, a non-state force might seek the active support of the population – but if it cannot 
attain this, it will often settle for at least popular passivity or neutrality.  If it cannot win the 
people over through its political or ideological efforts, it may resort to violence against them to 
prevent them from aiding the adversary or otherwise undermining its war-fighting efforts.693  
This incentive is a key driver of atrocities in warfare, including mass rape and 
mutilation/beheading, as a small armed force can pacify a large population via public and 
horrific acts of violence (as seen in the conflicts in the Balkans and West Africa, as well as the 
current drug war in Mexico).694 The aim is not to eliminate all civilians, but rather to victimise a 
sufficient number that the rest of the population submits to the non-state actor’s control.695 
 
Fourth, non-state forces may decide that the best way to acquire territory and resources is to 
kill, displace and rob civilians in large-scale victimisation campaigns.  This may be a particularly 
attractive option for weaker forces who cannot engage state forces directly, or who see the 
lower cost of civilian victimisation as desirable due to limited resources. The Balkan wars of the 
1990s demonstrate the relative ease with which small paramilitary forces can put rival 
populations to flight and claim their territory: for example, the attacks and predations of the 
‘White Eagles’, a Serbian gang in the Visegrad region of Bosnia, spurred the flight of around 
14,000 Bosnian Muslims despite a membership of only fifteen or so.696 As noted by Greenhill, 
refugee flows are often ‘strategically engineered’ and rational choices – in other words, not 
incidental effects of armed violence but intentionally organised phenomena intended to aid 
the pursuit of military or political aims.697 Finally, an interesting tangent to the acquisition 
incentive has arisen in recent decades due to the expansion and institutionalisation of 
international relief efforts. As argued by Polman, the exponential increases in attention and 
funding that derive from the perpetration of atrocities may serve as an incentive to commit 
them in the first place.698 For example, charity programmes intended to free slaves in Sudan by 
buying their freedom had the perverse effect of incentivising ‘slavers’ to take more captives.699 
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It is clear from the case study that the PFT saw significant strategic incentives for victimisation 
during Phase I of the war. In the earliest months, their small numbers and overall weakness 
meant that civilian targets were realistically the only targets they could pursue with any hope 
of success. The ‘war of the kolkhozy’ in the summer of 1992 was largely the result of militia 
weakness on both sides, with the lightly defended and open kolkhozy providing tempting 
targets. It was not until the PFT acquired larger numbers and better weaponry that they 
advanced to attacking larger population centres, including the capital. Following their victory, 
they continued to target refugees and other civilians. As noted in Chapter 4, low rates of gun 
ownership amongst Tajik civilians increased their vulnerability to predatory conflict actors. 
 
It would not necessarily be accurate to say that the PFT attacked civilians to prolong the 
conflict, but at least in the early days victimisation was a way for local militias to enter the 
conflict and acquire enough resources and territory to maintain a war-fighting existence. It 
appears unlikely, however, that the PFT sought a long-running state of disorder. Especially 
once their capabilities improved, they were clearly eager to end the war with victory in 
Dushanbe, as shown by their premature coup attempt in October 1992. Le Billon’s argument 
still bears some relevance for the conflict overall, however – as noted in Chapter 4, many 
believed at the time that the civil war was being prolonged for the benefit of the Tajik narco-
trafficking industry.  
 
PFT strategies did not require popular support outside their home constituency of Kulyab, but 
they did depend on popular passivity. In this, they were aided by what was seen at the time as 
a tendency toward passivity within the Tajik population generally. Davlat Khudonazarov 
explained, ‘At the moment society is asleep…The social system is still feudalistic. In the past, 
people got used to obeying first the local landlord, after that the chairman of the collective 
farm, then the secretary of the Communist Party. Now they obey the man with the gun’.700 
This served the PFT well. They were not a classical insurgent force, vying to overturn a regime 
on the basis of a preferable socio-political programme. They were operating within a strategic 
environment in which the non-state force that controlled the capital and a few key population 
centres – by force if necessary – could claim control of the state. During Phase I, the civilian 
population was a key centre of gravity because of the competition for territorial control and 
resources, not for the ‘hearts and minds’ of a COIN campaign. The conflict was being driven by 
paramilitary forces, not the public at large. Even Sangak Safarov, in his own slightly unhinged 
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way, believed that ‘to end the civil war in Tajikistan, it would be enough to shoot dead four 
leaders on each warring side. “I am ready to become one of these four,” he stressed’.701 
 
This particular incentive for victimisation helps explain the weakness of legitimacy incentives 
for restraint. Once the PFT had eliminated its opponents within Kulyab – their first order of 
business – they essentially gained legitimacy within their own constituency by virtue of being 
seen as the sole protectors of the community in the face of Gharmi and Pamiri aggression (e.g., 
the blockade of Kulyab). They did not have an incentive to try to gain legitimacy amongst other 
constituencies, not only because they were unlikely to do so in any event, but because their 
strategic needs did not include widespread popular support. They aimed to maintain 
themselves and eventually succeed through a combination of forcible acquisition, criminal 
proceeds and covert support from Uzbek and Russian actors. Thus, their main requirement as 
far as the civilian population was passivity, and victimisation proved a useful way of acquiring 
it.   
 
Finally, possibly the largest strategic incentive for victimisation by the PFT was its utility in the 
acquisition of territorial control and resources. During the early months of the war the PFT 
found the means to support its militias through attacks on kolkhozy, and later on population 
centres like Kurgan-Tyube and Kolkhozabad. Kulyabi militias managed to take control of 
southern and southwestern Tajikistan not only by defeating IRP militias, but by putting 
hundreds of thousands of civilians to flight. Following victory in Dushanbe, ethnic cleansing 
helped consolidate control of the capital and served to reward paramilitary fighters. Attacks on 
resettled refugees helped Kulyabis hold onto the land and possessions they had claimed during 
the fighting. In short, the terms of competition and conflict during Phase I of the civil war 
encouraged strategies based on the physical control of territory and the resources necessary 
to survive, and the relative military weakness of the conflict actors made victimisation appear 
the most likely means of success. 
 
In sum, strategic incentives for victimisation by the PFT were very strong during Phase I of the 
civil war. These incentives shifted somewhat during Phase II, however, due to the changed 
strategic environment and shifting role of PFT members. Victimisation remained attractive due 
to the vulnerability of civilian targets – especially refugees – to violence, whether for criminal 
or strategic purposes. It was no longer seen as useful, however, for entering or maintaining a 
presence in the conflict, as the PFT’s victory and incorporation into official structures had 
taken care of such needs. Victimisation continued to be useful for maintaining popular 
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passivity, which reduced potential opposition to the regime and facilitated the predatory 
exploitation of civilians by narco-traffickers and other criminal elements. Finally, there was still 
a need to acquire control over territory and resources – only now in the eastern half of 
Tajikistan, as government offensives targeted UTO bases and militias. In this case, however, 
civilian victimisation was not so much the primary means of acquisition as it was a predictable 
outcome of the manner in which the regime conducted its military operations in the region.  
 
In sum, the strategic incentives for victimisation can be represented thusly: 
 
Table 5.5.  Strategic Incentives for Victimisation 
Softer targets Strong in Phase I / Strong in Phase II 
Enter/prolong conflict Strong in Phase I / Weak in Phase II 
Popular passivity Strong in Phase I / Strong in Phase II 
Territory and resource acquisition Strong in Phase I / Moderate in Phase II  
 
 
5.5  Criminal Incentives for Restraint 
At first glance, the idea that criminally motivated groups – virtually defined by their predatory 
behaviour – would engage in restraint toward civilians appears illogical. However, non-state 
armed forces do face several incentives for restraint derived from their criminal activities. 
These incentives exist because of the nature of the war economy, or the shift of a state’s 
economic activities during conflict to encompass a range of licit and illicit markets and 
behaviour. Under this conceptualisation, criminal groups are not external and illegitimate 
actors preying upon a state’s economy and citizens, but key players in a transformed economic 
sphere in which ‘criminal’ activity becomes more widely dispersed throughout society.702 
Coercion and violence are still key aspects of criminality, but the greater scope of illicit markets 
and transactions requires conflict actors engaged in criminality – which in intrastate wars 
tends to be most actors – to consider new incentive structures with respect to their use of 
violence against civilians. 
 
In essence, viewing criminality – and especially criminality during warfare – as simply predation 
would obviate the possibility of criminal incentives for restraint. The value of the political 
economy of conflict approach is that it allows a more nuanced perspective on the incentives 
for criminality in conflict, and thus reveals that criminal actors in warfare are not monolithically 
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or consistently predatory. Two key incentives for restraint are the dynamics of the protection 
industry during conflict, and the sustainability requirements of criminal enterprises. 
 
First, whilst the literature on civilian victimisation notes that non-state armed groups may 
achieve legitimacy and popular support by protecting civilians from violence perpetrated by 
the state or other non-state actors, empirical evidence suggests that a leading source of 
funding for non-state groups is in fact payments for protection by civilians (including civilians 
engaged in illicit activity, such as narco-trafficking).703 In other words, non-state groups are not 
necessarily providing protection to civilians for normative or strategic reasons, but as part of a 
criminal racket designed to fund the group’s activities.704 The Taliban, for example, profit from 
the Afghan drugs trade not by being directly involved in production and trade but by providing 
protection to (as well as taxing) farmers and traffickers.705 Some non-state armed groups 
actually emerge from the protection business: the AUC, a right-wing paramilitary force in 
Colombia that became heavily involved in the drugs trade, was initially established as a 
protection force for large landowners. The privatisation of the security function thus provides 
an incentive for restraint toward those civilians participating in the market for protection 
provision.706  
 
Second, non-state forces engaged in any form of criminal activity require sustainable economic 
inputs of various kinds to participate in that activity, most of which would suffer if undue 
civilian victimisation were to occur.707  Narco-traffickers require civilians to grow and harvest 
drug crops and undertake low-level smuggling activity. Black markets require suppliers and 
customers. The highly profitable kidnapping industry that exists in many conflict zones would 
dry up if all of its victims were killed instead of released.708 Extortion rackets at roadblocks – 
another key source of funding – would suffer if victimisation became so severe that people 
avoided the area completely. Whilst coercion can be a strong factor in civilian participation in 
illicit activity, many civilians participate willingly as producers and consumers of criminal goods 
and services. With this in mind, general market dynamics should generate some consideration 
of restraint amongst non-state armed groups that depend upon criminal sources of funding to 
survive. According to the UNODC, ‘Professional criminals may seek to minimize the extent of 
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violence to ensure the smooth flow of profits and to avoid unwanted attention…Typically, the 
better organized the crime, the less violence associated with it’.709 
 
In short, the emergence of a war economy and its associated structures and market dynamics 
creates a set of incentives for non-state conflict actors engaged in criminality to limit their 
predation upon the civilian population. Put simply, civilians are not just a target to be exploited 
or robbed, but a valuable economic input in the production of illicit goods and services.  
 
Criminal incentives are quite salient in considering the PFT, a militia largely comprising 
criminals which persistently engaged in illicit activity to fund its activities and generate 
personal wealth, even after its official disbandment. To a certain extent, the PFT did engage in 
restraint toward its own constituency (the Kulyabis). In the anarchic environment of the Tajik 
civil war, with the security function highly privatised, protection was a key element of the PFT’s 
legitimacy and support. During the war of the kolkhozy, PFT militias protected Kulyabis in 
Kurgan-Tyube whilst attacking and robbing Gharmis and Pamiris. During Phase II, Gharmis and 
Pamiris, not Kulyabis, were targeted for extortion and coercion (for example at roadblocks) by 
former PFT members now in the security services. High-ranking former PFT leaders in the 
government offered protection for Kulyabis involved in narco-trafficking (much as former UTO 
leaders protected the trade in eastern Tajikistan).710 In short, the strategic environment of the 
conflict generated both the need for a privatised protection function as well as obvious lines of 
communal demarcation that made it easy for a group like the PFT to locate a constituency to 
protect. Thus, I argue that the PFT had a strong criminal incentive to engage in restraint, due to 
the protection element. 
 
With regard to the second incentive, I argue that consideration of the sustainability of illicit 
activity was relatively low during Phase I of the conflict. At this time, both the PFT and the IRP 
were in desperate need of resources, either for themselves or their suffering constituencies. 
They looted towns and farms, coerced civilians into the drugs trade, and exploited and stole 
from refugees. The sheer scale of brutality and destruction does not suggest any concern for 
possible over-predation. However, following the PFT victory in Dushanbe and its incorporation 
into official structures, there appeared to be a gradual consolidation of corrupt and criminal 
actors that encouraged more formal arrangements and a greater concern for sustainability. In 
the drugs trade, larger and more structured networks emerged, with a fairly high level of 
cooperation amongst them that reduced incentives for collateral violence. In the security 
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services, the removal of Salimov and purging of the Interior Ministry helped reduce 
lawlessness and funnel corrupt behaviour into more predictable channels (e.g., bribe-seeking). 
In general, former PFT members who joined the government were now able to preside over 
extensive patronage and criminal networks that privileged less violent methods of coercion for 
their maintenance. However, this should not obscure the continued high levels of criminal 
violence against civilians, compared to the pre-war era. 
 
In sum, the criminal incentives for restraint can be represented thusly: 
 
Table 5.6.  Criminal Incentives for Restraint 
Protection market Strong 
Sustainable economic inputs Weak in Phase I / Moderate in Phase II 
 
 
5.6  Criminal Incentives for Victimisation 
Despite the potential incentives for sparing civilians from victimisation for business purposes, 
there is no denying that non-state armed groups face strong incentives for civilian victimisation 
via participation in criminal activity. The types of organised crime that non-state armed groups 
are most likely to engage in – drugs and arms trafficking, natural resource exploitation, 
extortion and protection rackets, sex trafficking, kidnapping for ransom – all involve 
substantial and predictable harm to civilian populations.711 Thus, the decision by an armed 
group to engage in criminal activity is inherently a decision to engage in civilian victimisation. 
The criminal incentives for victimisation can perhaps best be summarised as, first, acquisition, 
and second, status and control. 
 
First, the fundamental incentive to engage in criminality – and thus criminal victimisation – is 
the acquisition of resources and profit. Regardless of whether a non-state actor’s purpose in 
engaging in criminality is to fund its war-making activities or to generate personal wealth, the 
basic aim of criminal behaviour is the acquisition of wealth, which generally requires the use or 
threat of use of violence, including against the civilian population. Criminal acquisition is a 
powerful incentive for non-state armed groups because typically, in modern conflicts, the 
usual sources of productive economic activity within a country have either been shut down or 
become the object of contestation amongst conflict actors.712 This leaves non-state groups 
with few other options, particularly if external assistance is not significant and they are forced 
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to self-finance.713 Two of the most common coping strategies are direct predation upon the 
civilian population (looting, robbing, kidnapping, appropriating homes and land) and taxation 
of licit and illicit activities within the war economy, such as by setting up checkpoint extortion 
rackets, taxing humanitarian aid deliveries, and taking a cut of lootable resource revenues.714  
 
Criminal acquisition becomes an even more powerful incentive when conflated with strategic 
incentives for the acquisition of territory and resources – i.e., when there is a strategic 
rationale for attacking and robbing civilians – and normative incentives such as demonisation. 
All of these variables come together in ethnic cleansing operations, for example.715 In addition, 
successful criminal acquisition by a non-state force may encourage victimisation by allowing 
the group to forego the need for popular support. The political economy of conflict literature 
reveals that conflicts sustained by the illicit trade in lootable resources (such as drug crops and 
alluvial diamonds), ‘appear to be associated with increased predation of civilians by armed 
groups in the form of forced labour, extortion, pillaging and looting, as control over lootable 
natural resources relieves combatants of the need to generate and maintain social capital 
among putative supporters’.716 
 
Second, as an actor in the organised crime market, a non-state armed force must maintain 
certain levels of influence and status, and control a defined criminal space (in the sense of 
territory, membership and/or networks). Thus, some violence against civilians will be 
motivated not by acquisition but by the need to reinforce the actor’s criminal position. For 
example, civilians who refuse to participate in drugs production may be killed as a message to 
other farmers. The families of rivals may be targeted to induce their withdrawal from the 
market. Non-state actors may try to create ‘no-go’ areas for state actors via high levels of 
civilian victimisation, in order to control political and economic activity in a given territory. In 
short, the desire on the part of a non-state actor to maintain its position in criminal markets 
and avoid government counter-strategies functions as a criminal incentive that leads to civilian 
victimisation.  
 
Again, criminal incentives are highly relevant for the PFT, which functioned essentially as a 
criminal militia during Phase I, and as a criminal network within official structures during Phase 
II. (As Chapter 4 described in detail the processes and aims of PFT criminality during the civil 
war, this incentive will be only briefly summarised here.) Throughout the war, the PFT was 
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highly motivated by criminal acquisition, both to fund its activities and to generate personal 
wealth. Towns and kolkhozy were targeted not just for strategic reasons, and not just out of 
normative hatred, but because they contained lootable goods that ad hoc PFT militias could 
appropriate. The defeated Gharmi and Pamiri populations were targeted for predation due to 
their vulnerability and the high likelihood of successfully victimising them with impunity. 
Overall levels of poverty and devastation helped boost the strength of criminal incentives, as 
illicit activity became one of the only ways ordinary Tajiks could survive.  
 
Second, there are also some indications of civilian victimisation in order to maintain status and 
control of criminal markets. PFT leaders who assumed local positions, such as Ibodullo 
Boimatov in Tursunzade, fought turf battles with rivals in which civilians were killed. Former 
PFT ministers in Dushanbe allowed their underlings, especially in the security forces, to 
victimise civilians as a way of gaining the loyalty of the ranks and increasing their political 
power. However, the general covert nature of this type of victimisation dictates that little firm 
evidence of its occurrence can be found. Thus, whilst I presume this incentive existed for the 
PFT, given its frequent occurrence amongst criminal actors, it cannot be analysed with 
significant clarity.  
 
In short, given the strategic environment of the war and the nature of the PFT, there was little 
likelihood that criminal incentives for victimisation would be weak. Many PFT members were 
criminals before the war and the anarchic conditions of the conflict only removed further what 
constraints had existed on their pursuit of ill-gotten gains. The primary effect of the war upon 
already existing criminal incentives was to strengthen them, due to increased opportunities 
and impunity as well as new strategic and normative rationales for victimisation. 
 
In sum, the criminal incentives for victimisation can be represented thusly: 
 
Table 5.7.  Criminal Incentives for Victimisation 
Acquisition Strong 
Status and control Presumed but uncertain 
 
 
The consideration of criminal incentives further strengthens the case for considering non-state 
armed forces as conflict actors, rather than attempting to separate them into political and 
criminal spheres. The overlap of incentives such as acquisition, protection, and sustainable 
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resources across both the strategic and criminal categories of incentives demonstrates the 
difficulty in teasing out the drivers of non-state actor behaviour. 
 
 
5.7  Conclusion: Considering the Incentives Mix  
Having examined each category of incentives in turn, it is now possible to aggregate the key 
variables and consider the ways in which they might interact for a singular conflict actor. The 
process of interaction is key: it would be rare for one set of incentives to be the sole and 
definitive driver of a decision to target civilians. I argue that it is more likely that a number of 
variables combine synergistically to encourage victimisation, and that this choice is further 
determined by the strength or weakness of the variables that encourage restraint. The 
strength of the binary, multivariate incentives model is that it allows a more holistic 
consideration of the drivers of targeting behaviour, which I believe is preferable to trying to 
find a singular linear cause of what in the end is amongst the most complex of human choices.  
 
The full array of incentives is captured in Table 5.8: 
 
 
Table 5.8.  Non-State Actor Incentives Model: Restraint vs. Victimisation 
 
Category of Incentives 
 
Binary Choice Main Variables 
Restraint International humanitarian law 





Defensive threat perceptions 
Blood feud traditions 
Utopian ideology 
Restraint Legitimacy 
Strategic discourse effects 
Sustaining resources 
Strategic 
Victimisation Soft targets 
Prolonging conflict 
Passivity of civilians 
Territory and resource 
acquisition 
Restraint Protection function 
Economic inputs 
Criminal 
Victimisation Asset acquisition 




Considering these incentives in a generic fashion, it appears that typically the normative 
incentives for restraint in intrastate war are extremely weak. The strategic incentives for 
restraint should be weightier, but may be overcome by either the normative incentives for 
victimisation (for example, if demonisation obscures the likelihood of negative strategic 
effects) or the strategic incentives for victimisation (such as when the need to stay relevant in 
a conflict overrides any concerns about sustainable resourcing). Even if the normative and/or 
strategic incentives for restraint are relatively strong, criminal incentives – particularly the 
need to acquire resources and funding – may override them and generate victimisation. 
 
In short, the normative, strategic and criminal incentives for civilian victimisation are relatively 
strong for non-state actors in intrastate warfare. They may yet be deterred by the threat of 
reprisals or intervention, but absent a strong response from the adversary, victimisation 
presents the possibility of positive outcomes for a non-state armed force.  
 
Viewing the Tajik case through the prism of this incentives model illustrates the 
interdependence of the variables considered here, as shown in Table 5.9: 
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NSA Codes of Conduct Weak Weak 
Restraint 








Norm-stretching Strong Strong 
Demonisation Strong Moderate 
Self-defence narratives Strong Moderate 
Blood feud traditions Strong Strong 
Normative 
Victimisation 
Utopian ideology Weak Weak 





Resource sustainability Weak Moderate 
Soft targets Strong Strong 
Prolonging conflict Strong Weak 
Passivity of civilians Strong Strong 
Strategic 
Victimisation 
Territory and resource 
acquisition 
Strong Moderate 
Protection function Strong Strong Restraint 
Economic inputs Weak Moderate 
Asset acquisition Strong Strong 
Criminal 
Victimisation 





During Phase I of the civil war, all of the restraint incentives were weak, except for Societal 
Norms (which were overridden by the normative incentives for victimisation) and the 
Protection Function (which could co-exist with victimisation, as captive constituencies allowed 
the PFT to protect their own whilst victimising rival communities). Conversely, the incentives 
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for victimisation during Phase I were very strong. As discussed, the relative strength and 
weakness of the incentives was due to the strategic environment of intrastate war in 
combination with the unique aspects of the Tajik conflict in its first year and the nature of the 
PFT.   
 
During Phase II, the strategic incentives for restraint grew in strength whilst the normative and 
strategic incentives for victimisation diminished somewhat. I argue that this helps account for 
the general lessening in intensity of victimisation during Phase II – whilst civilian suffering was 
still widespread, fewer people were killed and displaced populations were gradually allowed to 
return. Nevertheless, the incentives for victimisation still outweighed those for restraint. 
 
Thus, consideration of the full array of incentives and their interactions suggests possible 
answers to some of the more perplexing questions with respect to victimisation during the 
Tajik civil war. Why did societal norms not protect innocent civilians from being targeted? I 
argue that these were overcome by the strength of all the incentives for victimisation, and in 
particular those normative processes that allowed perpetrators to ‘stretch’ societal norms and 
rationalise their violations of them. Why did victimisation continue during Phase II, after the 
PFT had essentially won the war? I argue that the criminal incentives for victimisation, 
combined with still-strong normative and strategic incentives and still-weak restraint 
incentives, led the Kulyabi faction to continue to see benefits in victimising civilians. 
 
In short, I argue that this incentives approach provides the most comprehensive answers to 
the second element of the research question: why did the PFT target civilians? By considering 
this decision through the binary choices of restraint or victimisation, and examining a full array 
of possible drivers, it becomes possible to argue that victimisation was 1) largely a product of 
its apparent attractiveness to the PFT in fulfilling its political and criminal aims; and 2) 
facilitated by normative mechanisms that provided justifying rationales for behaviour that 
would otherwise be seen as transgressive. In other words, the PFT saw victimisation as a useful 
vehicle for sustaining its wartime activities, defeating its conflict adversaries, and enriching its 
members – and was able to overcome the taboos against its behaviour by constructing 
legitimising narratives and invoking retaliatory traditions. Finally, the incentives model helps 
clarify that some drivers traditionally associated with victimisation – such as utopian ideologies 
– were not a factor in PFT victimisation. 
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Having addressed the second element of the research question, I now turn to the third: what 
were the short-term effects of victimisation? The next chapter examines the impact of civilian 




THE IMPACT OF CIVILIAN VICTIMISATION ON THE CONFLICT DYNAMICS  
OF THE TAJIK CIVIL WAR 
 
 
This chapter comprises the fourth step in this dissertation’s research approach: an examination 
of the impact of civilian victimisation by the PFT on the conflict dynamics of the Tajik civil war. 
In terms of the strategic approach, this chapter’s aim is to highlight the strategic outcomes of 
the PFT’s decision to engage in civilian victimisation instead of restraint. 
 
A close reading of the Tajik case study yields five aspects of the conflict that were significantly 
affected by civilian victimisation by the PFT: military operations and strategy; escalation and 
resolution of conflict; dispersion of violence; territory and resource acquisition; and legitimacy. 
This chapter examines each of these in turn. Each section differentiates the impact of different 
types of victimisation (as presented in Chapter 4) whilst also considering their evolution over 
time. The chapter ends with a summary of the strategic outcomes related to victimisation, and 




6.1  Military Strategies and Operations 
The decision to engage in civilian victimisation will fundamentally determine the types of 
strategies and kinetic operations that non-state forces can pursue. Removing considerations of 
restraint opens up the target field immeasurably and allows combatants to use force without 
the obstacles imposed by the need for distinction. Violence can be geographically dispersed far 
more widely, as targets are not limited to fixed official and military installations but may 
include large segments of the population. Non-state forces may acquire control over large 
swathes of territory that could never be occupied via conventional military attacks, giving 
them resources and sanctuary that allow them to utilise increasingly conventional forms of 
warfare.  Indiscriminate violence also tends to generate large flows of refugees, who can 
become key strategic players in their own right. Finally, as described in detail earlier, the 
decision to engage in victimisation by a conflict actor will become a key element of the 
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conflict’s strategic discourse. In short, the military aspects of the conflict represent the most 
obvious area in which civilian victimisation will have an impact.717 
 
The strategic advantages of civilian victimisation for non-state armed groups tend to make it a 
key element of their war-fighting strategies. Civilian victimisation is not just a by-product but a 
primary expression of their violence. This was the case for the Popular Front of Tajikistan. 
Always an extremely devolved group of actors, it is difficult to speak of a unified war-fighting 
strategy for the PFT – even its top two leaders, Safarov and Kenjaev, disagreed over targets 
and timing. Yet overall, PFT militias clearly incorporated civilian victimisation into their 
instrumental pursuit of violence. Whether attacking rival kolkhozy, shelling cities or provoking 
the flight of refugees, nearly all of the methods with which the PFT decided to pursue its aims 
included some form of civilian victimisation.  
 
This section considers five aspects of military strategy and operations that were significantly 
affected by civilian victimisation by the PFT: targeting dynamics; war-fighting methods; 
adversary resources; dissension; and strategic discourse. 
 
First, civilian victimisation helped establish the targeting dynamics of the conflict, by 
contributing to the polarisation of the conflict into regional, not political, blocs.718 Civilian 
victimisation targeted at specific communities early in the conflict transformed the political 
confrontation in Dushanbe into a war based in social, historical, and perhaps more visceral 
factors: 
 
One informant stated: ‘The beginning of the war was ideological: Islamists 
and democrats against Communists. People went to their regions from the 
squares. Then war started in the regions….’ Yet another informant said: 
‘After the war started, people forgot about party, ideas, etc. The main issue 
became this region and that region. They began to kill people because they 
were from this region or that region…’ As the war progressed, it 
strengthened regional identities, and the parties to the conflict began to be 
more regionally homogenous.
719
   
 
In other words, civilian victimisation came to have a self-reinforcing quality: the more the two 
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sides targeted each others’ constituencies, the more they reinforced an absolutist framing of 
targets that encouraged strategies of civilian victimisation. The emergence of ‘Gharmi vs. 
Kulyabi’ as a shaping mechanism for violent activity split communities into two discrete camps, 
in a targeting process that could not be transcended by individual behaviour – in Dushanbe, for 
example, the PFT targeted Gharmis and Pamiris regardless of their political affiliation or 
wartime activities. This rooting of targeting within innate human characteristics instead of 
behaviour generated a conflict that in its first phase was largely irreconcilable except by the 
armed victory of one faction over another, and that in its second phase saw a substantial 
amount of continued victimisation of the losing party. 
 
Second, civilian victimisation influenced the war-fighting methods utilised by the PFT. In 
essence, it enabled the PFT to pursue militia-based warfare. The reliance on small, ad hoc, 
largely autonomous rural units as a vehicle to obtain military and strategic aims would have 
little hope of success if these militias chose restraint over victimisation. By engaging in attacks 
on civilians, militias were able to achieve an outsized impact, acquiring control over territory 
and resources with less effort and capacity than would otherwise be required. 
 
Third, civilian victimisation by the PFT had an impact on the resources available to the 
adversary, in both positive and negative ways. On the positive side (from the perspective of 
the PFT), their attacks on kolkhozy and cities left opposition militias with few resources to 
sustain themselves or to share with their constituencies. PFT militias looted food and 
valuables, destroyed villages, and let crops rot in the fields. The successful PFT offensive 
through Kurgan-Tyube at the end of 1992 drove the opposition militias from Tajik territory 
altogether, denying them a domestic base of operation in the south. On the negative side, 
however, this offensive also pushed thousands of refugees into Afghanistan; as detailed in 
Chapter 4, these refugees become a strategic asset for the exiled opposition, providing a 
source of recruits, funding and cover.  
 
Fourth, civilian victimisation led to an unspecified level of dissension within the ranks of the 
PFT.  In Phase II of the war, for example, the predations of Salimov’s Interior troops led to 
tensions within the regime, ending with Salimov’s removal and a thorough purge of his 
ministry. More dramatic was the apparent disagreement over refugee victimisation that led to 
the deadly confrontation between Safarov and Saidov in March 1993. That two such brutal 
perpetrators of atrocities should meet their own ends quarrelling over civilian victimisation, 
whilst ironic, also illustrates a little-explored aspect of civilian victimisation, namely the fact 
that its use and acceptance are not monolithically present within a group – or consistent over 
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time. Safarov gave every appearance in the last months of his life that he was trying to create a 
narrative for his wartime behaviour that was conducive to his new role as one of the most 
powerful men in the country: yes, he had partaken in violent acts, but only in self-defence or 
to punish enemy forces who had done far worse to innocent people. With the opposition 
defeated, he publicly (if perhaps cynically) embarked on a campaign promoting peace and 
reconciliation.720 The popularity of ‘Bobo Sangak’ amongst pro-government constituencies was 
undeniable; across the country, schools, kolkhozy and streets were named after him (until 
2002, members of the new Tajik army trained at the ‘Sangak Safarov Military College’). In 
contrast, Saidov, who had a far less public role and was still participating in combat operations 
against opposition militias, maintained his wartime outlook and personal desire for vengeance 
against enemy constituencies. In terms of the instrumentality of civilian victimisation, Safarov 
perceived strategic (and political) incentives for restraint, whilst Saidov was swayed more by 
his perception of strategic and normative incentives for victimisation. This type of divergent 
interpretation is not uncommon amongst non-state armed groups, but the result is seldom so 
spectacular (or, it may be said, so satisfyingly just for their victims). 
 
Finally, civilian victimisation by the PFT shaped heavily the strategic discourse of the conflict. In 
a dynamic somewhat unusual amongst civil wars, the PFT was facing not a state actor but 
another non-state group. This facilitated a process referred to earlier as the ‘socialisation of 
barbarism’, or the tendency of conflict actors to mirror each other’s behaviour. Operating as 
they were within the same strategic environment and with similar constraints, it is not 
surprising that both the PFT and the IRP/UTO militias engaged in civilian victimisation. As the 
next section explains, however, this mutually shared behaviour had an escalatory effect during 
the first year of the war.  
 
 
6.2  Escalation and Resolution of the Conflict 
For non-state forces who seek escalation and prolonged conflict to further their aims, civilian 
victimisation remains a favoured tactic.721 There are a number of reasons why a non-state 
armed force would seek escalation – to provoke government over-reaction, for example, or to 
inflame sectarian tensions and thus rally support to its efforts.722 As noted in Chapter 5, non-
state groups may seek to prolong conflict as part of a campaign of attrition, or in order to 
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perpetuate conditions of instability as cover for illicit activities. Weak armed groups may 
pursue a ‘crisis generation’ approach, seeking influence and coercive capabilities beyond their 
military capacities.723 Civilian victimisation plays a key role in escalation as it is the most likely 
act of violence to enable it. As discussed earlier, norms against attacking civilians are relatively 
strong throughout the world; atrocities thus inspire a greater degree of anger, revulsion and 
desire for revenge than attacks on armed forces or other official targets. They are also more 
likely to draw into the conflict segments of a population that had previously been dissociated 
from political disputes. One of the most notorious instances of successful escalation in recent 
years was the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, Iraq, reportedly by 
Al Qaeda in Iraq. The attack sparked sectarian violence and is seen as one of the key escalatory 
points in the Iraq conflict: it was following the mosque attack that the contest between Shi’ite 
and Sunni militias in Baghdad sharply intensified, leading to thousands of civilian deaths and 
the dramatic transformation of the city into sharply divided sectarian territories.724  
 
Another key aim for non-state forces may be to disrupt formal conflict resolution efforts, for 
which purpose civilian victimisation is well suited. First, the emotional consequences of civilian 
victimisation make it extremely difficult to bring parties to the negotiating table.725 Even if a 
conflict resolution process can be implemented, civilian victimisation can be utilised as a 
spoiler strategy – large-scale or dramatic attacks on civilians can quickly reignite hostilities and 
dash the prospects of negotiation. (The Arab-Israeli ‘peace process’ is perhaps an exemplar of 
the use of victimisation as a spoiler strategy for negotiations.) Second, civilian victimisation 
that involves large-scale ‘cleansing’ operations complicates conflict resolution by creating the 
need to either undo or accept the ‘facts on the ground’ created thereby. The acquisition of 
territory by ‘cleansing’ will not be seen as legitimate by other parties; however, if they cannot 
reverse this acquisition by force, it will prove even more difficult to undo it by negotiation. This 
leads to the development of complicated plans for phased withdrawal, de facto autonomy, 
demilitarised zones, et cetera – many of which have the effect of ‘freezing’ a conflict rather 
than resolving it. This is well illustrated by the continued political uncertainty in conflict zones 
from the 1990s, such as Bosnia and the southern Caucasus. 
 
In Tajikistan, both escalation and spoiler dynamics can be attributed to civilian victimisation by 
the PFT. First, atrocities committed by the PFT during the summer of 1992 provoked and 
‘legitimised’ retaliatory attacks by the opposition (and vice versa). Within weeks of the 
outbreak of conflict, both PFT and opposition militias were fighting less for political 
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motivations than in response to the escalating brutality of the war.726 According to 
Akbarzadeh, ‘The conflict had basically lost its ideological coating and turned into clan warfare 
between Kulyabis on the one hand and Pamiris and Gharmis on the other’.727  
 
Civilian victimisation by the PFT also contributed to escalation in the severity of the conflict. A 
key turning point in the war was the PFT’s acquisition of tanks and their use of them against 
the town of Kurgan-Tyube in September 1992. Following their capture of the town, they 
continued to deploy the tanks against population centres in Kurgan-Tyube, thus swiftly 
overcoming lightly armed opposition militia. As part of this offensive in the south, the PFT also 
purposefully created huge flows of refugees, driving tens of thousands of people into 
Afghanistan and thus internationalising the conflict for several years to come. 
 
Finally, the PFT were also key players in the escalation of the non-kinetic security challenges 
that emerged during Phase II – namely, criminality and corruption. As warlords, corrupt 
officials, narco-traffickers and abusive security officials, they greatly increased the insecurity of 
the population, even those far removed from the ongoing military operations. 
 
In terms of conflict resolution, both PFT and opposition militias used violence as a spoiler 
strategy to derail ceasefires and negotiations. In Phase I, ceasefires in the summer of 1992 
were violated by continued attacks on kolkhozy. Attempts to find a political settlement for 
control of Dushanbe in late 1992 were shoved aside by the PFT advance into the capital.728 In 
Phase II, after the launch of the formal peace process, each round of negotiations was 
accompanied by armed attacks, by both government and guerrilla forces, in order to influence 
diplomatic outcomes. For example, Tajikistan’s deputy prime minister was assassinated on the 
eve of the first round of talks in 1994, reportedly by ‘irreconcilables’ who objected to the 
commencement of negotiations (both the regime and the opposition included elements 
opposed to the talks). The attack succeeded in the near term: the Tajik regime suspended the 
talks, until pushed to the table by Russia the following month.729 The Ashgabat round 
(December 1995 – January 1996) was disrupted first by the bombing of four villages in Gorno-
Badakhshan and then by the assassination of the pro-regime Mufti of Tajikistan, Fathullo 
Sharifzoda. Without international pressure, it is doubtful that negotiations would have 
continued in the face of such provocations.730 It should be noted, however, that non-civilian 
targets (particularly police force members and regime officials) tended to be favoured during 
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Phase II spoiler attempts. One possibility is that this was due to the clearer signalling of attacks 
on official targets: killing civilians to send a political message, at a time when civilians were 
routinely harmed by criminals and warlords, was perhaps less effective than targeting security 
forces or political leaders.  
 
In sum, civilian victimisation by both sides contributed to escalation and complicated 
resolution efforts. However, the PFT’s advantages in weaponry and state support during Phase 
I, and their official status during Phase II, allowed them to escalate and disrupt to a greater 
degree than their opponents. 
 
 
6.3  Dispersion of Violence   
Militarily weak non-state armed forces face an incentive to target civilians because it requires 
fewer resources, training and capability compared to attacks on military targets. Civilian 
populations tend to be unarmed, or at most lightly armed; they can be attacked in their homes 
and villages, which are not set up with defensive works; they are not skilled in fighting or 
defending themselves; and many of them, particularly children and the elderly, are not capable 
of defending themselves. This accessibility of civilians to attack, and the relative ease with 
which large numbers of them may be killed or provoked into flight even by small groups of 
armed men, can encourage the entry into the conflict of actors who would otherwise be too 
weak, undisciplined, or incapable of mounting campaigns of violence against military or official 
targets.731 In other words, the availability of strategies based on civilian victimisation lowers 
the barrier to entry into the conflict. Small paramilitary groups and militias that would 
otherwise operate at the margins, if at all, can play a decisive role, and are often relied upon 
by political actors who lack conventional capabilities and capacity.732 Foreign fighters, despite 
their considerable disadvantages in operating in a foreign environment, can insert themselves 
into a conflict. Criminals and mentally deranged individuals who might not be tolerated in a 
force oriented toward attacks on military targets – which require a higher level of organisation, 
training and discipline – may be unleashed, often intentionally, on civilian populations.733 (In 
the Bosnian war, for example, some estimated that 80 per cent of paramilitary members were 
‘common criminals’, hired to do the ‘dirty work’ against civilian populations.734) In short, 
conflict actors tend to take advantage of the fact that war-fighting based upon strategies of 
victimisation can be done on the cheap, by empowering irregular armed forces and ‘paying’ 
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them in plunder – essentially, funding conflict via civilian victimisation (in a manner not 
dissimilar to that of medieval European rulers).735  
 
The use of civilian victimisation thus has the effect of dispersing violence, and the conflict it 
propels, more widely throughout a society – not only because of the immense harm inflicted 
upon the civilian population, but because it enables the participation in violence by individuals 
and groups who would not ordinarily be part of a conventional military campaign. This wider 
dispersion of violence throughout a society has several pernicious effects. First, it greatly 
complicates processes of conflict resolution, as there are more formal and informal actors in 
the conflict, some of whom may prefer a continuing profitable conflict environment to 
peace.736 Second, it draws into the conflict individuals and groups motivated by criminal or 
purely emotional aims who are thus less likely to be constrained by group discipline or the 
traditional laws of war.737 Third, the dispersion of violence spreads the effects of the conflict 
more widely through the society, setting the stage for significant levels of deprivation and 
victimisation as well as difficulties in postwar reconstruction and reconciliation. In short, the 
dispersion of violence facilitated by civilian victimisation creates a conflict environment that is 
considerably more complex, vicious and resistant to resolution than conflicts that are largely 
limited to military and official participants.  
 
The Tajik civil war is, perhaps, an exemplar of this scenario. Phase I of the conflict was 
dominated by non-state armed forces engaged in civilian victimisation as a prime strategic 
mechanism. The nucleus of the original PFT militias was found in the criminal gangs mobilised 
by Safarov and Kenjaev at the beginning of the war, later joined by local mafia leaders and 
corrupt officials. As noted in Chapter 3, many of the leaders – not just members – of the PFT 
were criminals, a state of affairs not typically seen in stable state armed forces.  
 
In addition, during the summer of 1992 many civilians were forced to join the Kulyabi militias: 
‘As armed militias started to fight, people who otherwise would not have engaged in hostile 
action were forced to participate… Many young men were forced to join. Many informants 
report that the militias told them, “you will come with us or we will kill you”’.738 In short, PFT 
militias often consisted of a mix of criminals, forcibly conscripted young men, and other 
civilians motivated by revenge or greed. This kind of force composition was only possible 
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because the conflict was dominated by irregular warfare against civilian targets, not the more 
restrained targeting of military forces that requires a more disciplined and trained-up force. 
 
During Phase II, the effects of the reliance upon criminal elements became even more obvious, 
as Kulyabi units incorporated into the new security and police forces engaged in continued 
victimisation of Gharmi and Pamiri populations. Another vector of dispersed participation in 
the conflict emerged with the arrival of foreign jihadist fighters, who joined the opposition 
campaign with few obstacles. This heavy concentration of criminal militias and foreign jihadists 
echoes the Bosnian conflict, although the latter featured large conventional forces in addition 
to paramilitaries. In both conflicts, however, key leaders utilised criminals in small armed 
forces to terrorise, expel and kill civilians belonging to rival constituencies, in order to claim 
their territory and resources. 
 
In short, the dominance of civilian victimisation as a means of achieving strategic aims allowed 
the kind of militia-based warfare that could be waged by ordinary members of the population, 
not just proper military forces. The PFT drew heavily on criminal members of the population, 
enhancing the likelihood of further victimisation. The use of ordinary citizens instead of 
experienced military hands also diminished the possibility of discipline and central control of 
the militias, leaving largely autonomous bands to their own devices and decreasing the 
chances that incentives for restraint could be transmitted to them (as demonstrated most 
dramatically by the ethnic cleansing in Dushanbe in December 1992). This reliance on criminal 
militias greatly complicated the regime’s attempts to stabilise the country after its victory in 
Dushanbe, as they continued to target civilians not only in Dushanbe but throughout the 
southern and eastern regions.  
 
 
6.4  Territory and Resource Acquisition  
Whilst traditional insurgency theory encourages non-state actors to acquire control of 
resources and territory by obtaining the support of the local population – through the 
provision of protection, social services and ideological persuasion – in practice non-state 
armed groups often meet their logistical and spatial aims through violent coercion of the 
populace and outright theft.739 This predation entails considerable costs (as discussed in 
Chapter 5) but is often the only viable strategy for small and militarily weak forces. At the 
extreme end of territory and resource acquisition is ethnic cleansing, or the use of violence to 
displace a targeted population. When successful, ‘cleansing’ operations drastically reshape the 
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operational environment, allowing conflict actors to accrue territory without engaging in 
conventional warfare.740  
 
In Tajikistan, the PFT was able to acquire control over significant amounts of territory and 
resources via civilian victimisation. First, during Phase I, the PFT gradually claimed more and 
more territory by attacking kolkhozy and towns and displacing civilians, culminating in their 
successful campaign against Dushanbe in late 1992. Interestingly, and unlike many conflicts in 
which the gains of ethnic cleansing are not relinquished, the regime eventually allowed the 
return of displaced populations, although refugees continued to be victimised for a long time 
and some Gharmi villages – for example, around the Turkmenistan kolkhoz – remain Kulyabi to 
this day. Even with the return of refugees, however, the territories acquired during the war 
remained definitively under Kulyabi control, with official and bureaucratic structures filled with 
men loyal to the regime.  
 
PFT militias also claimed a significant portion of their resources during Phase I through civilian 
victimisation – not only the food, money and other goods needed to support their military 
activities, but relief aid for their constituencies in the blockaded and starving Kulyab region.741 
Until they started receiving more aid from Uzbekistan and corrupt Russian soldiers in the late 
summer of 1992, civilian victimisation was virtually the only means of support available to PFT 
militias. 
 
During Phase II, civilian victimisation also aided the PFT acquisition of land and resources – but 
in a different way, as PFT members were now scattered throughout the security forces, local 
administrations and criminal gangs. Ethnic cleansing through mass displacement was no longer 
an available strategy: refugee resettlement was the official order of the day, although refugees 
still represented a vulnerable population to exploit. Instead, former PFT members used more 
atomised violence (such as extortion and kidnapping) to coerce and harm civilians for the 
purpose of acquiring more wealth and/or control over a given ‘turf’. The aims of acquisition no 
longer included the support of war-fighting militias, but focused on personal enrichment. 
Nevertheless, civilian victimisation remained a prime vehicle for the pursuit of this aim. 
 
6.5.  Legitimacy 
The relationship between civilian victimisation and the legitimacy of an actor who engages in it 
is a complicated one. Legitimacy is a key concept in intrastate warfare, especially in insurgency 
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scenarios where both state and non-state actors aim to diminish the other’s legitimacy 
amongst the population. Whilst it is important to note that legitimacy is not necessary to 
maintain a presence in a conflict zone (as seen in the persistence of AQI long after the vast 
majority of Iraqis turned against it), a lack of legitimacy can nevertheless cripple the 
effectiveness of a non-state actor due to its dependence on the general population for 
resources, sanctuary and information. An armed force with little or no legitimacy will not be 
able to obtain these inputs through persuasion, and will have to resort to coercion and/or 
criminality. This generally diminishes its moral authority and presents further obstacles to the 
achievement of its political aims. The FARC, for example, apparently lost a measure of 
legitimacy when some of its leaders became more deeply involved in the drugs trade, and as a 
result the Colombian government could treat the group increasingly as an illegitimate criminal 
actor rather than as a representative insurgent actor worthy of a negotiated settlement.742 The 
failure of foreign jihadist forces to achieve their political aims in a variety of conflict settings 
can also be partly attributed to their inability to achieve local legitimacy.743 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, however, there are ways for non-state armed forces to maintain a sense 
of legitimacy even whilst engaging in victimisation. The PFT managed to preserve a certain 
amount of legitimacy via the protection of their own constituencies and by primarily targeting 
civilians belonging to groups who had been successfully demonised and portrayed as hostile 
and threatening. A frequent theme in accounts of victimisation is that whatever transgressions 
may have been committed by the PFT, the acts of their enemies were far worse (hence 
bestowing a sort of relative legitimacy upon the PFT). For example, the Uzbek chairman of a 
kolkhoz in Kurgan-Tyube stated: 
 
The opposition plunged Urghuts [Uzbeks] into misery. Eighty per cent of 
their houses were burnt. I buried thirty of the massacred myself, including 
women and children… Cruelty has possessed the people. We are also 





Safarov himself deflected questions on the activities of his militias by invoking the horrors of 
atrocities committed by the opposition: 
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‘Where were you when the pseudo-Islamists shot women and children from 
atop an armoured personnel carrier? Where were you when they dumped 
bodies to be eaten by dogs? They burned everything, they stopped at 
nothing. Strong men would weep if they saw what I have had to see. Such 
crimes can never be forgotten’. His followers in the audience echoed a 
refrain with overflowing emotion: ‘They skinned… They burned… The 
children, the women…’ At the end there were no clear answers [on his 




The demonisation of the Gharmis did not end with the cessation of intense war-fighting in late 
1992; in his first New Year’s message to the Tajik population, President Rahmonov blamed the 
war on democratic and Islamic extremists and declared, ‘I must say that history will never 
pardon the guilty, and those who are guilty before it should receive their punishment’.746 
Statements such as these helped set the stage for continued victimisation during Phase II of 
the war, as the judgment was perpetuated that victimisation by the opposition was illegitimate 
and rendered Gharmis fair game for retaliatory justice (whilst such victimisation by the PFT 
and its constituents was merely self-defence). Thus, the use of victimisation by conflict actors 
can play a key role in establishing normative reputations with respect to legitimacy, which in 
turn can generate further victimisation as actors deemed ‘guilty’ are targeted for retribution. 
 
Another complex aspect of the relationship between victimisation and legitimacy is the fact 
that the very existence of conflict may lend a degree of legitimacy to actions that would 
otherwise be illegitimate.747 As discussed in Chapter 5, an entire range of normative processes 
exist to transform murder into justifiable killing in wartime, and the emergence of a war 
economy legitimises economic activity that would normally be considered illicit (particularly 
with respect to the ‘coping economy’ that sustains civilians). The PFT represents a good 
example of this dynamic: Sangak Safarov evolved from a regional mafia boss to national hero, 
despite remarkable continuity in his criminal and transgressive behaviour.  
  
In intrastate warfare with significant levels of civilian victimisation, often none of the 
participant forces has any real legitimacy in the eyes of the population. This creates an 
environment in which civilians respond to threats of violence without any real political or 
emotional preference for any one side; they are merely trying to survive, and become 
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dissociated from any purported political causes driving the conflict.748 Thus, one possible effect 
of extensive civilian targeting on the dynamics of intrastate warfare is to de-politicise the 
conflict for much of the population. This was true to a certain extent in Tajikistan, where even 
in the intense first year of the war, a sense prevailed that the majority of the civilian 
population favoured an end to the fighting above the triumph of their putative ‘side’. Deputy 
Premier Jamshed Karimov remained hopeful regarding the chances of a cease-fire as ‘95% of 
the population of both oblasts was in favour of stopping the bloodshed’.749 Nurali Kurbanov, 
while lamenting civilian deaths in Kurgan-Tyube, also stated: 
 
We do not want to blame the people of Kulyab. The population of Kulyab, at 
large, support peace and want peace. However, those groups who are well 
known to all of us, their leaders being Sangak Safarov, Langari Languriyev, 
and others…were all involved in the bloodshed. The like of all this bloodshed 




However, despite a certain amount of de-politicisation, the realities of widespread 
victimisation meant that over time armed groups managed to retain a certain amount of 
legitimacy amongst their constituencies, due to the complex dynamics of victimisation and 
protection that are typical of intrastate war dominated by absolutist targeting. In a conflict 
where civilians are targeted on the basis of some innate characteristic, rather than their 
behaviour, they must place their hopes for survival with the armed groups protecting their 
communities. Thus, whatever atrocities they may perpetrate, they still gain some amount of 
legitimacy within their constituency on the basis of their civilian protection activities.751 It is 
this dynamic that renders a good amount of insurgency theory and analysis invalid for conflicts 
like Tajikistan, where perpetrators were also protectors and thus did not automatically lose all 
legitimacy even with the transgressive atrocities they committed.  
 
In sum, legitimacy cannot be considered solely through the prism of civilian victimisation. It 
must also be considered via an examination of its counterpart, civilian protection. The ability of 
the PFT to preserve any legitimacy at all, after a campaign of atrocities against vulnerable 
civilians, is inexplicable unless one considers the normative processes affecting Tajiks’ 
perceptions of violence and the positive consequences of selective protection efforts. 
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6.6  Conclusion: Did Civilian Victimisation Help or Hurt the Popular Front? 
This consideration of the impact of civilian victimisation on conflict dynamics naturally leads to 
the question of strategic outcomes – in short, whether the use of victimisation by the PFT 
affected the conflict in ways that were beneficial to the achievement of their aims. Much of 
the literature on intrastate war that addresses civilian victimisation, perhaps unduly influenced 
by traditional insurgency theory, presumes that it is counterproductive for non-state actors.752 
On the other hand, there appears to be a growing acknowledgment within the literature on 
the political economy of conflict that for many groups, ‘violence represents not a problem but 
a solution’, a claim supported by a growing number of case studies.753 But what does the Tajik 
case study reveal? 
 
I argue that for Phase I of the conflict, civilian victimisation was a necessary but not sufficient 
factor in the Kulyabi victory. It was necessary in that there is virtually no other means by which 
the PFT could have conducted or won the war, given its minimal capabilities and the strategic 
environment in which it was operating. However, when faced with an opposing non-state 
actor that also engaged in civilian victimisation, the result was stalemate throughout the 
summer of 1992. Each side attacked the other but could not gain a decisive upper hand. 
 
The key ingredient that changed this equation was the increase in material capacity and 
resources that the PFT obtained in the late summer of 1992 thanks to support from actors in 
Uzbekistan and the Russian military. The acquisition of tanks and other weaponry, as well as 
space on Uzbek territory, gave the PFT an upper hand in Kurgan-Tyube and the contest for 
Dushanbe. Thus, whilst I argue that civilian victimisation was the foundation of the PFT victory, 
it is likely that on its own it may not have been sufficient to overcome the opposition. 
 
In Phase II of the conflict, it does not appear that civilian victimisation had much utility in the 
ongoing struggle against the UTO. No longer fighting in the flat lowlands of southern Tajikistan, 
but in the inaccessible mountains of eastern Tajikistan, the regime had less freedom of 
manoeuvre. It could and did create new flows of refugees whenever it conducted 
counteroffensives eastward, but this was less helpful in a scenario where the aim was not to 
acquire territory but to stabilise and normalise the local situation. The abuse of civilians by 
security forces only helped to maintain local allegiance to Gharmi militias instead of the central 
government. Thus, within the arena of a government counterinsurgency campaign in eastern 
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Tajikistan, victimisation of Gharmis by former PFT militiamen could be considered 
counterproductive in that it did not advance strategic aims. However, it is likely that the 
regime could not have achieved those aims even if it did not engage in victimisation during this 
phase of the war, due to the unforgiving terrain and ongoing Gharmi hostility it had 
engendered with its predations during Phase I. The fact that the UTO was not strong enough to 
take advantage of the vulnerabilities created by such victimisation also helped neutralise the 
disadvantage to the government. Finally, a lack of regard for civilians eased the burden of 
distinction in government military operations, enabling the regime to send ill-trained and 
criminalised troops to the frontlines and still achieve a measure of success. 
 
In the realm of the broader victimisation of the civilian population – i.e., criminality, corruption 
and the abuse of refugees – civilian victimisation continued to be an instrumental and 
productive endeavour for former PFT members. At the governmental level, victimisation 
allowed officials to stay in office, accumulate wealth and create personal patronage networks 
and fiefdoms. Outside the official sphere, victimisation allowed groups to acquire the goods 
and resources necessary for survival or for personal enrichment. Thus, I argue that overall, 
civilian victimisation continued to be beneficial for PFT members during Phase II, in that it 
actively advanced their aims or at the worst did not overly impede them. 
 
In short, a strategic environment of near-anarchy and security privatisation, coupled with 
individual aims of personal survival, power accumulation and material acquisition, generated a 
strong actor preference for (or at least, tolerance of) civilian victimisation strategies. Such 
strategies were easily implemented given the status of former PFT commanders and members 
following their victory in 1992, the easy availability of weapons and illicit funding via the drugs 
trade, and the lack of protection for the civilian population. Overall, the outcomes of PFT 
civilian victimisation were largely positive relative to their aims: not only did it aid them 
militarily and enable them to win the war, but many former PFT members gained substantial 
amounts of wealth and power and the Rahmonov regime itself has stayed in power for twenty 
years. In this sense, therefore, the PFT represents a case study of ‘successful’ civilian 
victimisation. However, as the next chapter will show, the strategic outcomes for the Tajik 




THE LONG-TERM STRATEGIC OUTCOMES OF  
CIVILIAN VICTIMISATION DURING THE TAJIK CIVIL WAR 
 
 
At the formal end of the civil war in 1997, peace and security in Tajikistan appeared fragile 
indeed. Five years of conflict had devastated the Tajik economy as well as the state’s ability to 
provide even the most basic services to the population. Criminal networks threaded the 
countryside and corrupt politicians prioritised their own interests over national needs. 
Tajikistan became a virtual open gate for the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan, and the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and recalcitrant warlords operated from bases within 
its territory. Attempts to address these problems were hampered by continued regional 
tensions and an authoritarian and nepotistic regime. Few expected President Rahmonov to 
stay in power for any considerable length of time. 
 
Many of the same problems continued to afflict the country as of 2013, seemingly 
demonstrating that state weakness may come to possess its own form of stability. Rahmonov, 
somewhat astoundingly, has maintained his presidency (via regular, if questionable, elections) 
and continued its authoritarian bent with few domestic political challengers. (Like many Tajiks, 
he ‘de-Russified’ his name in the postwar era, and is referred to as President Rahmon for the 
remainder of this dissertation.) The economy, whilst improved from its low ebb in the mid-
1990s, remains overly dependent on a vast flow of remittances from Tajik labour migrants as 
well as the illicit proceeds of narco-trafficking and other criminal enterprises. Lawlessness has 
subsided whilst corruption and organised crime have become solidly embedded in the political 
and economic infrastructure. The near-elimination of the IMU and cooptation of local warlords 
reduced the non-state threat to the state for many years, but recent incidents point to a 
possible regeneration of militant activity. In short, whilst the severity and specific nature of 
particular threats has fluctuated over the years, there is a general consistency in the types of 
threats facing Tajikistan in its postwar era. 
 
This chapter addresses the final element of the central research question: what were the long-
term strategic effects of civilian victimisation? It considers the postwar security threats to 
Tajikistan within three overarching categories – external threats; internal threats/non-state; 
and internal threats/societal – and evaluates whether civilian victimisation during the Tajik civil 
war affected the nation’s longer-term security challenges. The chapter concludes by briefly 
considering the effects of civilian victimisation on the potential for future conflict in Tajikistan. 
 199 
 
The central finding of this chapter is that evaluations of the impact of victimisation vary 
immensely depending on how one interprets the concept of ‘security threat’. Within the fields 
of international relations and strategic studies, ‘security threats’ have traditionally been 
limited to threats to and from sovereign states (a tendency that continues to dominate realist 
schools of thought). The end of the Cold War, however, yielded an expanded consideration of 
threats, as new conflicts and political violence were perceived to be driven by non-state actors 
and to derive from more amorphous political and socioeconomic forces.754 ‘Instability’ itself 
came to be seen as a threat, not merely a condition, thus greatly expanding the universe of 
factors thought to potentially impact state security. The globalisation of trade, transport, 
finance and communications also created new types and locales of challenges, and 
‘transnational threats’ such as narco-terrorism and organised crime were increasingly 
enshrined as national security threats by Western states.755 Finally, the emerging concept of 
‘human security’ – comprising not just an absence of conflict but political and economic 
security for a state’s citizens – led to an increased emphasis on the ‘security-development 
nexus’ and a further expansion of the universe of threatening variables.756   
 
All of these processes were accelerated by the 11 September 2001 attacks and the US-led War 
on Terror, which elevated non-state actor threats to a paradigmatic level and reoriented 
international security cooperation, operations and norms. Failed and failing states were 
perceived as pre-eminent threats, not only for their ability to generate regional disorder and 
humanitarian catastrophe, but because of the potential use of ‘ungoverned spaces’ and zones 
of instability by transnational terrorists and criminal networks.757  
 
Much effort has been expended in recent decades on the crafting of typologies and 
frameworks for analysis of contemporary security threats. For the purposes of this relatively 
brief discussion, and considering the relative isolation and weakness of the Tajik state, I have 
grouped the security threats to Tajikistan into three categories. First, external threats refer to 
foreign state and non-state actors whose actions negatively impact (or potentially negatively 
impact) the safety and security of the Tajik state and its population. Internal threats/non-state 
include the terrorist, extremist and criminal non-state actors operating within Tajikistan, which 
threaten the government’s monopoly on force and victimise the civilian population. Internal 
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threats/societal refer to developments in the political and socioeconomic spheres that create 
vulnerabilities to non-state actor attacks and/or state collapse. This presentation thus captures 
the evolving definition of security threats as well as the full range of potentially damaging 
actors and forces confronting Tajikistan. 
 
 
7.1  External Security Threats 
Leaving aside the interminable Afghan war to the south, Tajikistan is fortunate to be 
ensconced in a region that has been free from major conventional conflicts for many decades. 
There is also a certain level of regional security harmonisation, both in terms of threat 
perception and preferred strategic responses, due to shared Soviet legacies and similar 
authoritarian tendencies. This has facilitated a number of regional initiatives – such as the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation – and the spread of larger international security 
frameworks such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace, all of which Tajikistan has joined.758 These multilateral organisations focus heavily on 
non-state-actor threats, including terrorism and narco-trafficking, as well as on improving 
inter-state cooperation in the security and economic arenas. Within this multilateral 
cooperation, however, differences persist amongst the Central Asian republics on a number of 
issues, including relations with Russia and the United States and domestic approaches to 
Islamist groups.759 
 
More important, this regional collaboration should not obscure a number of security threats 
that have emanated from Tajikistan’s neighbours and partners. Whilst these have proven 
containable and more ‘potential’ than ‘actual’ in the postwar era, the persistence of their 
underlying drivers means that Tajikistan cannot yet discount the possibility that they may 
spark significant political violence or instability.760 This is especially true with regards to 
Afghanistan, whose future remains uncertain given the upcoming US/NATO drawdown of 
forces. 
 
Another source of unpredictability and potential volatility is the Ferghana Valley, commonly 
referred to as the ‘tinderbox’ of Central Asia. Analysts have been predicting its eventual 
explosion into violence since the breakup of the USSR, due to its unpopular border 
delimitations; its high population density and communal competition for land, water and 
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livelihoods; its high religiosity and its role as a crucible for Islamic extremists, such as the 
founders of the IMU; and its centrality to the region’s enormous narco-trafficking and other 
illicit flows.761 Nevertheless, whilst there have been ongoing low-grade confrontations 
between communities as well as occasional large-scale episodes of violence (notably in Osh, 
where clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek residents killed hundreds in both 1990 and 2010), 
Ferghana continues to simmer along without full-scale conflict erupting. The absence of 
solutions to its potential conflict triggers, however, keep it under consideration as a potential 
flashpoint. 
 
The following sections consider the state and non-state security threats associated with 
Tajikistan’s neighbours and international partners. 
 
 
7.1.1  Uzbekistan 
Since independence, Uzbekistan has posed the greatest state-level security threat to the Tajik 
state (keeping in mind that the considerable threats emanating from Afghanistan are non-state 
in nature). During the civil war, Uzbekistan aided and armed the pro-communist faction that 
succeeding in driving the opposition from Dushanbe. Dissatisfied with the peace settlement, 
which excluded the Uzbek factions in Tajikistan and installed Islamists within the government 
and security forces, and fearing the contagion effects of Tajik state weakness, Uzbekistan 
continued to violate Tajik sovereignty and use blockade-style tactics as a form of political 
coercion.762  
 
The most overt acts committed by Uzbekistan occurred in response to IMU incursions into 
Ferghana from Tajik territory in 1999-2000 (described in more detail in Section 7.2.1). 
Following the first incursion, Uzbekistan bombed several villages in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.763 Several thousand Tajik residents of Uzbekistan were also expelled, accused of 
aiding the invading forces.764 In 2000, Uzbekistan placed landmines along the Tajik-Uzbek 
border. The mines were often placed on disputed or Tajik territory; dozens of civilians have 
been killed.765 (It should be noted that the residents of central and eastern Tajikistan also 
continue to suffer from landmines and unexploded ordinance from the civil war era, with more 
than 800 killed or wounded countrywide.766) Uzbekistan’s response to the IMU incursions was 
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perhaps ironic given that only recently, in 1998, Colonel Khudoberdyev had utilised Uzbek 
territory as a base for his unsuccessful invasion of Leninabad (as discussed below). Uzbek 
support for Khudoberdyev and other potentially subversive Uzbek actors in Tajikistan created 
lingering distrust within the Tajik regime. 
 
Uzbekistan has also at times taken political advantage of its ability to apply a stranglehold to 
Tajik imports and the movement of peoples. As a result of Soviet transport infrastructure 
decisions, the only rail links into Tajikistan traverse Uzbek territory and can be easily shut 
down (as they were for months after a mysterious railway explosion in Uzbekistan in 
November 2011; Uzbekistan attributed the blast to terrorists but it was more likely an act of 
political sabotage by the regime767). Until the recent completion of a road under the Zarafshan 
mountains, traffic between central and northern Tajikistan had to go through Uzbekistan 
during the winter months, leaving Tajiks vulnerable to harassment and extortion at Uzbek 
border posts.768 In addition, Tajikistan remains dependent upon Uzbek natural gas imports for 
its energy needs. On a number of occasions, Uzbekistan has simply shut off energy supplies or 
shut down transport routes as a means of applying political pressure on the Tajik regime.769 (It 
has come under heavy criticism for doing so, given the dire effects of such actions on the 
already impoverished Tajik population.) These Uzbek blockades have been instituted for a 
variety of political reasons, most recently in response to Tajik plans to build an enormous 
hydroelectric plant at Roghun, which Uzbekistan claims would severely impact its own water 
resources (critical for maintaining its all-important cotton industry). 
 
There is also a non-state threat emanating from Uzbekistan, in the form of jihadists and other 
activists expelled or fleeing the state and settling in Tajikistan.770 Such flows have tended to 
occur after significant acts of violence in Uzbekistan, such as the Tashkent bombings in 
February 1999 and the Andijan massacre of 2005, both of which the Karimov regime blamed 
on Islamist terrorists. Uzbek jihadists bear no love for the Tajik regime either, and as discussed 
below their presence in Tajikistan constitutes the main terrorist threat in the country.  
 
 
7.1.2  Kyrgyzstan 
There have been no significant state-level threats from Kyrgyzstan in the postwar era, and this 
seems likely to continue. Kyrgyzstan possesses many of the same domestic challenges as 
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Tajikistan – poverty, corruption, organised crime, a growing militant problem – with the added 
worry of serious communitarian conflict (as demonstrated in Osh in 2010) and relative 
volatility in the regime (there have been two ‘revolutions’ in the past seven years).771 Thus, the 
Kyrgyz regime has neither the incentive nor the capacity to seriously threaten Tajikistan at the 
present time.  
 
Tensions do flare occasionally between the two states, however, generally in response to 
localised cross-border disputes in the Ferghana region over access to resources and other 
issues.772 In 2003, tensions over the installation of border regimes by both sides turned to 
violence, with the destruction of one Tajik and one Kyrgyz border post.773 In 2008, Tajik police 
and residents from the Isfara region crossed the border in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken region and tried 
to destroy a dam on the Aksay River that had reduced water supplies to their farms, 
generating a mini-crisis.774 More recently, there have been small-scale clashes amongst Tajik 
and Kyrgyz villages over land ownership and water for agriculture.775  None of these disputes 
are likely to disappear as long as borders remain poorly demarcated and the infrastructure 
that could support expanding populations remains unbuilt. 
 
 
7.1.3  Afghanistan 
With the end of its civil war in 1997, Tajikistan once again became a conduit for aid to 
Afghanistan; this time, however, it was not the Soviets resupplying their army units but the 
Russians funnelling assistance to the beleaguered Northern Alliance (which also operated 
bases on Tajik territory).776 Tajik militants and refugees in northern Afghanistan had been 
mostly repatriated: the UTO no longer needed them in Afghanistan to support an insurgency, 
but in Tajikistan to provide a domestic base of political support.777 (The advance of the Taliban 
and improving conditions back home also helped incentivise refugees to return.) The tangling 
of the Tajik and Afghan civil wars was gradually winding down, although the personal and illicit 
networks forged between 1992 and 1997 remained. 
 
The Taliban regime that governed most of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 did not pose a 
conventional military threat to Tajikistan, but its campaign against the Northern Alliance and 
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oppressive rule generated consistent cross-border fears of massive refugee flows and other 
spillover effects from conflict and instability.778 The opium trade, with all its regional and global 
ill effects, continued to become deeply embedded within the Afghan war economy and 
broader society (a temporary Taliban ban on cultivation – the reasons for which remain 
debated – did little to halt exports, thanks to massive stockpiles).779 In addition, the Taliban 
hosted the IMU, which had not given up its mandate of toppling Central Asian regimes. 
 
With the US-led campaign in Afghanistan in 2001, both of these concerns were lifted. The IMU 
appeared to have been virtually destroyed, and the Northern Alliance victory seemed to 
promise stability in northern Afghanistan. The new Karzai regime had no particular reason to 
threaten its northern neighbours. Whilst this absence of state-level threats remains, at least 
for the immediate future, Afghanistan’s post-2002 descent into renewed war and instability 
has posed a number of non-state security threats for Tajikistan. According to President 
Rahmon, the primary threats emanating from Afghanistan are terrorism, Islamic extremism, 
narco-trafficking, arms smuggling and illegal migration.780 These non-state threats are 
discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
 
Depending on the turn of events following the US/NATO drawdown, Afghanistan could 
become an even greater source of security challenges for Tajikistan. It already hosts a 
rejuvenated IMU and other militant groups, and a new regime might halt anti-trafficking 
efforts and/or spur a new flood of refugees (as noted by UNHCR, ‘The situation in Afghanistan 
always carries a risk of influx of Afghan refugees in Tajikistan’).781 
 
 
7.1.4  Russia and the United States 
Since independence, Tajikistan has essentially outsourced the protection of its security and 
sovereignty, first to Russia, and then increasingly after 9/11 to the United States and Europe, 
who required a stable Tajikistan in support of their operations in Afghanistan and also finally 
perceived a threat to their own interests arising from the Central Asian drugs trade and 
terrorist movements.782 Russian, American and European military and economic assistance has 
proved vital for the defence of Tajik borders, the development of security forces and improved 
capacity in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. It has also, however, created a serious 
dependence on foreign support that leaves Tajikistan vulnerable in the event of its removal. As 
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noted above, there are serious concerns as to what will happen when US and ISAF forces draw 
down in Afghanistan. 
  
With respect to Russia, there is an additional security threat that is somewhat more indirect. 
As will be discussed below, a prime driver of stability in Tajikistan at the present time is the 
fact that hundreds of thousands of Tajiks – many of them young men – live as labour migrants 
in Russia. This relieves pressure on the regime to provide for a huge tranche of the population 
whilst also removing from the country that segment of society most likely to provoke political 
unrest and violence. In recent years, however, Russia has increasingly regulated and limited 
migrant levels, and the economic downturn has led to calls for a radical reduction in migrant 
labour. The general consensus is that this could be catastrophic for Tajikistan; it is considered 
one of the few shocks that could indeed lead to renewed political violence or even regime 
collapse.783 
 
In sum, Tajikistan faces an array of security threats emanating from its neighbours and key 
patrons that has thus far proven containable yet unpredictable and volatile. It should be noted 
that Tajikistan would face additional potential security threats in the event of an outbreak of 
serious regional conflict, given its vulnerability to cross-border violence and destabilising flows 
of arms, drugs, militants and refugees. 
 
 
7.2  Internal Threats: Non-State 
The threat assessments embedded in the literature on postwar Tajikistan are striking in their 
overwhelming concentration on internal actors and near-exclusion of conventional state 
threats.784 Akiner, for example, argues that the primary threats to Tajik peace and security are 
narco-trafficking, the criminalisation of politics and society, and chronic poverty.785 The Tajik 
government tends to emphasise its vulnerability to terrorism and narco-trafficking – 
coincidentally (or, likely, not) the two areas in which it is most likely to receive Western 
security assistance and aid.786 In short, the Tajik emphasis on internal threats is a function not 
only of its relatively non-belligerent neighbours, but its internal weakness and participation in 
international markets for foreign aid.787 This section highlights the internal threats stemming 
from non-state actors, whilst Section 7.3 will detail the domestic trends and conditions that 
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also threaten Tajik security. 
 
The Tajik civil war, coming so close on the heels of the disintegration of the Soviet empire, led 
to the emergence of a broad range of non-state actors who posed varied challenges to state 
authority and differing levels of harm to the civilian population. The postwar DDR 
[demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration] process was hailed as a pragmatic 
recognition of facts on the ground: the wholesale incorporation of non-state militias into 
government security forces essentially prioritised reintegration over disarmament, and led to a 
relatively swift demobilisation of illegal armed groups (by 2000, nearly 7,000 opposition militia 
had been demobilised, with about 5,000 of them joining government security forces).788 As a 
result, the Tajik case is often presented as an unorthodox yet successful example of DDR.789 
There are two problems with this interpretation, however: first, there were a number of field 
commanders and militiamen who rejected the peace deal and reintegration; and second, the 
incorporation of heavily criminalised militias into state forces served to embed corruption 
within Tajik state structures and further empower criminal actors.790 As this chapter will show, 
the regime dealt reasonably well with the first challenge for a number of years, whilst largely 
neglecting to address the second in any substantive way. 
 
In the postwar era, Tajikistan has confronted a terrorist threat from the IMU and its probable 
splinter groups, localised security threats from non-coopted field commanders and minor 
warlords, and the expansion of narco-trafficking and organised crime networks. Occasionally, 
these threats converged, as in the case of the former opposition commander and local warlord 
Mullo Abdullo, who also enjoyed connections to the IMU and narco-traffickers.  
 
A review of contemporary reportage and analysis reveals some general trends with respect to 
the intensity of non-state-actor threats.791 In the five years after the peace agreement, 
strategies of co-optation and DDR considerably reduced the number of non-state actors and 
improved government control and authority (with the notable exception of eastern 
Tajikistan).792 By 2002, most warlords and terrorists had been neutralised as potential 
challengers to state authority, and the following few years were relatively quiet. By 2006, 
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however, sporadic violence in Ferghana was being attributed to IMU militants, and by 2008 
both foreign militants and local warlords were active once again in the Rasht (Karategin) 
Valley. September 2010 saw the first suicide bombing in Tajikistan as well as armed clashes in 
Rasht, and there are fears that spiralling violence and a resurgent IMU in northern Afghanistan 
will pose an increasing security challenge in eastern Tajikistan. This resurgence of armed 
violence in recent years has dampened somewhat the more optimistic assessments of Tajik 
security that emerged in the early 2000s.  
 
This section groups the universe of non-state actors in postwar Tajikistan into five categories, 
and considers each in turn: 1) Terrorist groups; 2) Islamist extremists; 3) Local warlords; 4) 
Narco-trafficking; 5) Organised crime. (Note that whilst narco-trafficking is itself a form of 
organised crime, its outsized impact on Tajikistan warrants its consideration as a separate 
category.) In doing so, it copes once again with the challenge of ascertaining whether violence 
is ‘criminal’ or ‘political’, given the essential hybrid nature of most non-state groups in postwar 
Tajikistan. (Indeed, Makarenko lists Tajikistan as one of her ‘black hole states’ that pose the 
greatest international security threat amongst the actors on her ‘crime-terror continuum’: a 
weak or failing state that permits freedom of action to hybrid criminal-political actors.793) 
Given the hybrid nature of not only non-state actors but the heavily corrupt Tajik regime itself, 
however, pinpointing whether armed violence is criminally or politically motivated is less 




7.2.1  Terrorist Groups: The IMU 
The terrorist threat in Tajikistan is primarily represented by the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) and its various permutations and splinter groups, which were incubated in 
eastern Tajikistan during the civil war. At that time, the Islamist opposition in Tajikistan 
advocated more limited aims than salafi-jihadists in other parts of the Islamic world. In part 
this reflected the moderate, Hanafi and Sufi Islam traditionally practiced in Tajikistan and the 
limits of external Wahhabi/Deobandi fundamentalist influences; it could also be traced to the 
Soviet legacy and the obstacles to establishing a strict Islamic order in the face of popular 
hostility to the concept.  Nevertheless, their cause attracted salafi-jihadists from other parts of 
Central Asia and the Muslim world, whose presence amongst the Tajik opposition began to be 
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noted in the summer of 1993 and was eventually confirmed by IRP leader Himmatzoda.794 In a 
pattern seen in other conflict zones, such as Bosnia, the IRP accepted their help out of 
necessity even when disagreeing with their ideology and their rigid interpretations of Islam.  
 
By most accounts, IRP members felt particularly alienated from the Arab mujahidin who 
migrated to the area after being forced to leave Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1993.795 They had 
little in common, and the Arab militants reportedly engaged in more brutal behaviour toward 
both combatants and civilians than the IRP militants approved of.796 This civilian victimisation 
crippled the Arabs’ war effort by preventing effective cohesion and coordination with their 
native hosts. They tended not to stay long, however, as the cool welcome they received and 
the outbreak of war in Bosnia and later Chechnya drew them away.797 (One such militant was 
the notorious jihadist commander Ibn Al-Khattab, a Saudi veteran of the Afghan war who 
fought with the Tajik opposition before commanding the Arab mujahidin in Chechnya. A 
former aide to Nuri said he was ‘quickly encouraged to move on’.798) Thus, the experience of 
Arab jihadists in Tajikistan conforms to that in other conflict zones, such as Bosnia and Iraq: 
civilian victimisation contributed to their strategic failure by alienating them from local civilians 
and combatants and impeding their coordination with other groups.799 
 
Salafi-jihadists from the Uzbek districts of the Ferghana Valley, however, established a much 
more lingering presence. As noted by Zviagelskaya, ‘In contrast to their Tajik brethren the 
Ferghana Islamists fully deserved the name of fundamentalists’.800 In 1992-1993, the Uzbek 
regime expelled and arrested hundreds of jihadist activists and foreign missionaries from its 
Ferghana districts, partly with the justification that such actions were necessary to prevent the 
sort of communitarian violence that had overwhelmed Tajikistan.801 As their exile coincided 
with the beginning of the Tajik conflict, many of the Uzbek jihadists migrated to Tajikistan and 
northern Afghanistan and fought with the UTO, including Tahir Yuldashev and Jumaboi 
Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (aka Juma Namangani). The Uzbek jihadists contributed significantly 
to UTO operations, but tensions between the groups remained. The Uzbeks, rigid and 
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uncompromising, did not approve of IRP negotiations with the Tajik regime. Later, Yuldashev 
and Namangani grew closer to the Taliban, the arch-enemies of the UTO’s main patron in 
northern Afghanistan, Ahmed Shah Massoud. With the signing of peace accords in Tajikistan in 
1997, Yuldashev, Namangani and many other Uzbek jihadists split from the UTO coalition.  
 
Despite their ‘irreconcilable’ status, and the utter hostility they evoked from the regimes in 
Dushanbe and Tashkent, the Uzbek jihadists managed to retain operational bases in eastern 
Tajikistan, thanks largely to their wartime connections to Mirzo Ziyoyev, the powerful former 
UTO field commander who became ‘Minister of Emergencies’ after the war. Reportedly, under 
his protection, the Uzbek jihadists used these mountain training camps as bases for their 
incursions and attacks into neighbouring countries.802 
 
In 1998, Yuldashev and Namangani officially formed the IMU, with the goal of toppling the 
Karimov regime and establishing an Islamic state in the Ferghana Valley. Their first major 
military operation occurred in August 1999, when a group of several dozen militants infiltrated 
the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan and – over the course of several weeks – seized several small 
mountainous posts and a number of Kyrgyz and foreign hostages.803 Whilst the militants 
initially demanded the release of political prisoners in Uzbekistan, their receipt of large ransom 
payments (including $2-5 million from the Japanese government) has led to speculation 
regarding the strength of their pecuniary motives. After releasing the hostages, the militants 
returned to Tajikistan, where even their connections to Ziyoyev could no longer shield them 
from the combined wrath of Dushanbe and Tashkent. Namangani and his fellow militants were 
hastily airlifted on Russian Army helicopters to northern Afghanistan, where they spent the 
winter. In 2000, however, Namangani returned to eastern Tajikistan with several hundred 
men. Yet again in August, he launched a second incursion into Ferghana, this time crossing into 
Kyrgyzstan and then attempting to infiltrate Uzbek territory, before being repulsed by Uzbek 
army units. Again, Namangani and his men were airlifted to northern Afghanistan, where this 
time they stayed. 
 
The incursions of 1999 and 2000 brought enormous attention to the IMU and its cause, but 
were strategically puzzling. To this day, analysts disagree on why the IMU pursued such a 
course of action. One theory is that they served some purpose in facilitating the IMU’s control 
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of the narcotics trade in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.804 Accounts supportive of this theory 
invariably note that the IMU controlled 70 per cent of the narcotics trade into Kyrgyzstan, 
despite the fact that there is no data to support this assertion other than a singular comment 
made by one Kyrgyz counternarcotics official.805 Whilst it is likely that the IMU were engaged 
to some extent in the narcotics trade, it is not clear how the incursions would have been useful 
for this endeavour, as they drew a phenomenal amount of attention and military personnel to 
an area that had previously been largely ignored and thus easily transited. Moreover, as noted 
by Crisis Group, if the IMU really had controlled such a large share of the drugs trade, they 
would have enjoyed extremely large revenue flows and thus would have undoubtedly been 
able to field a stronger and more capable force.806 More likely is the assessment of the UNODC, 
which considers the IMU and other armed groups to have a symbiotic relationship with locally 
based narco-traffickers – based on shared requirements for funds, arms, and covert cross-
border activity – but with organised crime figures reaping most of the profits of the trade.807 
 
Once in northern Afghanistan, the IMU became a key source of armed support for the Taliban 
regime in its ongoing efforts to eliminate the Northern Alliance.808  However, this brief success 
came to an end quickly, as the US/NATO campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in late 
2001 virtually eliminated the IMU as a group (and killed its most successful figure, Namangani). 
The small number of remaining IMU militants (including Yuldashev) relocated to Waziristan, in 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). These years in Pakistan are largely 
opaque, but it is believed that the IMU used its Al Qaeda/Taliban connections to maintain this 
sanctuary and gradually reconstitute itself, garnering new recruits as Central Asian regimes 
expelled Islamists who then migrated to FATA training camps. IMU militants participated in 
local armed clashes in South Waziristan, sometimes acting as mercenaries for Taliban and Al 
Qaeda groups, but Pakistani offensives against FATA militants in 2009 appear to have 
dispersed many of the IMU militants back into Afghanistan.809 
 
The IMU and its splinter groups remained the prime culprits of terrorist activity in Central Asia. 
In 2004, a supposed IMU splinter group claimed responsibility for several bombings in 
Uzbekistan. By 2006, there were reports of an IMU resurgence in Ferghana, and by 2009 it 
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appeared that the group was operating again in northern Afghanistan and eastern Tajikistan.810 
The Islamic Jihad Union, a radical splinter group, was blamed in 2009 for terrorist acts in 
Uzbekistan and terrorist plots in Germany. The first suicide bombing in Tajikistan, in Khujand in 
September 2010, was claimed by Jamaat Ansarullah, an apparent IMU splinter group. The Tajik 
government claimed to have intercepted and killed dozens of IMU infiltrators at its borders.811 
 
However, the precise nature of the IMU in its post-2001 incarnation – including its size and 
capacity and whether it is truly behind the violent acts attributed to it – remains extremely 
murky. As noted earlier, the Central Asian regimes have a sizable incentive to attribute non-
state armed violence to terrorists, obscuring the significant amount of violence engendered by 
domestic political or criminal rivals. At the same time, small and weak militant groups have an 
incentive to claim responsibility for violent acts and thus raise their profile. In short, there are 
structural conditions within the Tajik system that facilitate an exaggeration of the terrorist 
threat. To this must be added uncertainties stemming from the Afghan context, in which any 
non-Pashtuns fighting alongside the Taliban are labelled as IMU, further inflating IMU 
numbers.812 
 
It is clear, however, that militant jihadist groups are operating in Tajikistan and Central Asia, 
even if their size and capacity are unknowable at the present time. They do not pose an 
existential threat to the Tajik regime, despite the latter’s relatively weak security sector. 
Instead, the IMU and its splinter groups threaten the state in the manner that terrorist groups 
typically do: 1) they generate instability, which within the greater context of socioeconomic 
grievances can be exploited by regime opponents; and 2) they provoke the regime into overly 
harsh retaliation, thus legitimising the IMU narrative of tyranny and repression and facilitating 
an escalatory cycle of violence.813 The actual number of attacks and deaths attributable to 
Islamist terrorists in Tajikistan remains very small, and yet they have succeeded in being put at 
the front of the Tajik regime’s security agenda. 
 
As any number of analysts have pointed out, however, the persistence of the IMU in Tajikistan 
is ‘a symptom of instability rather than its cause’.814 In other words, whilst the IMU does 
contribute to domestic insecurity, the far more pertinent causality is that linking the country’s 
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political and economic instability – driven by repression, corruption and poverty – and the 
continued existence of terrorist groups. 
 
 
7.2.2  Islamic Extremists: Hizb-ut-Tahrir 
The IMU is not the only form of Islamic extremism of concern to the Tajik regime. In the 
postwar era, the Rahmon regime has increasingly targeted non-violent Islamist movements, 
demonstrating that it is concerned not only with violent behaviour but the fundamental 
ideologies of such groups. Having permitted the continued participation in politics of Central 
Asia’s only Islamist party – the IRP – the regime is unwilling to allow any further manifestations 
of Islamist political activism, and has increasingly monitored and restricted religious practices 
(for example, ordering the return of Tajik students from foreign madrassahs, installing 
surveillance cameras inside mosques, dictating sermon topics to imams, and closing mosques 
of concern).815 The Tajik population has not mounted serious resistance to these measures, in 
part because of a continued scepticism regarding Islamist politics (a pre-war tendency that was 
only exacerbated by the sectarian aspects of the civil war).816 
 
The regime’s prime target is Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), an international Islamist activist movement 
that began making inroads into Central Asia in the mid-1990s, particularly in Uzbekistan.817 
Founded in Jerusalem in the 1950s, HT utilises missionaries and an ideology of non-violent 
pursuit of socio-political change in the hopes of creating a new pan-Islamic caliphate 
throughout the modern Muslim world. A large part of its successful global transmission is the 
translation of this overarching goal into local contexts: in Central Asia, it focuses on toppling 
the existing autocratic regimes and creating an Islamic emirate in the region. In Tajikistan, its 
followers are drawn heavily from the Uzbek communities in the northern districts and around 
Dushanbe, in particular impoverished young men. The enduring poverty and deprivation in 
Tajikistan, juxtaposed against official corruption and openly flaunted ill-gotten wealth, have 
facilitated the emergence of grievances amongst the population and thus the appeal of 
ideologies promoting a sense of social justice.818 (Disenchantment with the IRP also fuels the 
attraction to HT amongst devout Tajiks.) Some suggest that the HT has additional appeal in 
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Tajikistan due to its message of non-violent struggle, given the enduring societal trauma 
created by the civil war.819 
 
Despite its supposed adherence to non-violence, HT is considered a major threat by the Tajik 
regime. Whilst the chances of HT actually overthrowing the regime and creating an Islamic 
state in Tajikistan are virtually nil, the regime continues to take a hard-line approach to the 
movement (as do many other countries – including the UK – who consider HT to be a ‘gateway’ 
to more violent groups such as Al Qaeda). The Tajik regime rejects HT claims of non-violence, 
often attributing violent acts to its members and insisting that it cooperates directly with the 
IMU.820 HT has been banned within Tajikistan since 2001 and hundreds of its members have 
been imprisoned for plotting terrorist acts or proselytizing extremist literature.821 However, as 
noted by the US State Department, many observers suspect the regime of using ‘HT or 
extremist labels to harass opponents, extort favors or financial benefits, or otherwise 
intimidate rural populations’.822 Local experts suggest that hard-line government repression 
actually enhances the appeal of HT, thereby ensuring its continued presence even whilst 
managing to contain the activities of its members.823 
 
 
7.2.3  Local Warlords  
The Tajik government has been fond of ascribing terrorist connections to local militants and 
warlords, in order to reduce their claims to legitimacy, excuse heavy government responses, 
and build up the terrorist threat confronting the state. Nevertheless, the Tajik commanders 
who resisted government control, relying upon their own security forces and local sources of 
authority, generally had aims and activities distinct from the largely foreign terrorist cadres 
plotting to overthrow Central Asian regimes. 
 
The literature on intrastate conflict includes many attempts to grapple with the ‘warlord’ 
phenomenon.824 Many conventional definitions are unsuitable for the purposes of this 
discussion, as they locate warlords in a fixed context of state collapse (excluding evolving and 
diverse state conditions) and presume a primacy of self-interest in warlord behaviour, 
neglecting the extent to which they act as protectors of their local communities (and thus 
acquire more legitimacy than the common conception of ‘warlord’). Both of these aspects are 
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vital for understanding the warlord phenomenon in Tajikistan. Therefore, this section utilises a 
fairly broad understanding of ‘warlord’ as a sub-state actor operating with considerable local 
autonomy and authority within a given territory, under conditions of fragmented central 
authority and a significant privatisation of the security function.  
 
In Tajikistan’s early postwar period, local warlords were pervasive and relatively powerful, 
given the dominance of non-state forces during the civil war and a central government that 
remained weak.825 Generally, local warlords were men who had participated in the war as field 
commanders and/or had played a key role in the protection of their local communities. They 
thus possessed arms, followers and access to illicit funding sources, which most were loathe to 
surrender following the peace deal – and in the end, few had to. Many field commanders 
retained their arms, followers and funds by virtue of being incorporated into the new political 
and security structures, whilst other local authority figures remained unchallenged due to the 
lack of government control over their regions. In both cases, they continued to exercise 
considerable local autonomy for a number of years, retaining the allegiance of fighters and 
constituents and their connections with fellow warlords. As noted by Nourzhanov, ‘A warlord 
in Tajikistan is not a mere bandit or a selfish politician with an organised military force. A 
warlord is a protector and a provider who is accepted by a community under pressure from 
unrepresentative government as a legitimate leader’.826 (At the same time, it should be noted 
that some former commanders generated popular discontent for their ‘selfish’ behaviour in 
the postwar years.827) 
 
The majority of local warlords were in effect co-opted by the government gradually over the 
course of about five years following the end of the war. Whilst continuing to pursue their own 
interests locally (including illicit interests, such as narco-trafficking), they by and large acceded 
to the government’s mandate and did not challenge the regime politically. This process of 
warlord neutralisation was, in fact, a key element of stabilisation and peace-building following 
the end of the conflict, as the pacification and reintegration into society of such conflict actors 
was necessary for future stability – even if obtained not through genuine reconciliation, but by 
essentially ‘buying off’ potential opponents with profitable positions and the spoils of war.828  
 
                                                                 
825
 Nourzhanov (2005); ICG (2001a), 13, 16-18. The situation in Tajikistan thus conformed to the now-accepted view 
among many scholars that a lack of central government control does not necessarily indicate a lack of governance; 
see Menkhaus (2010), 182-85. 
826
 Nourzhanov (2005), 126. See also Torjesen and MacFarlane (2007), 318-19. 
827
 Torjesen, et al. (2005), 13. 
828
 Tadjbakhsh (2008), 34-35; Torjesen and MacFarlane (2009), 53-54; De Danieli (2011), 140. On the ‘corruption 
buys peace’ argument, see Le Billon (2003). 
 215 
However, there was also a ‘spoiler’ category of local warlords: those who rejected the peace 
agreement outright. They were relatively small in number, indicating the general success of 
the co-optation approach pursued by the regime. One of the most notable was Colonel 
Khudoberdyev, reflecting general Uzbek dissatisfaction with the agreement as well as his 
previous experiences challenging the regime successfully.829 He joined an unsuccessful coup 
attempt in August 1997, then went into exile in Uzbekistan on the condition that his brigade 
and his constituents would not be harmed. However, this agreement was violated when the 
forces of another former field commander, Suhrob Kasimov, proceeded into Kurgan-Tyube and 
selectively targeted Uzbeks for retribution, reportedly beating, raping and executing a number 
of people.830 In November 1998, Khudoberdyev invaded Leninabad from Uzbekistan and briefly 
took control of parts of the city of Khujand. Again his rebellion was put down, and he retreated 
once more to Uzbekistan.831 Several hundred people were killed, including civilian 
bystanders.832 Khudoberdyev was most likely killed in Tashkent in 2001, but the circumstances 
of his death are murky, engendering rumours over the years that he is still alive and still 
plotting to unseat Rahmon.833 
 
The failure of the powerful Khudoberdyev, as well as a handful of other spoilers, to derail the 
post-conflict political arrangements augured well for the regime’s co-optation approach. Most 
observers judge that by 2001-2002, most warlords and former field commanders had been 
successfully co-opted or at least contained.834 In this way, the central government was able to 
slowly erode the hyper-localisation of authority and politics that had taken root during the 
anarchic conditions of the civil war (although even today, local and informal systems of 
governance remain strong in many areas of Tajikistan, and former warlords are key actors 
within them).835  
 
Over time, as Rahmon grew in strength, he was able to remove co-opted warlords from the 
regime if they became too powerful or difficult. They were often replaced by Kulyabi allies. For 
example, Ghaffor Mirzoyev, one of the most powerful former PFT commanders due to his 
leadership of the Presidential Guard and significant criminal enterprises, was arrested for 
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treason and murder in 2004 and sentenced to life imprisonment.836 (He was replaced by 
another former PFT commander from the president’s hometown of Danghara.) Many of the 
UTO commanders who joined the reconciliation government and security forces were also 
gradually forced out between 2001 and 2007; one of the last was Mirzo Ziyoyev, who returned 
to Tavildara in 2006.837 Ten years after the peace agreement, Tajik political and economic elites 
were more likely to be oligarchs and corrupt officials affiliated to Rahmon than former field 
commanders.838 
 
However, the relative quiescence of local power brokers in eastern Tajikistan has been broken 
several times in recent years, with serious confrontations between government forces and 
local warlords and militants in 2008 (Gharm), 2010 (Rasht Valley) and 2012 (Khorog).839 
Government operations have eliminated many militants, yet the regime has also frequently 
had to rely on deals with local warlords to restore stability (as when it arranged for Mirzokhuja 
Akhmadov, in the Rasht Valley, to track down and kill Mullo Abdullo in 2010-11).840 
 
These events demonstrate several key facts with respect to the security threat posed by local 
warlords. First, the Rasht and Tavildara valleys are not wholly and reliably controlled by the 
central government. Local authority figures in eastern Tajikistan might hold government 
positions and refrain from openly challenging the regime, but the government cannot assume 
it can exercise its will in the region.841 Even fifteen years after the end of the war the Tajik 
government must make deals with local commanders instead of directly exercising its 
authority. Thus, recent events must be taken as a corrective to the more optimistic 
interpretations of Tajik security from earlier in the decade. 
 
Second, it is apparent that local commanders in eastern Tajikistan are still capable of 
mobilising fighters and arms. As noted by Roche and Heathershaw, in discussing the 2010 
clashes in the Rasht Valley: 
 
The loyalty to the leader was such that former fighters agreed that they 
would go back to the mountains if their leaders should call them. This does 
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not mean that they were waiting for another opportunity to fight. More 
that they felt they had laid down weapons collectively and voluntarily, 
rather than been defeated. Such fighters feel dishonoured and threatened 
when government troops enter Kamarob for conscription and security 





Further, infiltration routes from Afghanistan are still apparently in operation. Taken together, 
this indicates that the low-level threat that currently exists has the potential to continue in the 
future, and possibly escalate. At the same time, it must be noted that most former opposition 
field commanders have now been eliminated, and the authority and connections acquired by 
militiamen during the civil war are fading year by year.  
 
In short, the continued existence of alternative authority figures in eastern Tajikistan 
undercuts one of the key tenets of modern statehood: the regime’s monopoly of force within 
its borders. Whilst a strategy of tolerating and negotiating with local authorities on the 
periphery of the state may indeed be a rational choice for a weak regime, it is a complex and 
risky strategy that may not prove sustainable over the long term.843 Local warlords in eastern 
Tajikistan are unlikely to depose the regime or launch a secessionist movement, but they 
generate continued instability whilst also sitting astride the vast flow of narcotics – and 
potential flows of militants – that traverse Tajikistan. They thus represent a critical, if currently 
mostly latent, security threat to the state. 
  
 
7.2.4  Narco-trafficking 
The expansion of the drugs trade within Tajikistan during the civil war (described in Section 
4.3.2.) was not curtailed with the peace agreement; if anything, the reintegration of opposition 
militias steeped in the narcotics business served to embed the industry within military and 
government structures.844 The official cessation of hostilities also facilitated the expansion of 
drug routes and the consolidation of trafficking networks. The return of refugees, in need of 
new sources of income and often having useful knowledge of cross-border routes and 
connections, provided a large labour pool of smugglers, and production in Afghanistan was 
booming. The removal of Russian border forces from the Tajik-Afghan border in 2005 also 
apparently increased trafficking volumes, as their Tajik replacements were poorly paid and 
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trained and highly corrupt.845 Much of the remote segment of the border in Badakhshan 
remains effectively unguarded.846 Narco-trafficking and its associated violence and corruption 
have infected the Tajik security forces and border regions, whilst also providing an economic 
basis for local militants and warlords. Some have gone as far as to call Tajikistan a ‘narco-
state’, demonstrating the pervasiveness of the drugs trade in the Tajik state and society.847 
 
Because interdiction rates are believed to be so low – from 2 to 10 per cent – it is difficult to 
estimate the size of the drug flow through Tajikistan.848 The UNODC estimates that up to 100 
tonnes of heroin – representing 20 per cent of Afghan production – transit Tajikistan each 
year, in addition to hundreds of additional tonnes of opium and cannabis.849 Estimates of net 
profits from the drugs trade range from several hundred million to two billion dollars, an 
amount equivalent to 40 per cent of Tajikistan’s GDP.850 In essence, ‘the trafficking route is the 
country’s most valuable resource’.851 
 
There have been several major changes in the drugs trade in the postwar era. First, the 
number and location of transit routes has evolved. For example, whilst during the 1990s the 
primary trafficking route between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan followed the Khorog-Osh highway, 
government counter-operations around Osh meant that by 2003 there appeared to be four 
major routes and more than a hundred smaller paths bringing drugs into Kyrgyzstan.852 Some 
of these routes were laid upon the paths taken by Tajik refugees during the war.853 Additional 
routes have also developed through northern Tajikistan, as shown in the map below. Finally, 
the growing organisation and official protection of the drugs trade appears to have funnelled 
transit routes through southern Tajikistan onto well-travelled highways and border crossings, 
as the low risk of interdiction – thanks to corruption – means that small, covert pathways are 
no longer as vital.854 
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The second major change involves the composition of trafficked drugs. Of the 4,000 kg of 
drugs seized in Tajikistan in 2011, opium and heroin comprised only 24 percent; cannabis 
(including hashish) made up the rest. The rise in the cannabis trade has been startling: it was 
not found at all within drug seizures in 1996, but made up 25 per cent in 2005 and 52 per cent 
in 2009.856 The reasons for this shift can be found within the dynamics of drug production in 
Afghanistan, where cannabis production has skyrocketed: compared to opium, cannabis is less 
likely to be targeted for eradication, is less labour-intensive, requires no precursor chemicals 
for processing, and is still highly profitable.857  
 
Third, with regard to the networks controlling the drugs trade, there has been a significant 
shift from the war years, when the narcotics industry was relatively open, freely structured 
and entrepreneurial. Today, the drugs industry is controlled by a smaller number of more 
structured organisations (perhaps 10-20), often rooted in solidarity group networks and 
operating under the protection of senior regime officials and the police forces.858 (This 
protection is evidenced in the fact that large seizures are increasingly reported, indicating that 
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‘traffickers operate with a high confidence level’.859) It is generally believed that Rahmon 
himself is not directly involved in the drugs trade, but its corrupting influences extend 
throughout the highest levels of his regime and the security services.860 Thus, the considerable 
efforts expended by domestic and international agencies to counter the narcotics trade are 
resisted by players who also exert considerable power and influence. In some cases, 
counternarcotics efforts are actually used by corrupt officials to target rival elites and 
networks. 
 
The drugs trade represents several obvious security challenges for Tajikistan. Its scale and 
profitability generate a host of additional criminal activities, including extortion and money 
laundering, as well as solid systems of corruption in the political and security sectors. (It should 
be noted, however, that high levels of competitive violence – i.e., ‘turf wars’, such as those 
plaguing Mexico today – are not associated with the Tajik trade; only a small percentage of the 
overall crime rate is officially attributed to narco-trafficking.861) Whilst enriching corrupt 
officials, the drugs trade subverts the institutions and key functionalities of the state: the 
security services are weak, the formal economy stagnant, and the rule of law moribund, thus 
raising significant questions as to the long-term viability of the state.862 The proceeds of narco-
trafficking enrich non-state armed groups, further eroding government authority. Narco-
trafficking also victimises Tajiks living near transit routes, especially along the border: whilst 
many impoverished Tajiks willingly participate in drugs smuggling, some living in the border 
regions are forced by Afghan traffickers to become couriers, with family members beaten or 
kidnapped to ensure compliance. Afghan drug traffickers also reportedly engage in kidnapping-
for-ransom and robbery of local civilians.863 This sort of victimisation also extends to the 
border forces, many of whom collaborate in the drugs trade not solely on the basis of bribes 
but because of the fear of retribution to themselves or their families.864 
 
The threat from narco-trafficking is unlikely to subside in the near term, given continued 
production in Afghanistan and the difficulties in halting the cross-border traffic.865 
Afghanistan’s drug economy is deeply and structurally embedded in that country’s political, 
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economic and social systems. To date, counternarcotics programmes have not addressed the 
fundamental drivers of the drug economy, and they are unlikely to do so in the near term, 
given the many benefits accruing to both powerful political and military figures and thousands 
of rural civilians.866 Within Tajikistan, the greater reach and capacity of the counternarcotics 
sector seems to have had as its major impact thus far an increase in the opportunities for 
corruption and profit-making (for example, more checkpoints and more police increase the 
number of people and locales for bribery).867 Thus, Tajikistan should expect to have to deal 
with the trade in opium and cannabis for the foreseeable future, regardless of the nature of 
the post-ISAF regime in Afghanistan.  
 
 
7.2.5  Organised Crime 
The narcotics trade receives most of the attention in Tajikistan, but this should not obscure the 
many other forms of organised criminality that occur within its borders. Organised crime 
groups engage in robbery, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, prostitution and other 
illicit activities, generally facilitated by hefty levels of corruption. As noted earlier, organised 
crime is now routinely considered an internal security threat when it facilitates actors and 
conditions that threaten the continued existence of the regime and impose significant harm 
upon the civilian population. Organised crime poses a security threat due to its use by 
terrorists and insurgents to fund their anti-government activities as well as the violence and 
instability that permeates border regions due to cross-border illicit flows (including armed 
clashes with border security forces).868 It also corrupts state security forces, leaving them 
unable or unwilling to confront the broad array of security threats facing the nation.869 More 
broadly, organised crime contributes to what the UNODC calls the ‘insidious erosion of state 
control’ by stimulating the creation and maintenance of parallel power structures that are 




                                                                 
866
 Felbab-Brown (2006). 
867
 IGC (2001b), ii; Latypov (2011); De Danieli (2011). 
868
 Makarenko (2002), 10; UNODC (2007), 33; McMullin (2009), 94. 
869
 Galeotti (2001). 
870
 UNODC (2010), 36. See also Williams (2003), 79.  
 222 
  
Table 7.1.  Typology of Central Asian Criminal Groups (UNODC, 2007)
871 
 






















































































































Table 7.1, formulated by the UNODC, presents the types of organised crime groups active in 
Central Asia and the activities they engage in; it is based on an analysis of organised crime 
groups in Tajikistan. Interestingly, Tajik criminal groups tend toward the larger and more 
organised end of the spectrum, compared to other Central Asian countries, partly due to the 
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mobilisation of non-state militias during the civil war. It should be noted that in many areas, 
there is often a distinct separation between groups involved in the drugs trade and groups 
engaged in other forms of criminality.872 
 
The chart demonstrates the wide range of criminal activities in Tajikistan and the corrupt 
structures of governance that they promote. As noted by Akiner: 
 
In the past, prospective Tajik leaders lobbied Moscow for backing. Today, it 
is the criminal world within Tajikistan that provides support for would-be 
political actors… The black market trade in Tajikistan’s main exports – 
aluminium, cotton and gold – produces huge wealth and has virtually 
acquired institutional status. Politicians, bureaucrats and warlords alike are 




Organised crime actors and their corrupt partners are a key factor in the ongoing weak 
governance and diffuse security functions present within the country. Their activities not only 
undermine good governance and security, but actually require weak governance in order to 
sustain high levels of illicit wealth creation and the patronage networks that provide status and 
funding. Thus, the convergence of interests between corrupt state officials and criminal 
networks has actually generated an ongoing form of stability within the country. As noted by 
Wiegmann, a ‘weak but stable’ state is not necessarily an unfortunate turn of events for a 
regime but can be something actively and rationally sought by elites eager to maintain their 
profitable status quo.874 In this, Tajikistan follows the example of many other countries 
(particularly in sub-Saharan Africa) in which corruption’s ubiquity and utility for maintaining 
reciprocity within and amongst the patronage networks that structure the state gives it a 
measure of legitimacy, and thus it becomes an ‘informal code of conduct’ rather than a force 
for destabilising the political order.875 
 
In this sense, organised crime is not currently a direct threat to the regime, but rather a 
symbiotic partner. In the long term, however, the corrupting influence of organised crime and 
its enervating effects on economic performance and social wellbeing represent a significant 
threat to the continued functioning of the state.876 Organised crime subverts the potential for 
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legitimate and profitable economic activity, reducing the ability of the state to fund its 
functioning via taxation as well as impoverishing the civilian population. In Tajikistan, 
organised crime actors are not merely concerned with profit via trade in illicit goods and 
services; they actually control or influence much of the licit economic sector as well, including 
its most profitable activities (notably, the export of aluminium and cotton).877 Organised crime 
is a key factor driving continued non-democratic rule in Tajikistan, as the transparency and 
accountability associated with democracy would limit the ability of corrupt officials to acquire 
illicit wealth. Finally, a severe political or economic shock, or renewed competition between 
political actors, could not be absorbed by a state hollowed out in service to the personal greed 
of corrupt officials and their clients. For all these reasons, organised crime represents not just 
a socioeconomic or legal problem but a key security threat. 
 
 
7.3  Internal Threats: Societal 
Contrary to stronger, more stable states, a very real objective for regimes in weak states is 
simply maintaining their hold on power and – in extreme cases – the very existence of the 
state. In such cases, anything that threatens the continued functioning of the state can 
reasonably be perceived as a security threat, in a way that does not hold true for stronger 
states.878 Poverty, for example, can be alleviated and contained in developed states, but its 
typical pervasiveness and unequal distribution in weak states can generate challenges to 
central governance as well as grievances leading to political unrest. Societal threats create an 
environment of instability and victimisation that facilitates grievance formation and can be 
exploited by the kinds of non-state actors considered in the previous section.  
 
From this perspective, Tajikistan has suffered from a number of internal security threats at the 
societal level in the postwar era. This section considers these from the perspective of the Tajik 
population itself, as illustrated in several key public opinion surveys. This facilitates a human 
security perspective that is useful in considering not only the levels of ongoing civilian suffering 
in the postwar era, but the likely sources of grievance and potential instability going forward. 
 
One very interesting study from the OSCE Counter Terrorism and Police Unit in Tajikistan, 
conducted in 2009, reveals a number of key insights.879 A series of focus groups in Kurgan-
Tyube, Shaartuz, Kulyab, Khujand, Dushanbe and Khorog identified the top ‘security concerns’ 
of diverse groups of local residents. For the most part, their top concerns were not those 
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already discussed in this chapter, but focused on the leading challenges faced by Tajik society 
and their potential ill effects for Tajik security. Table 7.2 consolidates the focus group results:  
 
Table 7.2.  Focus Group Security Concerns by Region (OSCE, 2009) 
Kurgan-Tyube Shaartuz Kulyab Khujand Dushanbe Khorog 





































The focus groups revealed that people perceived security threats as emanating not directly 
from terrorists, militants, narco-traffickers or neighbouring states, but from the conditions that 
could drive such actors toward more threatening behaviour. For example, a common theme 
was the fear that a large-scale return of migrant workers, in the context of economic crisis and 
government corruption, would generate higher levels of crime and extremism. (An exception 
was Khorog, where narcotics were directly mentioned – unsurprisingly, given the city’s leading 
role in the transit of drugs and the corruption of its border forces.) This focus on drivers has 
been backed up by other polls, notably those conducted by IFES and the Sharq Center.880 
Therefore, this section briefly addresses three key issues consistently raised by Tajiks as 
current security threats: migration, corruption and economic crisis. (Note that drugs and 
extremism are also cited in such surveys, but have been addressed in previous sections.) 
 
 
7.3.1  Migrant Workers 
Perhaps the most dominant structural factor in the postwar Tajik political economy has been 
the out-migration of up to 1 million Tajiks per year – or 15 per cent of the population – to 
Russia and neighbouring states, primarily for the purpose of work.881 The majority of these 
migrants are young men, and thus their absence from the country removes the primary 
constituency for criminality, militancy and social unrest, whilst also freeing the Tajik 
government from having to create jobs or social services for them. The remittances they send 
home constitute a large percentage of the Tajik GDP (42 per cent in 2010) and constitute one 
of the key sources of income for Tajik citizens (along with subsistence agriculture, barter, aid 
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money, and illicit incomes).882 In terms of the shadow economy, migrants also play a role in 
smuggling and trafficking activities in Central Asia and Russia; for example, 32 per cent of 
foreign nationals arrested for drug offences in Russia in 2011 were Tajik citizens.883  
 
Tajik labour migration began in earnest during the later stages of the civil war, when Gharmi 
and Pamiri men left the country to avoid ethnic cleansing and to find some source of income. 
This process accelerated as they found that even with the subsiding of conflict, their home 
regions did not have enough economic activity to support them and they were limited in their 
ability to work in other regions of the country (according to Wiegmann, most Gharmis and 
Pamiris were not allowed to work outside their regions until 2004).884 The scale of the out-
migration can be seen in surveys from the early 2000s, which revealed that two-thirds of 
residents in the Rasht Valley were dependent on remittances from migrants working in 
Russia.885 More recently, labour migration has also been driven by the desire of many young 
men to avoid compulsory military service, which features poor living conditions, low wages, 
and institutionalised hazing.886 
 
In recent years, however, the global financial crisis and associated downtowns (particularly in 
the Russian construction industry) has dampened the labour market for Tajik migrants and led 
to increased pressure within Russia to limit labour migration. Still, in early 2012, Russia 
estimated that there were 700,000 Tajik migrants residing in the country, or 10 per cent of the 
Tajik population.887  
 
Should economic or political circumstances force the return of most migrants, many fear the 
impact on Tajikistan could be catastrophic. The Tajik economy cannot absorb their numbers, 
and the state cannot replace their income (estimated at nearly $3 billion per year).888 The 
presence of hundreds of thousands of unemployed young men in a corrupt and repressive 
state is a virtual recipe for political unrest and exploitation by non-state groups and extremist 
movements. Thus, the inherent instability and unsustainability of the migrant worker situation, 
and the grave threat it may someday pose to the continued functioning of the state, are 
perceived as a major threat in Tajikistan today. 
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7.3.2  Corruption 
Tajikistan is one of the most staunchly corrupt countries in the world: in 2011, it was ranked 
152 of 182 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.889 
Corruption is not limited to a single sector, industry or political faction but rather pervades 
every aspect of political, economic and social life in Tajikistan. It is frequently cited as the main 
obstacle to reform and progress in the postwar era. 
 
A key driver of corruption within the security and police forces is low salaries, which are 
topped up by officers via bribes and extortion.890 For example, in Dushanbe, I personally 
witnessed a police checkpoint in action: cars were frequently waved over, cash quickly 
changed hands, and then the motorist was sent on his way. (My experience thus correlated 
with the OSCE’s field survey results that found, ‘On a daily basis the average citizen can look 
out his or her window and see a law enforcement officer taking a bribe for a multitude of 
reasons or for no reason at all’.891) This kind of corruption can envelop entire security 
structures, especially at the border. For example, at the time of my visit to the Sher Khan 
Bandar crossing (on the Afghan border) in 2008, a gleaming new customs facility built with 
Western funds lay unused, whilst dozens of large lorries surrounded a small trailer, waiting – 
as I was told by a frequent border crosser – for the right official to show up and receive his 
bribes for not inspecting their contents. I was later informed by an international organisation 
employee that the main reason for the delay in using the new facility was a dispute as to which 
ministry should control it – not surprisingly, given the substantial revenue that can be 
generated at a major border crossing thanks to corruption. 
 
Low salaries also drive another aspect of corruption in the security services: the payment of 
bribes to avoid compulsory military service. Brutal conditions in the barracks have made 
service so unpopular that temporary deferments are widely sought after – and thus, naturally, 
available for the right price. The combination of labour migration and corruption has left the 
Tajik state with so few available recruits that they have resorted to sweeps and press-ganging 
to fill the ranks of the army.892 
 
The Tajik government is also heavily nepotistic, with Kulyabis continuing to dominate key 
government and economic posts (although Rahmon has broadened his strategic alliances with 
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non-Kulyabis since the civil war era, partly in order to quell regional tensions and partly in 
response to new rivals from within his own Kulyabi political clan).893 The continuing 
importance of patronage politics means that there are real-world consequences of this 
nepotism amongst the population, with those lacking connections effectively shut out of the 
political and economic spheres. Thus, corruption acts as a mechanism for the preservation of 
status quo inequality and the grievances it generates.894 
 
This level of corruption represents a security threat because of the way in which it facilitates 
direct and indirect challenges to the state and victimisation of the population. It is the linchpin 
of the shadow economy and organised crime, including the narco-trafficking that has hollowed 
out state institutions and capacity, and thus of the non-state actors who rely upon illicit 
funding and connections to maintain their presence in the country.895 It stymies economic 
growth and inhibits post-conflict development, thereby perpetuating the ill effects of poverty 
amongst the population. It creates concrete grievances: the 2010 IFES survey showed that 87 
per cent of respondents considered corruption a serious problem and 58 per cent were 
dissatisfied with the government’s attempts to address it.896 The OSCE field surveys found that 
‘Corruption in the law enforcement agencies is widespread and very visible to the public. They 
know it is happening and they resent the fact that the government refuses to deal with the 
problem’.897 Such grievances contribute to the appeal of extremist movements like HT, which 
are built on a foundation of social justice and anti-corruption, as well as more violent groups 
like the IMU.898  
 
Corruption subverts the performance and legitimacy of official security forces, thus weakening 
the government response to security threats and encouraging the privatisation of the security 
function. It also leads to abuses of the civilian population, as people are forced to pay bribes 
for essential services or to avoid police harassment, or are coerced into participating in 
protection rackets. Finally, corruption amongst official and highly visible actors (such as 
government officials and police) encourages the spread of corruption through other sectors of 
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7.3.3  Economic Crisis 
Tajikistan’s postwar economic performance has been less than impressive, a situation not 
improved by the current global financial crisis. Already the poorest of the Soviet republics, 
Tajikistan was devastated economically by the civil war, with an annual GDP in 1997 only 40 
per cent of its 1991 levels.900 Postwar economic growth rates have been positive, typically 
ranging from 5 to 10 per cent per year, but given the drastically low foundation from which 
they started, Tajikistan is still one of the poorest countries in the world: with a per capita 
income of $862 in 2011, it is ranked 155 of 184 countries.901 Whilst the number of people living 
in poverty has fallen considerably since the late 1990s, the World Bank states that 47 per cent 
of the population lives below the national poverty line (2009 data), whilst 21.5 per cent of the 
Tajik population lives on $1.25 or less per day (a standard metric for impoverishment).902 
Official unemployment figures of 3 per cent are not credible; international agencies estimate 
real unemployment to be closer to 40-50 per cent.903 
 
Poverty is consistently cited as a major challenge and potential security threat for Tajikistan.904 
Not only does it provide a pool of recruits for criminal and terrorist networks and extremist 
movements, but it strains the functioning of state institutions and makes it difficult for the 
central government to fulfil its security functions. As noted by Phil Williams, Tajikistan – like 
other Central Asian republics – is a country ‘in which many of the needs of citizens are not met 
by government or by business, and where there is considerable capacity for alienation and 
subsequently violence in an attempt to improve conditions’.905 Poverty also contributes to 
poor education and falling literacy levels, which are seen by Tajiks as a driver of criminality and 
extremist movements. Amongst people who remember the Soviet era, when poverty was 
cushioned by the comprehensive provision of social goods and basic needs, the relative 
poverty and inequality in Tajik society today generates a strong sense of grievance.906 
 
The human security implications of the economic crisis can be seen in the country’s rising 
crime rates. According to the Tajik government, the total number of crimes committed in the 
country fell from around 16,000 in 2001 to 13,000 in 2006 – but then steadily rose after 2009, 
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up to 17,000 in 2011.907 The increase has been attributed to improved reporting of crimes as 
well as the economic downturn and lower levels of remittances from Tajik labour migrants in 
Russia.908 (In 2011, 86 per cent of drug crimes, for example, were committed by unemployed 
people.909) Thus, under broader definitions of security threats that include criminal predation 
of the population, Tajikistan faces a rising threat from criminality.  
 
In many ways, Tajikistan has outsourced its social services function in a manner similar to the 
way in which it has outsourced its security function to Russia and the United States. 
International aid agencies and NGOs play a significant role in providing and improving basic 
goods and services to Tajik citizens, including food, health care, housing, education, water, 
agricultural assistance and many other fundamental needs. Whilst this relieves the 
responsibilities of the Tajik state, in the long term it contributes to the continued influence of 
local and informal systems of governance, at the expense of the central government’s 
authority and legitimacy.910 Thus, the mechanisms for addressing poverty in Tajikistan are 
inadvertently undermining the long-term functionality of the state.  
 
Finally, a key economic activity feeding into Tajikistan’s security challenges is the cotton 
industry, which features high levels of corruption and the callous exploitation of rural Tajik 
labourers (including women and children). This continuing state of affairs inhibits Tajik 
economic development, drives the out-migration of the male labour force, and creates serious 
grievances that facilitate the spread of extremist movements.911 
 
In sum, there are a number of trends and conditions at the societal level that are of great 
concern to Tajiks as potential drivers of conflict and victimisation. Despite this, surveys show 
that Tajiks are thus far relatively complacent as to their overall opinion of the state of their 
nation. This apparent paradox can be explained, in part, by civilian victimisation, as discussed 
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7.4  Conclusion: Did Civilian Victimisation During the Civil War Drive Postwar 
        Security Threats? 
The central finding to emerge from this discussion of the postwar era is that the role of civilian 
victimisation as a driver of security threats fundamentally depends on which interpretation of 
‘security threat’ is being utilised. 
 
If one takes the traditional view that security threats are those emanating from states and 
external sources, it appears that civilian victimisation during the Tajik civil war had little impact 
on postwar security challenges. The one exception is Uzbekistan, who became noticeably more 
hostile toward the Tajik regime after Kulyabi attacks on and exclusion of the Uzbek community 
within Tajikistan.912  
 
However, under an expanded universe of security threats that includes non-state actors, 
civilian victimisation begins to acquire more relevance. I argue there are three ways in which 
civilian victimisation during the civil war may have contributed to the formation of postwar 
security threats at the non-state level. 
 
First, a key factor in civilian loyalty to sub-state actors in the postwar era is the dynamics of 
protection and revenge associated with attacks on civilians during the war. In eastern 
Tajikistan, a large measure of the authority and legitimacy that local warlords maintained after 
the war stemmed from their role as protectors of local constituencies – a role made necessary 
only because of the indiscriminate violence deployed against the Gharmi and Pamiri 
populations.913 At the same time, the enduring trauma of the war and the losses that were 
suffered at the hands of the current regime, in combination with local norms of blood feud and 
revenge, encourage loyalty to local authority figures at the expense of the central government. 
 
As noted earlier, the continued existence of local warlords in eastern Tajikistan remains an 
ongoing security threat to the regime. It is difficult to say whether such figures would 
command local loyalty even if civilian victimisation had not occurred at such levels during the 
war, but given that most grievances against the regime are rooted in relatively recent 
victimisation and maltreatment – as opposed to, say, longstanding historical enmity or 
centuries of conflict – I argue that enduring sub-state loyalties and their attendant diminution 
of state authority in eastern Tajikistan have been significantly increased by the civilian 
victimisation perpetrated by the PFT and the Kulyabis during the war. 
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Second, in examining the current dynamics of the narcotics trade and other non-state threats, 
it appears that the large refugee flows generated during the war contributed to the 
development of illicit flows in the postwar era in several ways. Some of the key routes used by 
narco-traffickers and militants were first established by refugees fleeing into Kyrgyzstan and 
Afghanistan.914 In the refugee camps of northern Afghanistan, Tajik refugees made 
connections with Afghan trafficking networks.915 Many of the Tajik drug couriers, in the early 
years after the war, were former refugees who continued to suffer economically and turned to 
the drugs trade for support.  
 
In short, the massive dislocation of civilians during the war facilitated the long-term growth of 
criminal and militant networks by opening up new logistical possibilities and providing a large 
pool of recruits. Indeed, according to one UNODC expert in Dushanbe, the primary long-term 
consequence of the Tajik civil war and its associated refugee flows was the creation of the 
organised narco-trafficking networks seen today.916 Whilst it is possible that transit routes 
could have been established without refugee input, and a large pool of recruits may have 
existed anyway due to poverty levels in Tajikistan, this connection between refugee 
populations and the development of trafficking networks is a frequently overlooked element 
that deserves greater attention. 
 
Third, as noted earlier, it has been suggested that one of the key reasons for the appeal of HT 
in Tajikistan is that a traumatised population is attracted to an ideology of change without 
violence. Thus, it could be theorised that civilian victimisation during the war is now 
contributing to HT recruitment. If true, this would be a significant finding, given the degree to 
which the Tajik regime considers HT a current security threat. However, there is not enough 
data to conclusively support this theory, and the relatively low levels of HT membership in 
Tajikistan (lower even than in Uzbekistan, which did not experience a civil war) further 
diminish confidence in the primacy of this factor.  
 
In sum, I argue that civilian victimisation during the war contributed – albeit to varying degrees 
– to some of the key non-state threats in the postwar era: warlords, narco-trafficking and 
(possibly) extremist movements. Civilian victimisation facilitated ideational dispositions and 
logistical expertise that such non-state actors could draw upon after the war.  
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Finally, civilian victimisation has arguably had a significant impact within the final category of 
threats – internal/societal. The death and displacement of thousands of civilians directly 
created conditions of poverty and insecurity for a large segment of the population in the 
postwar era, conditions which are generally seen by Tajiks today as the drivers of extremism, 
criminality and militancy.917 Ethnic cleansing and continued discrimination drove thousands of 
Gharmis and Pamiris to leave the country in search of work, creating an enduring and likely 
unsustainable migrant labour challenge. Systems of predation that were formed during the 
war – such as the abuses committed by new Kulyabi security forces against Gharmis and 
Pamiris – became the basis for entrenched corruption and criminality within the Tajik security 
services. Finally, the psychological legacy of civilian victimisation and the continued physical 
and material suffering within the population create a latent pool of socioeconomic grievances, 
one which may be exploited more successfully by militant or extremist groups in the years to 
come. 
 
This argument, however, relies upon an interpretation of threat in which poverty and other 
socioeconomic conditions may be considered security threats due to their role as drivers of 
more conventional threats like terrorism and political violence. It is an interpretation well 
supported by the literature on the political economy of conflict – and even by earlier events in 
Tajikistan. After all, whilst there were multiple drivers of the Tajik civil war, one key ingredient 
in its outbreak was the poverty and inequality amongst regions which engendered serious 
political and socioeconomic grievances. If one accepts this view of the causes of the civil war, it 
becomes difficult to argue that poverty and inequality in the postwar era should not be 
considered potential security threats. 
 
In sum, I argue that civilian victimisation during the Tajik civil war facilitated the following long-
term strategic outcomes: 
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Table 7.3.  Long-Term Strategic Outcomes of Civilian Victimisation 
External Non-State Internal/Societal 
Increased hostility from 
Uzbekistan 
Increased sub-state loyalties 
 
Increased socioeconomic 
grievances, leading to 
potential unrest/extremist 
recruitment 
 Facilitated transit routes and 
recruitment for narco-
trafficking 
Corruption of security sector 
 Enhanced appeal of non-
violent Islamist extremists 
(possibly) 
Migrant labour ‘timebomb’ 
  
 
This extended discussion of the security threats facing contemporary Tajikistan raises the 
question of whether Tajikistan could once again fall into conflict or be subject to state collapse 
– a question that is continually debated amongst Central Asia observers. The consistently 
gloomy prognoses offered by, for example, the International Crisis Group are countered by the 
apparent solidity of the Rahmon regime and of the networks of political-criminal connections 
that suffuse the country’s political and economic spheres. This state of affairs contradicts the 
conventional view that weak, impoverished and authoritarian states cannot maintain stability 
for long periods, but fits nicely into emerging debates on the nature of the state, sub-state 
governance, and whether state failure is a viable concept.918  
 
I argue that Tajikistan is not a failing state, but rather a quite successful criminal state. By the 
standards of Western democracies it fails its citizens and seriously risks its long-term viability, 
but viewed from the perspective of the corrupt and criminal actors that dominate it, it has 
proven a rather successful vehicle for the pursuit of personal wealth. The open question is how 
long this scenario might continue, and whether any number of severe shocks – the death of 
Rahmon, the return of migrant labourers, another Taliban takeover in Kabul – could be 
absorbed by the criminalised state structures or would instead destroy the functioning of the 
central state. (It should be noted, however, that unlike in 1992 the Tajik state now possesses 
functioning – if massively corrupt – security forces, which means any renewal of conflict would 
evolve along much different paths than in the civil war.919) 
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One key element in the current stability in Tajikistan is the complacency of its people with 
respect to the Rahmon regime. Public opinion polls reveal that Rahmon still enjoys popular 
support and faces few political challenges.920 A number of factors could account for this; the 
most often cited is ‘war weariness’ amongst the population and their belief that a strong 
central leader will forestall the re-emergence of conflict.921 In the context of what they have 
endured in the last twenty years, this is not necessarily an irrational choice, especially as it also 
offers something people consistently prioritise: predictability. A key (if often overlooked) 
factor in a population’s tolerance of suboptimal conditions is their preference for predictability 
and order, especially when recent history reveals the potential costs of political change.922 The 
2010 IFES survey revealed that 68 per cent of respondents were very or somewhat satisfied 
with the current situation in Tajikistan; 55 per cent of that cohort gave a reason of ‘peace and 
no war’ whilst 34 per cent offered ‘situation is not very good but can live’ as a reasoning.923 
The OSCE field surveys found that in Dushanbe, ‘For many, high levels of corruption, a low 
standard of living, and few opportunities for work are bearable as long as the conditions that 
were present during the civil war are never replicated’.924 It is important to note, however, 
that the regime has encouraged and exploited such anti-war sentiments over the years for its 
own political benefit (in other words, whilst ‘war weariness’ is a genuine emotional trend, it is 
also a political phenomenon mediated by the regime).925 
 
The centrality of ‘war weariness’ in future threat assessments is intriguing, because in many 
ways it is a euphemistic proxy for civilian victimisation. The antipathy of the Tajik population 
toward war is deeply rooted in the massive civilian suffering that attended their civil war, 
when a million people were driven from their homes, tens of thousands were killed, wounded 
and raped, and most of the country lived through years of anarchy and poverty. In the end, 
then, the most significant result of civilian victimisation during the civil war may be its central 
role in the popular rejection of renewed conflict – and thus acceptance of a repressive yet 
stable regime. In a sense, victimisation has thus created numerous negative long-term security 
effects whilst at the same time producing a large positive security effect in terms of mitigating 
the likelihood of renewed conflict. 
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However, no one can be certain how long this ‘war weariness’ will last. An entire generation 
that has no firsthand experience of the war is now approaching the age group in which political 
opposition and violence is most common. Political or economic shocks may also serve to 
overcome lingering traumas. At the present time, there is no reason to think that Tajikistan is 
in imminent danger of collapse or renewed conflict, but it continues to possess a large number 
of latent conflict triggers that must be carefully monitored.926 
 
In sum, it is clear that civilian victimisation during the Tajik civil war has had lingering effects on 
the security of Tajikistan to the present day. The next chapter concludes this dissertation by 
considering the implications of this and other analytical insights for our understanding of the 
character of modern conflict. 
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CONCLUSION: KEY FINDINGS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
It is a matter of constant debate as to whether the social sciences generally and rationalist 
analysis specifically can illuminate even the darkest and most brutal aspects of human 
behaviour in warfare. Can models and theories truly explain why individuals slip the bonds of 
their peacetime inhibitions and commit appalling acts of violence upon helpless civilians? Can 
five-step processes really capture the mechanics of revenge, greed and power that seemingly 
drive mass murder and displacement? Or are such transgressions actually beyond the remit of 
scholarly discourse and evaluation? 
 
In this dissertation, I argue that whilst we may never fully understand the reasonings of 
individual perpetrators, a combination of strategic and constructivist analysis, applied to case 
study evidence, yields a number of group-level findings applicable to non-state-actor 
victimisation during the Tajik war – and possibly a wider universe of conflicts as well. In this 
chapter, I aggregate these findings and provide conclusive answers to the central research 
question posed in Chapter 1: how and why did the Popular Front of Tajikistan engage in civilian 
victimisation, and what were the strategic effects in the near and long term? After addressing 
the findings relevant to the Tajik case, I then propose four additional findings related to the 
broader study of civilian victimisation by non-state forces. I conclude the chapter with a 
consideration of how these findings fit into the current state of research as well as promising 
avenues for future research given the conclusions reached herein. 
 
8.1  Key Findings: The PFT and Civilian Victimisation 
In this dissertation, I have examined in depth the strategic behaviour of the PFT and the 
consequences of its use of victimisation for the strategic outcomes of the conflict as well as 
longer-term strategic challenges for the state. Utilising the strategic approach, and considering 
in turn how and why the PFT victimised civilians as well as the evident effects in the short and 
long term, I have arrived at four key findings that – taken together – serve to answer the 
dissertation’s central research question. 
 
The PFT victimised civilians primarily via targeted violence, displacement and criminality 
In answer to the question of how the PFT victimised civilians, my construction and evaluation 
of a strategic history of the civil war lead me to conclude that there were three primary 
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mechanisms of civilian victimisation on the part of the PFT: targeted violence, displacement 
and criminality. In the first year of the war, PFT militias victimised civilians during attacks on 
kolkhozy and population centres, culminating in a frenzy of ethnic cleansing following the fall 
of Dushanbe. After being incorporated into government structures, PFT members continued to 
victimise Gharmis and Pamiris during military operations and through their construction and 
perpetuation of criminal networks and corrupt official agencies and security forces. 
Displacement peaked during the first year of the war but continued at lower levels during 
Phase II as well. 
 
These categories of victimisation were largely a function of the PFT’s strategic aims in 
combination with its capacity and capabilities. This is illustrated by considering the types of 
attacks that did not occur – for example, an attempt at the wholescale slaughter of the Gharmi 
population, which was neither necessary for the PFT to achieve its aims nor possible given its 
relatively small size. Forced labour, a form of victimisation seen in other conflicts, was not a 
significant issue as the PFT did not control productive industries requiring large inputs of 
labour. Abuse of civilians by the police forces during Phase II of the conflict was significant, but 
usually did not extend to mass murder, as it was more profitable to keep civilians alive and 
paying bribes and ransoms. In short, the finding that certain types of victimisation occurred 
and not others helps to establish a scope of PFT victimisation – and once the limits of its 
victimisation can be discerned, it becomes possible to consider the question of why such 
victimisation occurred. 
 
PFT victimisation was a rationalist strategy based upon the strength and weakness of 
normative, strategic and criminal incentives 
Having established the types and limits of PFT victimisation, the question of why the PFT 
victimised civilians can be addressed. My application of a multivariate incentives model to the 
PFT case study reveals that the normative, strategic and criminal incentives for victimisation 
were strong, and all but two of the corresponding incentives for restraint were weak (and 
further, that those two non-weak incentives were overridden by the incentives for 
victimisation). Thus, the PFT perceived victimisation as an attractive strategic choice for 
achieving its strategic aims as well as criminal and personal needs, and was able to construct 
normative mechanisms in order to override societal taboos. 
 
This is a significant finding because it illustrates the fact that victimisation occurred in 
Tajikistan not just because there were strong incentives in favour of it, but because the 
incentives for restraint that are theoretically possible in every intrastate conflict scenario were 
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extremely weak in this case. Thus, PFT victimisation was not solely the result of its own 
internal aims but of a broader strategic environment that failed to offer constraining factors 
(such as a strong state actor or pervasive legal norms) upon its behaviour. This recognition of 
the role of the strategic environment in victimisation – one of the benefits of utilising the 
strategic approach – remains relatively rare, despite its explanatory value.  
 
Civilian victimisation led to successful conflict outcomes for the PFT 
PFT victimisation contributed to a range of conflict dynamics: it polarised conflict actors, 
enabled militia-based warfare and the dispersion of violence, facilitated the acquisition of 
territory and resources, escalated the conflict at key junctures and complicated conflict 
resolution efforts. Overall, however, the most significant finding is that victimisation led to 
successful conflict outcomes for the PFT, both in winning the first phase of the war and in 
consolidating power and personal wealth during Phase II. There were very few aspects in 
which victimisation proved counterproductive, and these were significantly outweighed by the 
benefits. 
 
This finding is significant because it departs from both theory and case study derived from 
other intrastate conflicts, which generally depict victimisation by non-state forces as 
counterproductive – if not in the short term, at least in the long term. I suggest that PFT 
success may be attributable to two key factors. First, its adversary during the first phase of the 
conflict was not a strong state actor, but another non-state force – and one which also 
engaged in civilian victimisation. This mitigated the legitimacy effects that traditionally doom 
brutal non-state groups, and the fact that each actor had a more or less captive constituency 
also meant that protection dynamics could come into play. Second, the PFT was somewhat 
unusual amongst non-state forces in actually taking over the reins of power. Having captured 
Dushanbe and installed its then-puppet ruler, the PFT was in a position to embed itself within 
the government and enjoy all the perks of participation in a massively corrupt politico-
economic system. The surprising stability of this corrupt authoritarianism means that even 
fifteen years down the line, victimisation cannot be considered counterproductive for PFT 
factions (if not for Tajikistan as a whole). This is an important finding for the consideration of 
the utility of victimisation for non-state forces. 
 
Civilian victimisation led to negative long-term strategic effects, with one significant positive 
effect 
Tajikistan faces an impressive array of security challenges in the postwar era. Depending on 
the locus of threat perception – whether one focuses on state-level, non-state or societal 
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threats – the impact of civilian victimisation ranges from rather low to very significant. I argue 
that given a holistic interpretation of the pre-war factors that generated the civil war, it is 
necessary and also more accurate to consider the broad range of non-state and human 
security threats facing Tajikistan, in which case one must conclude that victimisation has had a 
large impact. It has facilitated sub-state loyalties, criminal logistics and corrupt systems, and 
most importantly generated significant levels of impoverishment and depredation that fuel 
many of the current security challenges (including terrorism, extremism, out-migration and 
economic crisis). 
 
This finding, whilst interesting in its linkage between overall threat perception and 
victimisation impact, is nevertheless not entirely unpredictable. It echoes the experiences of 
many other post-conflict states, where the effects of mass victimisation complicate peace-
building and reconstruction efforts. The more significant finding is that there appears to be 
one large positive effect of civilian victimisation: the sense of ‘war weariness’ and severe 
aversion to conflict that remains palpable within Tajik society. Despite the utter lack of 
reconciliation mechanisms, the continued authoritarian bent of the Rahmon regime, and 
severe levels of poverty and hardship, it is a virtual article of faith within Tajikistan that war 
cannot be allowed to resume, for the consequences would be too disastrous. Whilst there is 
no telling how long this sensibility might endure, it is notable for having lasted at least fifteen 
years already. This places Tajikistan apart from many other conflict states and leaves it thus far 
outside the ‘conflict trap’ mechanism (in which post-conflict conditions set the stage for future 
conflict). 
 
In sum, the central findings from the Tajik case study are: 1) The PFT victimised civilians 
primarily via targeted violence, displacement and criminality; 2) PFT victimisation of civilians 
was a rationalist strategy given an incentives structure in which the normative, strategic and 
criminal incentives for victimisation were strong and the corresponding incentives for restraint 
were weak; 3) Civilian victimisation led to successful conflict outcomes for the PFT; 4) Civilian 
victimisation led to negative long-term strategic effects for the Tajik state, but with one 
significant positive effect in the form of postwar popular rejection of the renewal of conflict. 
Taken together, these findings serve to answer the central research question posed by this 
dissertation. 
 
8.2  Proposed Findings for the Study of Civilian Victimisation 
This dissertation aims to contribute not only to analysis of the Tajik civil war, but to our 
understanding of the dynamics and effects of civilian victimisation by non-state actors more 
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generally. Based upon the Tajik case study, I would like to propose four possible findings that 
could significantly enhance evaluation of non-state-actor victimisation in other intrastate 
conflicts. 
 
It is analytically possible and advantageous to include criminality within categories of 
victimisation 
The distinction between political and criminal actors in conflict states is increasingly 
acknowledged to be an analytical convenience rather than a reflection of reality. As new 
models and approaches emerge that account for the essential hybridity of non-state actor 
motivations and activities in modern conflicts, it seems logical enough to expand notions of 
victimisation to include criminal predation and violence against civilians. Whilst criminality is 
often considered as a sort of backdrop to victimisation – part of the overwhelming fabric of 
misery within which civilian populations are embedded – this dissertation demonstrates the 
utility of bringing criminality to the foreground of victimisation analysis. It helps to provide a 
much fuller accounting of the costs borne by civilians as well as the range of instrumental 
incentives that non-state actors possess. 
 
A multivariate incentives model provides a rigorous appraisal of non-state-actor targeting 
behaviour in war 
Thorough engagement with the theoretical and empirical literature enabled the construction 
of a multivariate incentives model, which I applied to the Tajik case study with useful effect. I 
argue that it captures not only the essential dichotomy within targeting choices – victimisation 
vs. restraint – but the full array of influences upon a non-state actor’s perceptions of the 
optimal strategic choice. Whilst it is impossible to ascertain here whether this model is 
generalisable to the analysis of other non-state conflict actors, based upon my own immersion 
in the literature on intrastate war I see few obstacles to utilising the model in this way. 
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Table 8.1.  Non-State Actor Incentives Model: Restraint vs. Victimisation 
 
Category of Incentives 
 
Binary Choice Main Variables 
Restraint International humanitarian law 





Defensive threat perceptions 
Blood feud traditions 
Utopian ideology 
Restraint Legitimacy 
Strategic discourse effects 
Sustaining resources 
Strategic 
Victimisation Soft targets 
Prolonging conflict 
Passivity of civilians 
Territory and resource 
acquisition 
Restraint Protection function 
Economic inputs 
Criminal 
Victimisation Asset acquisition 
Status and control 
 
 
It is possible for victimisation to serve as a successful strategic choice for non-state forces in 
intrastate war 
As noted above, civilian victimisation proved an ultimately successful strategy for the PFT, 
most likely due to several unique conditions of the conflict. It does raise the possibility, 
however, that non-state forces in intrastate wars might engage in victimisation and succeed – 
something that is rarely acknowledged in current thinking on insurgency and civil war 
outcomes. I have seen firsthand, in consultations with British and American counterinsurgency 
practitioners, the allure of the belief that insurgents are doomed to fail if they brutalise 
civilians. Whilst still a very likely outcome, the experience of the PFT should be kept in mind 
when analysing the future potential of other groups engaged in victimisation, such as the 
Taliban and various Al Qaeda militias around the world. 
 
It is possible to isolate and evaluate the long-term strategic effects of victimisation in warfare 
I argue that this dissertation demonstrates that the strategic approach can and should be 
extended to consider the long-term effects of victimisation. First, the continuity between 
conflict and post-conflict conditions allows for this kind of extended analysis. If we reject the 
overly prescriptive view of conflicts as being neatly broken up into pre-conflict, conflict, and 
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post-conflict phases, and focus on the ways in which conflict environments are transformed 
rather than ended, it becomes possible to continue strategic analysis for some set time after 
the formal end of conflict.927  
 
Second, there is analytical value in extending the timeframe under consideration. It allows for 
a broader and more accurate accounting of the true costs of civilian targeting in warfare, 
whilst also revealing the degree to which contemporary security problems have their roots not 
just in ‘the war’ but in specific aspects of the way it was conducted. Imagine, for a moment, 
that the Tajik civil war had been conducted solely by small forces of armed men, with virtually 
no damage to the civilian population. Would we expect to see the same level and kind of 
security threats visible in Tajikistan today? Would Tajikistan still be so impoverished, corrupt 
and criminalised, vulnerable to attacks and collapse? Perhaps because modern warfare so 
often includes mass levels of civilian victimisation, these sorts of long-term effects are easily 
blamed on conflict itself – but as this case study shows, it is specific aspects of the conduct of 
modern warfare that generate significant long-term costs. 
 
Third, it is analytically feasible to consider the effects of civilian victimisation in the postwar 
era as the long-term strategic outcomes of civilian victimisation. Whilst it should be 
emphasised that causality cannot be emphatically proven across such a long time period, 
especially considering the multitude of factors that affect each of the variables considered 
here, it remains logical within the confines of the strategic approach to refer to the postwar 
effects of a strategic decision (in this case, targeting) as strategic outcomes. The change in the 
strategic environment from an official state of war to an official state of peace is of negligible 
impact considering the continuity of actors and overall security conditions.  
 
In sum, I propose the following findings with respect to the study of civilian victimisation as a 
whole: 1) It is analytically possible and advantageous to include criminality within categories of 
victimisation; 2) A multivariate incentives model provides a rigorous appraisal of non-state-
actor targeting behaviour in war; 3) It is possible for victimisation to serve as a successful 
strategic choice in intrastate war; 4) It is possible to isolate and evaluate the long-term 




                                                                 
927
 On the continuum of violence and the artificiality of pre- and post-conflict determinations, see Keen (2008); 
Cramer (2006).  
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8.3  Implications for Current and Future Research 
These findings are intended to contribute to ongoing research efforts to expand our 
understanding of how and why non-state armed forces victimise civilians in warfare. As noted 
in Chapter 1, much of the research dedicated to civilian victimisation focuses on state actors, 
or on aspects of non-state forces (such as culture) that I argue are not analytically productive 
in isolation. Thus, it is my hope that the findings and research frameworks contained within 
this dissertation might demonstrate that innovative approaches to this complex issue can yield 
additional empirical evidence as well as new hypotheses. In short, I believe this dissertation 
sits comfortably within current academic research – as it draws upon existing methodologies 
from within strategic studies, the political economy of conflict, and constructivism – whilst also 
creating new analytical stepping stones for the further examination of both the Tajik conflict 
and non-state-actor victimisation. 
 
Several areas of future research suggest themselves. Within Tajik studies, there remains the 
need for a full-length treatment of the events of the civil war as well as additional case studies 
of other conflict actors. Just as the strategic history and various typologies provided within this 
dissertation represent an additional layer of knowledge with respect to the Tajik war, I hope 
that future research will build upon this empirical content with further micro-level 
investigations of actors and conflict dynamics. Further, within Central Asian studies, there 
remains a need for more analysis of the impact of large refugee populations on security 
challenges. As shown in Chapter 4, displaced populations can become key strategic actors in 
their own right; given the ongoing dislocation of civilians and potentially large new flows in the 
coming years, this aspect of the intersection between victimisation and security requires more 
attention. 
 
With regard to war studies generally, there is a critical need for improved understanding of 
how criminality and illicit flows affect not just the initiation but the conduct of warfare, 
especially with respect to treatment of the civilian population. To the extent that criminality is 
considered within the context of warfare, it is all too often limited to evaluation of the ways in 
which crime funds war-fighting. The strategic choices of criminal militias and the impact of 
criminal incentives on targeting choices are seriously under-theorised, within both academic 
and policy communities, largely due to artificial analytical distinctions between criminal and 
political actors and dynamics. This state of affairs is gradually improving, however, as new 
approaches for incorporating criminal variables in conflict analysis gain traction.  
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Finally, it should be remembered that an improved understanding of the drivers and effects of 
civilian victimisation might serve a higher purpose: namely, a better understanding of the ways 
in which victimisation might be reduced. A further benefit of utilising an incentives model is 
that it helps illustrate potential pressure points where incentives might be adjusted and thus 
potentially reduce the appeal of victimisation as a war-fighting strategy.928 For example, civil 
society initiatives can help halt dangerous norm-stretching mechanisms; better understanding 
of the strategic discourse of victimisation can help avert escalation and retaliation; foreign 
interventions can provide sufficient security and policing to reduce criminal predation. Further 
research may demonstrate that applying the multivariate incentives model to specific conflict 
actors does in fact reveal larger and more nuanced preference structures than are currently 
considered, and thus improved access points for efforts to adjust their perceptions and 
behaviour. 
 
In conclusion, the purpose in investigating the dynamics and effects of non-state-actor 
victimisation is not limited to improved understanding, but includes the hope that new 
research approaches may yield insights and mechanisms to better counter and mitigate its 
occurrence. It is my hope that the Tajik case study and expanded analysis contained within this 
dissertation will contribute to additional research on non-state-actor victimisation as well as 
new strategies for inducing restraint amongst conflict actors in modern intrastate wars. 
                                                                 
928
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